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Re´sume´
Le de´veloppement re´cent des communications sans fil a` courte porte´e a permis l’e´mergence
d’une nouvelle topologie de re´seaux, connue sous le nom de MANET, signifiant “Mobile Ad
Hoc Networks”. Un re´seau ad hoc est forme´ par des appareils he´te´roge`nes et potentiellement
mobiles qui sont relie´s entre eux par des connexions sans fil a` courte porte´e. Ces appareils
sont conside´re´s comme des peers parce qu’aucun d’entre eux n’a de roˆle pre´-assigne´. En effet,
ils ne peuvent pas compter sur une infrastructure pre´-existante telle qu’un serveur centralise´,
par lequel ils pourraient interagir. Le de´veloppement d’applications sur les re´seaux ad hoc
soule`ve de nombreux proble`mes. En particulier, l’inhe´rente he´te´roge´ne´ite´ des appareils formant
les re´seaux ad hoc requiert le de´veloppement d’un protocole de communication ge´ne´rique que
tout peer doit utiliser. De plus, le manque de fiabilite´ des peers demande de nouveaux moyens
pour ge`rer la dynamicite´ de leurs connexions. Enfin, les re´seaux ad hoc offrent typiquement
une re´sistance plus faible aux attaques de se´curite´ a` cause de l’utilisation de communications
sans fil.
De´finir un middleware cachant la complexite´ induite par ces re´seaux est l’approche clas-
sique pour faciliter la taˆche des programmeurs d’applications ad hoc. Le de´couplage en es-
pace et en temps fourni par le mode`le des espaces de tuples (tuple spaces) apparaˆıt comme
un moyen e´le´gant et efficace pour de´velopper un tel middleware. Ce me´moire vise justement a`
expe´rimenter le de´veloppement d’un middleware ad hoc en utilisant un syste`me de coordination
base´ sur le mode`le des espaces de tuples. Pour atteindre ce but, nous proce´dons comme suit.
Premie`rement, nous de´crivons le projet europe´en SMEPP qui a pour objectif de de´velopper un
middleware ad hoc e´quipe´ d’un langage de spe´cification, appele´ SMoL. Deuxie`mement, dans le
but de choisir le meilleur syste`me de coordination sur lequel de´velopper le middleware SMEPP,
nous e´tudions un large ensemble de mode`les de coordination en tenant compte des exigences
de SMEPP. Troisie`mement, nous proposons un cadre conceptuel et son imple´mentation dans
le langage de coordination SecureLime. L’imple´mentation est constitue´e de deux parties: une
API pour le middleware et un traducteur de spe´cifications SMoL. Finalement, nous apportons
un regard critique sur notre prototype. Ce nouveau regard ouvre, entre autres, de nouvelles
perspectives de travail.
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Abstract
The recent advances in short distance wireless communication resulted in the emergence of a
new network topology, known as MANET, which stands for mobile ad hoc networks. An ad hoc
network is formed by heterogeneous and potentially mobile devices bound together with short
range wireless connections. These devices are considered to be peers because none of them has
a statically assigned role. Indeed, they cannot rely on a pre-existing infrastructure such as a
centralised server to interact with each other. Ad hoc networks raise many issues to be faced
when building applications on top of them. In particular, the inherent heterogeneity of the
involved devices requires a generic way of communication to be used by all peers. Furthermore,
the lack of peers’ reliability demands new means to handle highly dynamic connections between
them. Finally, ad hoc networks are usually weaker against security attacks because of the use
of wireless communications.
Defining a middleware hiding the complexity induced by these networks is the classical
approach to ease the programmer’s task. The space and time uncoupling provided by the tuple
space model appears as an elegant and effective mean to develop such a middleware. This
thesis actually experiments the development of an ad hoc middleware on top of a tuple space
based coordination system. To achieve this goal, we proceed as follows. Firstly, we describe the
SMEPP European project which intends to develop an ad hoc middleware which is equipped
with a specification language, called SMoL. Secondly, in order to choose the most suitable
coordination system on top of which we can build the SMEPP middleware, we survey a broad
set of coordination models with regards to the SMEPP requirements. Thirdly, we propose a
conceptual framework and its implementation in the coordination language SecureLime. The
implementation consists in two components: a middleware API and a SMoL translator. Finally,
we bring a critical point of view on our prototype implementation which notably opens new
work perspectives.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Peer-to-peer systems have become more and more common as a solution for a wide range of
applications. The emergence of such systems brought a completely new application architecture
where the usual hierarchy between application components is no longer relevant. Indeed, the
client/server model was the classical answer to distributed computing. Today, this strongly
hierarchical model is not suitable anymore in many cases, particularly in the field of ad hoc
networks.
The recent advances in short distance wireless communication opened up new areas of ap-
plications where mobile devices can collaborate using wireless channels [99]. Currently, these
advances are highly used in the field of personal mobile devices. Indeed, today more and more
people possess PDA or new generation mobile phones which feature wireless communication.
Owners of such devices have induced new communication needs resulting in a massive develop-
ment of heterogeneous applications trying to answer the demand. Furthermore, the appearance
of electronic sensors featuring wireless communication induces similar needs, for instance, in the
domain of home automation and environmental monitoring (especially in the field of nuclear
energy [99]).
A consequence of these advances is the emergence of a new network topology, known as
MANET [26] which stands for mobile ad hoc network. This kind of networks interconnects
several mobile devices (PDA, mobile phones, routers, etc.) and is not based on a pre-defined
infrastructure. For instance, a newly connected node does not know how the network is organ-
ised before effectively communicating with other nodes. Moreover, in such a network, nodes are
free to join or leave it whenever they want. Thus, the network’s wireless topology may change
rapidly and unpredictably.
The traditional client/server model does not fit MANETs in the sense that it is structured
in a strong hierarchical way. The peer-to-peer model [68] is more suitable for this kind of net-
works. Informally, peer-to-peer systems are based on the concept of resource sharing by direct
exchange between nodes. Those nodes are symmetrical and thus do not rely on dedicated nodes
to communicate. All kinds of resources can be shared: computing power, storage capacity, ac-
cess to physical resources, etc. [22]. This paradigm is the opposite of the client/server one,
where some powerful computers (servers) are used to provide services to a large number of
clients.
This kind of networks features many advantages [11, 22, 99]. We outline a non-exhaustive
list of the main advantages of ad hoc networks.
 Flexibility. Being based on non-predefined infrastructures, ad-hoc networks can adapt
easily to change. If some peers disconnect or new ones appear, the collaboration can
continue.
 Independence. Ad-hoc networks do not rely on servers or any central administration.
In this way they avoid to have a single point of failure.
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 Self-healing. Nodes can re-configure themselves to keep routing information updated,
for instance. Each node is also in charge of his own resources (power, data, etc).
 Scalability. Each node contributes to the network capacity. One does not need additional
resources to add a new node.
 Low cost. Getting started costs are really low, there is no need to install base stations.
The creation of temporary setup is then easier.
The main drawbacks are also due to those characteristics. Firstly, being so flexible and
independent, ad-hoc networks are often composed of heterogeneous softwares and hardwares.
The challenge is to find a generic way of communication which could be used on all kinds of
platforms. Another drawback is the lack of node reliability. Indeed, each node is free to leave
the network whenever it wants or whenever it moves out of range. Moreover, such a network
is usually weaker against security attacks because of the use of wireless communication. Of-
ten, this is worsen by the lack of computational power of the nodes to encrypt data. This
requires, on the one hand, to define a way to manage efficiently topology changes, and, on
the other hand, to secure the communications by taking into account the weak computational
power. Finally, each peer must be programmed in such a way that it is able to autonomously
manage, at run-time, its interactions and interconnections with its environment [22]. From the
point of view of a node developer, this is an overhead compared to the use of a more classical
client/server approach. To help the programmer in this task, one can think about defining a
high-level language for programming these aspects.
Some approaches tried to provide a way to reduce the impact of the above mentioned draw-
backs. JXTA [61] is the most famous one. JXTA offers protocols allowing a peer to publish
services, to discover other peers and to open/close connections with other peers. Unfortu-
nately, JXTA does not solve all the aforementioned drawbacks. It does help much to manage
the dynamic topologies of the network. A better solution for this problem is the specification
of a generic service model encompassing features which wrap the difficulties induced by ad hoc
networks. This model has to be implemented in a specific middleware designed to work on
heterogeneous hardwares and softwares.
As suggested in [51], “the specification of the internal behaviour of the components in a
distributed computation or application should be distinct and separated from the specification
of their interaction and dependencies. A coordination model defines the medium that the com-
ponents exploit in order to coordinate, as well as the rules governing the interaction between
the components and the coordination medium. On the other hand, a coordination language is
a linguistic embodiment of a coordination model, i.e. it is the language that can be used to
program the interaction among components according to the coordination model”. The first
and most representative example of this theory is Linda [50] which provides the basic high-
level blocks of coordination. One can use those blocks, by extending and composing them,
to build the aforementioned middleware. Despite the apparent elegance of this approach, it
raises a fundamental challenge. Linda-like languages are based on the idea of a centralised data
space which inherently comes into conflict with the definition of ad hoc networks. Indeed, a
centralised unit does not make sense in this kind of networks. This challenge is the starting
point of the research presented in this document, namely, to study the research made in the
field over more than twenty years in order to find an extension of Linda which fits the require-
ments of ad hoc networks. The analysis of the state-of-the-art of coordination languages led
us to select an extension of Lime, called SecureLime. The main features of this language are
mobility (using transiently shared data space) and security (using symmetric keys) mechanisms.
In order to experiment the result of this research, we had the opportunity to take part of the
SMEPP European project. SMEPP stands for Secure Middleware for Embedded Peer-to-Peer.
“Its goal is to develop a middleware that will have to be secure, generic and highly customisable
allowing for its adaptation to different devices (PDA, smart phones, embedded sensor actuator
systems) and different domains (critical systems, comsumer entertainment or communication).
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The key features of the middleware are groups of peers, service offered by peers or groups and
security concerns. Furthermore, SMEPP is equipped with a high-level language (called SMoL)
which allows to specify how to orchestrate a peer code. This language notably simplifies the
time-consuming and error-prone task of specifying the interactions of a complex peer-to-peer
system” [14].
Within the context of SMEPP, our contribution is to develop a proof-of-concept implemen-
tation of the middleware on top of a coordination language. This implementation has two goals.
On the one hand, it evidences the feasibility of the tuple space approach in the ad-hoc network
field. On the other hand, it provides a first prototype to simulate and experiment the SMEPP
service model. The implementation contains an API for the SMEPP middleware and a trans-
lator from SMoL to this API. This approach then provides a reusable code generator from SMoL.
To reach our goals, the rest of our master thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 details
the context in which the proof-of-concept takes place. It also provides more requirements on
the coordination language to search for. Chapter 3 browses the state-of-the-art in the field
of coordination models, keeping in mind the requirements elicited in Chapter 2. Chapter 4
describes the design and implementation of the proof-of-concept. It is subdivided into two main
parts: the first one dedicated to SMoL translation concerns while the second one dwells on the
middleware API. The latter has been published as a paper1 to the Workshop on Coordination
Models and Applications: Knowledge in Pervasive Environments in June 2008. Finally, Chapter
5 looks critically both at the implementation itself and at its context and foundations. This
chapter also offers perspectives for future work.
1Available in Appendix C.
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Chapter 2
Context
This chapter presents the context of our master thesis. As already mentioned in the previous
chapter, we had the opportunity to work within the SMEPP European project which intends
to develop a secure middleware for embedded peer-to-peer systems.
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.1 introduces the project and presents its
key concepts. Then, Section 2.2 shows two typical applications which are expected to be
implemented using SMEPP. This allows the reader to see concretely the target of SMEPP.
Having a good overview of the project, Section 2.3 then presents the SMEPP service model
which defines the basic communication blocks of the middleware. Section 2.4 gives the goals
of our work in the SMEPP project. Finally, Section 2.5 drives the reader to the coordination
language on top of which we can develop a proof-of-concept of the service model. In particular,
it details the requirements that the language has to meet to make the implementation possible.
2.1 Overview of SMEPP
The purpose of the Secure Middleware for Embedded Peer-to-peer Systems (SMEPP) project
is to develop a middleware which meets the new challenges raised by embedded peer-to-peer
systems (EP2P) for distributed systems. These systems are extremely vulnerable against inter-
nal or external attacks (because of resource constraints and the nature of open communication
channels). Moreover, application development of EP2P systems requires to compensate for the
disappearance of centralised entities and pre-defined infrastructure. One needs to abstract all
these problems by means of a convenient middleware. The main objective of SMEPP is to
develop a new secure and generic middleware which could be used in many domains from home
automation to nuclear plant monitoring.
SMEPP is a project funded by the European Union and is part of the “Sixth Framework
programme” (FP6). FP6 intends to contribute to the creation of an “European Research Area”
through the promotion of better cooperation between European actors. “Information society
technologies” is the second main priority of the Sixth Framework. The actors involved in the
SMEPP project are:
 Universita` di Pisa (Italy),
 Universidad de Ma´laga (Spain),
 Tecnatom, SA (Spanish engineering company),
 Technische Universitt Graz (Graz university of technology, Austria),
 Siemens AG (German company notably active in power, transportation, information &
communication, medical and lighting),
 Valtion Teknillinen Tutkimuskeskus (Finnish technical research centre),
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 Telefo´nica I+D (Spanish telecommunication company),
 Institute for Infocomm Research (information & communication research and development
centre in Singapore).
In the rest of this section, we give an overview of the SMEPP project necessary to understand
our work. Firstly, we overview the SMEPP service model which provides a framework for EP2P
development. Secondly, we introduce the security aspect of the SMEPP project. Finally, we
outline a specification language, called SMoL, which provides an abstract model of peer and
service behaviour.
2.1.1 Service model overview
In order to build a generic, high-level and customisable middleware, an objective of SMEPP is
to specify a high-level service-oriented model. This model provides a framework for the devel-
opment of interactions between peers. The service model features a set of abstract primitives
which can be used to develop peer-to-peer applications in a high-level manner. The basis of the
model rely on the state-of-the-art of web service technologies. For instance, a service signature
is modelled using the Web Service Description Language (WSDL [109]). Furthermore, ser-
vices behaviours are specified similarly to what is achieved by the Business Process Execution
Language (BPEL [78, 79]). The rest of this subsection describes the key concepts of the model.
Peers. A peer is the basic entity of a SMEPP application. Intuitively, it is a program inter-
acting with other programs of its kind, i.e. other SMEPP peers. The communication is based
on services which are offered by peers. One may say that peers are service containers.
Groups. A group is a logical collection of peers. It provides a secure communication envi-
ronment and a scope for service discovery. Groups are created by peers and they are kept alive
as long as they contain at least one member.
Services. A service is a set of functionalities offered by one (or several peers). Those func-
tionalities, or operations, can be invoked by other peers to retrieve information or to execute a
task. Note that a service is identified by its contract. This means that several peers can offer a
same service while each instance is located in a different place. In the SMEPP service model,
a service consists of two parts, its implementation and its contract. The contract provides de-
scriptive information on the service while the implementation represents the executable service.
Both parts of a SMEPP service are specified using the eXtensible Markup Language (XML).
The contract is modelled by using WSDL and the implementation could be modelled by using
the SMEPP Modelling Language (SMoL) or by any other language1.
The contract itself is composed of two mandatory parts, the signature and the grounding.
The signature describes “what the service does” by providing an abstract description of the
operations included in the service. The grounding describes “how clients can invoke the service”,
i.e. it provides information on the procedure a client has to use to communicate with the service
(e.g.: port number, protocols, etc.). Other information may be added to a contract such as
QoS information, behaviour description2, etc.
Once a service is published, it can be seen both as a service provided by a specific peer
(its provider) or as a service provided by the group in which it has been published. When a
service is called through its group, the middleware is in charge of transmitting the invocation
to a specific peer offering the service. This abstraction allows to hide the fact that there are
several providers of a same service.
Services are divided in two classes: state-less and state-full services. The former gathers
services which do not keep track of the past interactions with callers (e.g. operations can
be invoked in any order). The latter is the opposite: state-full services keep track of their
1In this case, it requires language-dependant wrappers to provide interoperability for the SMEPP middleware.
2Written in SMoL.
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interactions with clients. Moreover, state-full services can be instantiated by several sessions.
Further details concerning services are available in Section 2.3.
Communication abstraction. The SMEPP service model features three ways of communi-
cation. Peers and services can send and receive messages, events and faults.
 Messages are used to invoke operations. The service model offers two kinds of operation:
one-way and request-response. The former requires only an input message (which could
be empty). The latter requires an input message (possibly empty) and produces an
output message (possibly empty) as a result of the operation execution. Both kinds of
operation block the invoker until the provider has executed a specific action. Note that
the possibility of using empty inputs allows the creation of operations without parameters,
while using empty outputs permits synchronous operations which do not need to return
any data.
 Events introduce non-blocking communication. Peers and services raise an event and
continue their execution as soon as it has been signalled to the middleware. To receive
an event, peers and services “listen” to events of their interest. Note that an entity has
to subscribe to an event type before being able to receive it.
 Faults are the mechanism to communicate failures. Two fault types exist. On the one
hand, the middleware raises fault when the user does not comply with the service model.
For example, when an operation invocation fails because the caller and the provider do not
belong to the same group, a fault is returned to the caller. On the other hand, an entity
can explicitly return a fault as a result of an operation (in the case of a request-response
operation).
2.1.2 Security aspects
As stated before, SMEPP defines a security framework to enable secure communication in an
EP2P network3. SMEPP provides two domains of security.
 Routing security ensures that only authenticated SMEPP peers participate in the net-
work of a specific SMEPP application. One can see peers of a SMEPP application as
members of a default group which use a secret key to secure their communication.
 Group security concerns the access restriction to a group and the privacy of the commu-
nication inside a group. According to their credentials, peers are allowed or not to become
a member of a group. Once member of a group, a peer uses a secret key (shared by other
group members) which is used to secure the communication between groups members.
Furthermore, three security levels are defined. The first level is level 0, the “no security” one:
access to the SMEPP application and groups are granted to all peers. The second level, level
1, is based on the assumption that all peers share a set of pre-shared keys. There are two
types of keys: one is the key granting access to the SMEPP network, the other gathers the
keys granting access to groups4. Level 2 provides the greatest level of security. It is based on
asymmetric keys: each peer has a set of private/public keys and a set of attributes (in the shape
of certificates) granting access to groups.
The default security level of SMEPP is level 1. The credentials are included statically in the
SMEPP application. This implies that the set of possible groups is known in advance. Note
that the choice of the security level as default is notably justified by the basic assumption that
most of the authenticated peers will well behave5. This means that attackers in possession of
credentials of a SMEPP application are considered as exceptional cases.
3An EP2P network established by devices belonging to the same SMEPP application.
4Note that each group has an associated key.
5Note the detection of a bad behaviour of a peer is not (yet) defined in the SMEPP project.
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2.1.3 SMoL
The SMEPP service model features the SMEPP Modelling Language (SMoL). The objective of
this language is to provide a high-level specification tool to orchestrate the SMEPP primitives.
It allows to build complex P2P programs while being able to reason formally on the behaviour
of peers and services. For instance, [12] defines a transformational semantics of SMoL in terms
of YAWL workflows [107, 114]. Roughly, SMoL features usual constructions which one can
find in every programming language such as loops, conditional branches, etc. It also provides
some coordination-oriented constructions (e.g. InformationHandler) which allow to make the
most of the SMEPP primitives. SMoL is inspired by the Business Process Execution Language
(BPEL [78]). The SMoL language is detailed further, in Section 2.3.2.
2.2 Application examples
Before going further in the description of the project, it is important to see in a concrete manner
what are the objectives of the SMEPP project. This section describes two real-life applications
in which the SMEPP middleware is intended to be used (these examples are described thor-
oughly in [97]). It is the occasion to make the link between the SMEPP key concepts and the
future applications. It will also permit to elicit some requirements of the project.
Those two examples are typical applications of ad hoc networks, but such networks are used
in many other fields. We outline some of them. Environmental monitoring is a classical applica-
tion field for ad hoc networks. For instance, [19] describes a sensor network system to monitor
vineyards. Ad hoc networks are also used as an emergency response in case of disaster. For
instance, CodeBlue [63] is an architecture providing naming and discovery, robust-routing, and
security services, specifically designed to address challenges met in case of catastrophe. Another
emerging applications for ad hoc networks are e-health systems. E-health is an emerging field
which intends to gather information and medicine technologies to better meet needs of patients
and health-care professionals. MANETs are also spreading in the home environment through
home automation. Many commercial systems already make a house “feel” what is happening
inside the walls.
In the following examples, the first one is related to the e-health field and home automation,
while the second one is oriented towards environmental monitoring and disaster recovery.
2.2.1 Home systems and mobile telephony
This example is based on an existing application, SequiTel, which is an e-health platform
developed by Telefonica I+D [87]. This application provides telecare through a client/server
architecture. A residential gateway has to be connected at home via ADSL to the Service
Provider. Users can subscribe to different services depending on their needs (elders, pregnant
women, diabetics, etc.). The current system provides videoconference (for tele-consulting),
alarms handling, agenda management, home automation control and vital parameters reading
(such as temperature, electrocardiogram, blood pressure, etc.).
The main drawback of this system is that if there is a connection problem between the
residential gateway and the service provider, the user can not run most of the services. The
main contribution of SMEPP is to allow family members and friends to be introduced as “care
takers”, by using a peer-to-peer architecture linking together the “patient” and his/her family
and friends. Moreover, the user trust and service perception will be significantly enriched and
improved because the user relatives and friends may be directly caring for their elders, for
instance, in many non-critical situations.
With such an architecture, both telecared users and their relatives can act as peers and
can share services between them. They can create groups to share experiences or any helping
materials. One can imagine those groups can gather people undergoing the same problems or
situations (pregnant women, renal patient, etc). Members of a same family can create their
own group with all their relatives and friends.
Two main requirements are elicited:
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 the system has to be able to spread alarms through the peer-to-peer network (through
different topologies),
 the middleware has to provide confidentiality, integrity and authenticity in transmitted
data.
A set of services are proposed to be developed using SMEPP for SequiTel. The following
examples will help to illustrate the specification of the SMEPP service model.
 A Browser to navigate in the network in which the user is. It allows to access groups,
peers and their services. This browser provides two navigation modes. On the one hand,
the user can navigate through the physical network. The user interface shows the peers
with direct connectivity and the services they are offering. On the other hand, the browser
provides navigation through groups showing all peers belonging to them and services
offered to the group.
 Alarm notification to family/friends group provides a way to spread an alarm message
to the peers in the family/friends groups. If there are no connected peers in the group,
the system can send the alarm to the Telecare Center. Note this service needs to avoid
an intruder to receive the alarm without belonging to the right group.
 Emergency alarm from a mobile device. Devices such as PDA or new generation
mobile phone can include an emergency alarm generation function. In this way, users can
send a S.O.S message wherever they are and this message can possibly include coordinates
to know where the user is.
 File Sharing allows users to share videos with exercises, documentaries etc. through the
peer-to-peer network. In the current system, users can only download videos from the
central server. With the new system, a peer is able to download a file from several sources
(as in systems like BitTorrent) using the bandwith more efficiently.
 Tele-consulting. SMEPP improves the videoconference system provided by the current
system of SequiTel which does not have the quality required by telecared users and doc-
tors. Moreover, the videoconference can be extended to every SequiTel user (not only
doctors/supervisors). Users can also use different kinds of devices such as mobile phones
and laptops.
 The current Agenda is improved by adding the possibility of reminders or appointments
acknowledgement. If there is no online peer, a warning can be sent to the family/friends
group.
 Workflow. A data file containing the vital parameters readings can be, for instance, sent
to different peers, to the telecared user’s nurse every day and to his doctor every month.
Each user can write in the document to add comments or other modifications.
 A Chat application would allow any user to communicate with people in the same situ-
ation. Moreover, it could decrease the number of queries to specialists (doctors, nurses,
etc). Other similar applications such as a forum could also be studied.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the scenario of an emergency alarm6. The telecared user John Smith is
sitting in his living-room but does not feel well. He pushes his emergency button because he
knows the system automatically warns the needed persons. Mr Smith is connected to Sequitel
through his residential gateway (e.g an ADSL router). His son, Peter, is an assistant user,
which means he is a “telecare provider”. Both are connected to the Telecare Center. Once the
warning arrives to Peter’s phone, he can set up a video conference with his father to see what
is wrong. When Mr. Smith pushes the button, the system determines the best person to warn.
The alarm is spread through the peer-to-peer network as follows. If there is more than one
peer connected, the warning arrives to the nearest peer (of all the peers connected to Smith’s
6This scenario and the associated Figure are adapted from [97].
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Figure 2.1: Sequitel example.
group). In case no peer is connected, the signal arrives to the Telecare Center, provided that
the network is working.
Without a suitable middleware, the development of such a system would be tedious. Indeed,
in addition to the application itself, three main issues would need to be faced. Firstly, the
system will connect together different kinds of devices, such as mobile phones and desktop
computers. Thus, without a middleware, the programmers would have to take care of the
communication between devices from the physical layer. Secondly, since the application requires
confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of the transmitted data, the programmers would also
have to implement security protocols. Finally, programmers would have to face the transient
connection of peers. Indeed, peers can join and leave the application whenever they want.
Through this first application example, one can easily link the key concepts of SMEPP with
real life applications. For instance, each family member, friend and telecared user will be a
SMEPP peer in the new version of SequiTel. One can imagine that a group can be created
for each telecared user, gathering all his/her family members and friends. In addition, alarms
and other notifications could be modelled using SMEPP events. Moreover, services such as file
sharing or tele-consulting could be modelled using the concept of SMEPP service. Finally, in
such an application, security has a significant role. Indeed, malicious peers using the system
could endanger telecared user’s life. Access to the system has then to be restricted.
2.2.2 Environmental monitoring and remote control of workers
This second application focuses on environmental monitoring and remote control of workers in
industrial plants. Monitoring the effect of a plant on the environment is a key issue in different
application domains, especially in the field of nuclear plants. Indeed, in the nuclear industry, the
exposition to ionizing radiation is a risk present in daily operation and maintenance activities
for workers present in the plant.
Current environmental monitoring and remote control of workers systems are based on a
centralised architecture where a control room acts as a bottleneck of information and a potential
risk if the communication is lost or if the control room itself is facing some troubles. The SMEPP
middleware could provide a more robust and flexible architecture in which any “control node”
could connect to the network in a secure way (from almost anywhere). Moreover, the peer-to-
peer topology could provide a new way of communication inside team of workers.
Typically, the system will be composed of wireless sensor networks. Static radiation sensors
and environmental monitors (measuring temperature, air quality, etc.) will be deployed outside
and inside the plant to measure different environmental conditions. Furthermore, by regulation,
current staff working in nuclear industry has to wear a so-called dosimeter which measures the
degree of radiation received by a worker. In the proposed SMEPP application, every dosimeter
will be connected to a small mobile device (such as a PDA or a mote) with two goals. On the
one hand, it will enable a worker to monitor his/her dosimeter in a more advanced way. On the
other hand it will provide a wireless connection to a control node, in order to send the current
measurement. All those devices will form a large ad-hoc network which will allow a worker to
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Figure 2.2: Plant monitoring example.
know the radiation level in the area where s/he is. This network will be monitored by a control
node which will have a global view of the plant.
Three kinds of devices will form the system.
 Wireless sensors with compute capabilities to measure environmental conditions and/or
radiation levels inside or outside the plant, for instance, temperature, air quality monitors,
personal dosimeter, etc. Most of them will be tiny, low-cost and low-power devices but
some of them can be bigger and more sophisticated. This kind of node will alert other
devices as soon as they detect special conditions.
 Personal mobile devices (PDA, mobile phone etc.) connected to dosimeters worn by
plant’s staff. These devices allow a worker to check his/her personal radiation level as
well as the radiation level present in nearby areas.
 Supervisor nodes are computers being able to monitor the whole network and supervise
other workers. The software running on these computers will be able to display informa-
tion about the network, to communicate with workers (through audio/video conference)
and to dynamically set alarm levels in dosimeters.
Figure 2.2 (taken from [97]) shows a view inside the plant. Sensor nodes are deployed in the
building and they are also carried by workers. Some workers have a PDA providing audio and
video to interact with their co-workers. Furthermore, the figure shows several supervisor nodes
that can interact with the system, both inside or outside the building.
The main requirements of the proposed system are:
 Real-time. Each device must be able to send information in (almost) real-time.
 Devices. The system can be composed of different kinds of devices and communication
technologies. The middleware must provide heterogeneity in this way.
 Confidentiality. Provided the criticity of the domain, the data must be protected.
 Absence of supervisor node. The system must be able to work without a supervisor
node.
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 Authentication. Since nodes carried by workers will appear and disappear dynamically,
the system has to provide a way to authenticate them automatically (i.e. without any
intervention of the worker).
As in the first application example, the SMEPP team proposes several kinds of services to
enrich the system. They are divided according to the kind of devices they are designed for.
The following gives a non-exhaustive list of services which could be offered by using SMEPP.
 Sensor nodes.
– Data transmission. Theses nodes must be able to transmit data to other nodes in
the network.
– Transmission rate. The nodes should allow supervisor nodes to configure transmis-
sion rate. For instance, in case of radiation sensors carried by worker, the rate may
be one sample per second.
– Configuration. Where possible, these sensors should be configurable by a supervisor
node without physical contact to the device.
 Worker nodes.
– Alarm self-notification. Worker nodes must notify their user about an alarm when
the alarm level reaches risky conditions.
– Alarm notification to supervisor. When a sensor detects abnormal measurement, it
must be able to send an alarm to supervisor nodes.
– Alarm notification to nearby worker nodes. When a sensor node (either static or
carried by a worker) reaches an alarm level that can affect other workers, the system
sends the warning to the active nodes of the nearby zones. It can then help to save
seconds by warning a peer which is closer to the problem.
– Alarm reception from supervisor node. The node will inform the user that an alarm
is received from the supervisor that affects him/her.
– Alarm reception from nearby nodes. This is the dual of the third services, the system
must be clever enough to handle alarm in a efficient way (filtering low relevance ones
for instance).
 Supervisor nodes.
– Browser to navigate through the network and check other nodes status.
– Real-time dose/rate information about workers and nodes.
– Programming alarm levels in nodes.
– Automatic notification to workers reaching alarm levels through audio or vibration.
– Worker management. Self-identification, through dosimeter’s identifier for instance.
– Environmental conditions map. Map of environmental conditions inside and outside
the plant.
– Time-out alarm. When a node in the network does not transmit information for a
certain period of time, an alarm is displayed to the user.
– Dose/Rate map to show graphically the situation in the plant.
Similarly to the first example, the implementation of such an application is really hard without a
suitable middleware. Notably because of the heterogeneity of the nodes (PDA, laptop/desktop
and sensors) and the need for security. Furthermore, the system has to be very robust. It
requires tried and tested means of communication between nodes.
Although this application is quite different from the first one, it still features common links
with SMEPP key concepts. We find again the concepts of alarm and notification which can
be modelled by events in the SMEPP service model. Remote configuration of nodes can be
implemented by services, providing different operations for different types of configuration.
Security is even more important in such a critical application.
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2.3 SMEPP service model
2.3.1 Primitives
In order to provide a simple and high-level service model to ease the development of peer-to-
peer application, SMEPP has defined a service model featuring a set of abstract primitives.
Intuitively, those primitives are the basic blocks to define SMEPP programs (either a peer code
or a service code). Figure 2.3 summarises them.
Note that some primitives can only be called by peer codes. Consequently, the middleware
has to know whether the caller is a peer or a service (and, if needed, prevent the execution of
the primitive). In that aim, each caller has an identifier and each type of entity has a different
type of identifier. Peers identifiers are peerIds, services are identified by their peerServiceId
and groupServiceId and sessions are identified by thier sessionId.
In the following, we shall use the following syntax to define the primitives.
output name(input1,..., inputn) throws exception exception1, ..., exceptionn
Where name is the name of the primitive,
output is the type of the output parameter,
inputk is the kth input parameter,
exceptionk is an exception throwable by the primitive,
par? denotes an optional parameter,
par[] denotes an array.
In the rest of this subsection, we present the SMEPP primitives as follows. We start by
the peer management related primitives. Then, we present the primitives used to manage
groups. The following part introduces the SMEPP service management and the corresponding
primitives. The two last parts concern the communication by using messages and events.
Peer management
In the SMEPP service model, peer management is achieved by using three primitives. NewPeer()
provides an operation for a program to become a SMEPP peer, getPeerId() allows a SMEPP
entity to retrieve a peer identifier and getPeers() returns a list containing the identifiers of
the members of a group.
NewPeer
peerId newPeer(credentials) throws exception invalidCall
To become a SMEPP peer, a program has to call the newPeer() primitive. This call will return
a peerId, a peer identifier given by the middleware, provided the credentials authenticate actu-
ally the peer7. Otherwise, the invalidCredentials exception is raised8 and the access to the
SMEPP application is refused. Furthermore, only a peer code is allowed to call this primitive.
When called by a service code, the primitive raises an invalidCall exception.
Example: In the context of the plant monitoring application, this primitive may be used to au-
thenticate nodes carried by workers. Thus, only nodes having the right credentials have access to the
application.
GetPeerId
peerId getPeerId(id?) throws exception invalidId
where id is either a peerServiceId or a sessionId.
If an id is specified, this primitive returns the identifier of the peer offering the service identified
by id. Otherwise, the primitive returns the peerId of the caller peer. If the middleware cannot
find an entity corresponding to id, invalidId is raised.
Example: This primitive is more “technical”, it allows a service or a peer code to know the provider
of a service or its own identifier.
7Subsequent invocations to newPeer() returns the same peerId.
8See FaultHandler command in Subsection 2.3.2.
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Peer Management:
peerId newPeer(credentials)
peerId getPeerId(id?)
peerId[] getPeers(groupId)
Group Management:
groupId createGroup(groupDescription)
groupId[] getGroups(groupDescription?)
groupDescription getGroupDescription(groupId)
void joinGroup(groupId, credentials)
void leaveGroup(groupId)
groupId[] getIncludingGroups()
groupId getPublishingGroup(id?)
Service Management:
<groupServiceId, peerServiceId> publish(groupId, serviceContract)
void unpublish(peerServiceId)
<groupId, groupServiceId, peerServiceId>[] getServices(groupId?, peerId?, serviceContract?,
maxResults?, credentials)
serviceContract getServiceContract(id)
sessionId startSession(serviceId)
Message Handling:
output? invoke(entityId, operationName, input?)
<callerId, input?> receiveMessage(groupId?, operationName)
void reply(callerId, operationName, output?, faultName?)
Event Handling:
void subscribe(eventName?, groupId?)
void unsubscribe(eventName?, groupId?)
void event(groupId?, eventName, input?)
<callerId, input?> receiveEvent(groupId?, eventName)
Figure 2.3: SMEPP Primitives.
GetPeers
peerId[] getPeers(groupId) throws exception invalidGroupId, callerNotInGroup
getPeers() returns the list of peer members of the groupId group. If no groupId group can
be found, the primitive raises an invalidGroupId. As its name implies, callerNotInGroup is
raised when the caller is not a member of groupId.
Example: This primitive could be notably used to implement a network browser in the telecare
application. It provides a list of member identifiers, which in turn can be used to browse services.
Group management
A SMEPP peer can create, join, leave and discover groups. There are primitives for each of
those functionalities. Note that access to groups is restricted, a peer needs to have the right
credentials to become a group member. Furthermore, a peer may join several groups. It is
important to point out that group creation, joining and leaving can only be managed by peer
code (i.e. not by service code). That is why each of the corresponding primitive raises an
invalidCall exception when called by a service code.
CreateGroup
groupId createGroup(groupDescription) throws exception invalidCall
To create a new group, a peer calls createGroup(). The groupDescription parameter has to
contain, at least, the name of the group. Optionally, the creator can add information such as a
textual group description. Remember that each group has an associated key to restrict access
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to it9. Furthermore, the service model allows several groups to have the same name. They are
only identified by the groupId returned by the middleware.
Example: In the telecare application, this primitive would permit a telecare user to create a group
for all his/her family and friends. Then, they could communicate with each other in a secure fashion.
JoinGroup
void joinGroup(groupId, credentials) throws exception accessDenied, invalidGroupId,
invalidCall
Peers use this primitive to become member of a groupId group. If the credentials actually
authenticate the peer (it matches the security level of the group) and if the group exists, the
access is granted. Otherwise, corresponding exceptions are raised. Note that several calls to
join the same group do not raise an exception.
Example: In the same vein as the previous primitive, this primitive would be used to allow family
members or friends to join the group created by a telecared user.
LeaveGroup
void leaveGroup(groupId) throws exception invalidGroupId, peerNotInGroup, invalid-
Call
Peers use the leaveGroup() primitive to exit a groupId group. If the peer published services
in this group, all of them are automatically removed from it by the middleware.
Example: When a relative or a friend does not want to take part of the user’s undertaking anymore,
s/he can leave the group. Then, s/he does not provide any service to other users anymore.
GetGroups
groupId[] getGroups(groupDescription?)
This primitive is used by peers and services to discover groups available in the SMEPP appli-
cation. It returns a list of group identifiers. The parameter can be used to retrieve only groups
matching certain characteristics (e.g. group name, security level, etc.).
Example: Still in the context of the telecare application, let’s say there exist groups for pregnant
women, diabetic persons, renal patients etc. Those groups serve to exchange information between
patients in the same condition. The primitive may be used by a new user who wants to discover groups
of his/her interest (specifying key words, group name etc.).
GetGroupDescription
groupDescription getGroupDescription(groupId) throws exception invalidGroupId
Peers call this primitive to get more information about a group. The groupDescription object
contains the information the group creator has provided at the creation time.
Example: Following the previous example, this primitive may be used to get additional information
on a particular group.
GetIncludingGroups
groupId[] getIncludingGroups() throws exception invalidCall
getIncludingGroups() returns an array containing the group identifiers of the groups the
caller peer belongs to.
Example: Any user of the telecare application could call this primitive to know in which groups
s/he is currently active.
GetPublishingGroup
groupId getPublishingGroup(id?) throws exception invalidId, invalidCall
where id is either groupServiceId, peerServiceId or sessionId
The behaviour of this primitive depends on whether it is called by a service or by a peer. Called
9In security level 1.
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by a service, without parameter, the primitive returns the group in which the (caller) service is
published. Called by a peer or a service, id specified, the primitive returns the group in which
the service corresponding to id is published. The primitive raises an invalidCall exception
when no id is provided and the caller is a peer.
Example: This primitive provides a mean for a service to know in which group it has been pub-
lished.
Service management
Services are published by peers into groups by using the publish() primitive. Once a service
is published, it is visible both as a “peer service” and as a “group service”. As explained in
Subsection 2.1.1, callers use peer services when they want to interact directly with a particular
peer. They use group services when they want to invoke “blindly” a service, this means without
knowing the actual provider. Moreover, the service’s visibility inherits from the group in which
it is published. Thus, a peer can only discover services published in groups to which it has
access.
The SMEPP service model specifies two kinds of services: state-less and state-full. State-
less services do not keep track of the past interactions with clients, while state-full ones do.
For instance, a radiation monitoring service can be modelled by a state-less service, one does
not need to keep track of interactions to offer this kind of information. State-full services are
divided into session-less and session-full services.
 Session-less services are services which have only one communication channel, shared
by all clients. This communication channel is active as soon as the service is published
and dies with the removal of the service. For instance, a virtual blackboard where every
client can write at anytime could be implemented by using a session-less service.
 Session-full services support multiple channels. Each client has to open a new channel
(using the startSession() primitive) before actually interacting with the service. Clients
can also share their channel with others (by giving the session identifier to other clients).
Figure 2.4 (taken from [98]) illustrates the three types of services. The left-hand side of the
picture shows a state-less service, where clients interact through their own channel. The right-
hand side presents three clients interacting with a session-full service. Two clients share a
channel while the last one has its own channel. The bottom of the picture illustrates a session-
less service, two clients interact with it, using one shared channel.
In the following, we give the five primitives which allow to manage services.
Publish
<groupServiceId, peerServiceId> publish(grouId, serviceContract) throws exception
invalidService, invalidGroupId, peerNotInGroup, invalidCall
This primitive is used by peers to publish a service into a group (groupId). The serviceContract
parameter is the service contract which notably contains the signature and the grounding of the
service. The primitive returns two identifiers corresponding to the two ways a service can be
invoked. groupServiceId stands for the identifier to invoke the service as a “group service”,
while peerServiceId is the identifier for the invocation as a “peer service”. Note that if two
peers publish two services with the same contract in the same group, the middleware has to
return the same groupServiceId. Furthermore, the “republishing” of a service does not raise
an exception. A call to the primitive raises invalidService if the contract does not correspond
to a valid service. Other throwable exceptions are straightforward. InvalidGroupId is raised
when no groupId can be found and peerNotInGroup is raised when the caller is not member
of groupId. Remember that a service code cannot call publish().
Example: In the context of the plant monitoring application, this primitive may be used by a
worker node to provide a service which allows the node to be configured remotely. For instance, this
service would exhibit an operation for each editable configuration details.
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Figure 2.4: Service types.
Unpublish
void unpublish(peerServiceId) throws exception invalidServiceId, peerNotService-
Owner, invalidCall
Unpublish() is the dual of publish(), it removes the service from the list of discoverable ser-
vices inside a group. Exceptions are raised if peerServiceId does not exist, if the caller is not
the service owner or if the caller is a service code.
Example: In the telecare application, unpublish() may be used by a doctor when s/he finishes
her/his working day. For instance, if the doctor offers a teleconsulting service from 8:00 a.m. to 17:00
p.m., the service may be unpublished at 17:00 p.m.
GetServices
<groupId, groupServiceId, peerServiceId>[] getServices(groupId?, peerId?, service-
Contract?, maxResult?, credentials) throws exception invalidGroupId, invalidPeerId,
invalidService
Services discovery is done by using getServices(). The credentials parameter serves to
match the security level of SMEPP groups in which services are published. All the other pa-
rameters are optional, the output of the primitive is filtered to match them. The primitive raises
exceptions when the specified identifiers do not exist or when the provided service contract is
not valid.
Example: Following the previous example, this primitive may be used by patients to discover which
services a doctor offers.
GetServiceContract
serviceContract getServiceContract(id) throws exception invalidId
where id is either groupServiceId, peerServiceId or sessionId
Entities call getServiceContract() to retrieve the service contract of a service corresponding
to id.
Example: Let’s say a user has retrieved all the service identifiers corresponding to her/his doctor.
By using this primitive, the user can get enough information to actually invoke the service.
StartSession
sessionId startSession(serviceId) throws exception invalidServiceId, accessDenied,
cannotStartSession
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where entityId is either groupServiceId, peerServiceId of a session-full service
A communication channel, or session is created with startSession(). It returns an identi-
fier of the session, which can be used by the caller to communicate with an instance of the
service. Sessions can be shared among peers at the application level. Furthermore, a peer
can interact with a service using multiple sessions. If the caller specifies a groupServiceId,
the middleware has to choose an actual provider (peerServiceId) and then starts a session
with it. The invalidServiceId exception is raised when no corresponding service can be
found, accessDenied when the caller and the provider do not belong to the same group and
cannotStartSession when the provider cannot start a new session (e.g. if the maximum num-
ber of open sessions has been reached).
Example: This primitive may be used in the chat service of the telecare application. For instance
the chat program could permit both public and private discussions. Starting a session would correspond
to create a new private channel between two users.
Message handling
In SMEPP, messages are used to invoke service operations. The model features two kinds of
operation. One-way operations take only input parameters, while request-response operations
return a result to the caller.
Basically, the invocation of an operation is done as follows. Firstly, the caller sends a
message, containing the (possibly empty) input parameters via the invoke() primitive. Then,
the provider calls receiveMessage() in order to retrieve the input parameters. Finally, if the
operation is “request-response”, the provider returns the result by using reply(). Note that
the provider could call receiveMessage() before the caller calls invoke(). In that case, the
provider’s program would be blocked until a corresponding message can be retrieved.
The three primitives are detailed below. Regarding the caller program, if the opera-
tion type is one-way, it will be blocked until the provider makes a corresponding call to
receiveMessage(). If the operation type is request-response, the caller is blocked until it
gets the result (i.e. when the provider calls the corresponding reply().
It is also important to note that the model does not allow a same entity to execute a same
concurrent request-response operation of a same provider (except if it is managed by different
sessions).
Invoke
output? invoke(entityId, operationName, input?) throws exception invalidPeerId,
invalidServiceId, invalidOperation, concurrentRequest, invalidInputParameter, invalid-
OuputParameter, accessDenied
where entityId is either peerServiceId, groupServiceId, sessionId or peerId
Entities use invoke() to call operations (identified by operationName) of a provider (identified
by entityId). Invoke() imposes the following restrictions:
 If the invoked service is state-less, entityId must be either groupServiceId or peerServiceId.
 If the invoked service is session-less, entityId must be peerServiceId. Note entityId
cannot be a groupServiceId since a state-full service10 keeps track of past interactions
and the middleware does not guarantee the same provider will be chosen between two
invocations specifying the same groupServiceId identifier.
 If the invoked service is session-full, entityId must be sessionId, since session-full
services can only be called through sessions.
Note that entityId can be a peerId identifier (direct interaction with the peer code). Further-
more, the model makes the assumption that operations offered directly by peers are one-way.
In the other cases, the middleware identifies the operation type from the service contract.
Regarding exceptions, invalidPeerId, invalidServiceId and invalidOperation are raised
when the corresponding object cannot be found. ConcurrentRequest is raised when the caller is
10Remember that session-less and session-full services are both state-full services.
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already calling this operation on this provider. AccessDenied is raised when the two entities do
not belong to the same group. Finally, invalidInputParameter and invalidOuputParameter
are raised when the parameters do not match the operation signature.
Example: In the plant monitoring application, this primitive may be used by a supervisor node to
remotely configure a worker node (one-way operation). In the telecare application, it could be used by
patients to do a health check-up. They could send some data (such as temperature, blood pressure, etc.)
to their doctor and receive her/his opinion (request-response operation).
ReceiveMessage
<callerId, input?> receiveMessage(groupId?, operationName) throws exception invalid-
Operation, invalidGroupId, callerNotInGroup, invalidInputParameter
where callerId is either peerServiceId, sessionId or peerId
Entities call this primitive to retrieve an invocation message for operationName. Service calls
to receiveMessage require that a service offering operationName is published by the caller.
The primitive returns the identifier of the caller (callerId) and the input parameters. The
optional groupId parameter restricts the reception of the message to the group identified by
the respective groupId.
Example: This primitive may be used by a service (running at the doctor side) waiting for some
patient’s data in order to give a diagnosis.
Reply
void reply(callerId, operationName, output?, faultName?) throws exception invalid-
PeerId, invalidPeerServiceId, invalidOperation, missingReceiveMessage
where callerId is either peerServiceId, sessionId or peerId
Provider of request-response operations use reply() to give the result of an operation (operationName)
to its caller (callerId). Note that the model requires that a corresponding message has
been previously received via a call to receiveMessage(), otherwise missingReceiveMessage
is raised. The primitive can also be used to signal an erroneous behaviour of the operation to
the caller. In such a case, the output parameter stands for the data associated with the fault.
Example: In the same vein as the previous example, this primitive may be used by the doctor to
send back her/his diagnosis to a patient.
Event handling
Basically, event-based communication differs from message-based communication in two ways.
Firstly, the generator of the event does not block until someone receives it. Secondly, more
than one client can receive the same event. Entities have to subscribe (subscribe() primitive)
to the events of their interest in order to receive them. Once subscribed, entities can actually
receive an event via the receiveMessage() primitive. On the provider side, raising an event is
done by using the event() primitive.
Event
void event(groupId?, eventName, input?) throws exception invalidGroupId, caller-
NotInGroup, invalidEvent
This primitive serves to raise an eventName event. If groupId is specified, the event is published
in this group. Otherwise, if the primitive is called by a service code, it is raised in the group in
which the service is published. If the caller is a peer and the group is not specified, the event
is published in all groups to which the peer belongs. The caller can also attach additional data
with the input parameter. It is important to highlight that the service model does not specify
any lifetime for events.
Exceptions are similar to receiveMessage(). However, note that a service call to event()
implies a previous publication of a service contract that defines eventName, otherwise invalidEvent
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is raised.
Example: In the context of the plant monitoring application, raising an event may be used to
signal a radiation alert. For instance, when a worker node detects an abnormal radiation level, it raises
an event called “radiation level exceeded” with the measured level as associated data.
ReceiveEvent
<callerId, input?> receiveEvent(groupId?, eventName) throws exception invalidGroupId,
callerNotInGroup, invalidInputParameter
where callerId is either peerServiceId,sessionId or peerId
To retrieve an event, entities call receiveEvent(). This primitive is similar to receiveMessage().
But in this case, entities have to be subscribed to eventName before being able to receive such
an event.
Example: Likewise in the previous example, this primitive may be used at the supervisor node
side, to receive an event signalling a radiation alert.
Subscribe
void subscribe(eventName?, groupId?) throws exception invalidGroupId, callerNot-
InGroup
To register as event listeners, entities call subscribe(). They can subscribe to:
 eventName events raised in a groupId group,
 eventName events raised in all groups (to which the caller belongs),
 all events raised in a groupId group, or
 all events raised in all groups to which the caller belongs.
Exceptions raised by subscribe() are similar to the primitive seen before.
Example: In the context of the telecare application, this primitive may be used by relatives and
friends of a patient to signal to the middleware they want to receive events concerning the patient.
For instance, an event could be an emergency alert or a reminder spread in the patient’s family/friend
group.
Unsubscribe
void unsubscribe(eventName?, groupId?) throws exception invalidGroupId, caller-
NotInGroup, notSubscribed
This primitive is the dual of subscribe(), it cancels previous subscriptions. Note that the two
primitives do not have to match exactly. For instance, unsubscribe(eventName, groupId)
matches a previous subscribe(eventName). Unsubscribe() raises notSubscribed when there
are no matching previous subscriptions. Other exceptions are similar to the primitives seen be-
fore.
Example: Still in the telecare application, this primitive may be used by users who do not want to
receive emergency alerts anymore (because they are abroad, for example).
2.3.2 SMoL details
The SMEPP Modelling Language (SMoL for short) is used to orchestrate the primitives in
order to define the behaviour of peers and services. The language is similar to (and is inspired
by) the Business Process Execution Language (BPEL [78, 79]). Since the language takes a
lot of concepts from BPEL, it is useful to present this reference language. The first part of
this subsection briefly describes the main ideas of BPEL. Then, we detail SMoL by giving
its constructions and, informally, their semantics. Further in this chapter, Subsection 2.3.3
proposes an abstract model of the language.
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Business Process Execution Language.
The second version of BPEL has been specified by the Organization for the Advancement of
Structured Information Standards (OASIS), a consortium that drives the development of open
standards for the global information society. This version is the result of a long process involving
the combination of several “programming in the large languages” such as WSFL (IBM) and
XLANG (Microsoft).
The definition of the language takes place in the field of Web Services which bring interop-
erability between heterogeneous applications through web standards. The interaction between
business processes is often complex and long-running, involving sequences of message exchanges
between several parties. To define such business interactions, one needs a formal description of
the message exchange protocols used by the applications. An “Abstract Process” can describe
observable behaviour of all parties involved in the interaction. On the one hand, this allows
businesses not to reveal all their internal decision making and data management. And, on the
other hand, it provides the freedom of changing private aspects of the implementation without
affecting the observable behaviour.
BPEL defines two kinds of processes, Abstract and Executable. An Abstract Process is
a partially specified process, it may be used to describe a process template. Then, it would
capture essential process logic while excluding implementation details. An Executable Process
is fully specified and thus can be executed. Both Abstract and Executable Processes share the
same constructs, they thus have the same expressive power. In concrete terms, the language
offers constructions for the specification of Abstract and Executable processes. For instance, the
language provides constructions similar to what can be found in classic programming languages,
e.g. sequences, repeated executions (loops), conditional branches etc. It also features parallel
execution and exception handling. BPEL code is written using XML. This allows processes to
be human-readable while being easily processed by XML tools and other parsers. The BPEL
process is basically an expression of an algorithm of which each step is called an activity. Those
activities are similar to the SMEPP primitives (actually, the primitives are inspired by the
BPEL activities). For instance, one can invoke an operation on a web service via <invoke>,
wait for a message (<receive>), etc. Activities are combined using “structured activities” to
create more complex algorithms. One can define an ordered sequence of steps (<sequence>),
execute one of several alternative paths (<pick>), execute several steps in parallel (<flow>)
etc. The language allows to recursively combine the constructions.
The SMEPP Modelling Language (SMoL) is a BPEL-like language. Many constructions
available in SMoL are taken from BPEL. SMoL programs are also written by using XML.
Furthermore, the purpose of SMoL is quite similar to BPEL’s one. Indeed, SMoL allows to
model the behaviour of peer and service codes as BPEL models business processes. It is then
possible to analyse formally the interactions between peers and/or services (as BPEL allows the
analysis of interactions between business processes). However, SMoL was designed to simplify
BPEL in the context of the SMEPP project. Indeed, the semantics of BPEL is quite complex
and, thus, its analysis is very time-consuming. Moreover, SMEPP, being targeted to the field
of EP2P, does not require several BPEL concepts [15]. The removed concepts (or constructs)
are11:
 compensation which allows to specify an activity that is used to undo one of the steps
that have already been completed,
 synchronisation links, which are used to declare control dependencies between concurrent
activities,
 forEach which is similar to the for statement in classic programming language, however
it allows parallel execution of its body,
 isolated scope which, basically, provides control of concurrent access to shared resources.
It is similar to the concept of “serialisation” in database transaction,
11This list describes some BPEL constructs in very few words, please refer to [79] for more information.
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 partner links which define the different parties involved in a process (e.g. customer, provider,
shipping provider, etc.),
 message properties which provide a way of naming and representing (business or infras-
tructure) protocol relevant data,
 correlation sets which are used to “tag” conversations involving several parties. They allow
to match messages with business process instances for which they are intended.
The rest of this subsection describes in details SMoL. Note that all of the following commands
are very similar to BPEL’s ones.
SMEPP Modelling Language
The constructions (or commands) of the language are typically subdivided in two categories.
A basic command is either a primitive call (see Figure 2.3 for a summary of the primitives)
or a call to an atomic statement. A structured command orchestrates basic commands. They
can be used recursively to define more complex behaviours. Note that a lightweight formal
semantics of the language can be found in [15]. This provides a way to analyse formally the
peer and service behaviour.
Basic commands. Basic commands are either a command listed below or a SMEPP prim-
itive. The following commands are somewhat similar to the SMEPP primitives. However, the
basic commands only define local behaviours. In other words, a basic command affects only its
local program, not other peers or services.
Some parameters used in those commands are specified by using the XML Path Language
(XPath [110]). Basically, XPath is a language for selecting nodes from an XML document. In
SMoL, this functionality is used to retrieve and store values. Futhermore, it can also be used
to compute boolean, integer or string values.
Empty
void empty()
A call to empty() is equivalent to “no-op”. It serves in case one wants an execution branch to
do nothing (e.g. ignore a fault in a FaultHandler, see below).
Wait
void wait(for?, until?, repeatEvery?)
A program calls wait to suspend its execution either for a certain time (for) or until a certain
moment (until). In case the command is used inside an InformationHandler (see below),
programmers may use the repeatEvery parameter to trigger a certain branch repeatedly after
each specified period of time. It is important to note that only one parameter can be used at a
time. The syntax is defined by XPath. For instance, a program executing wait(2009-09-15)
will wait until the 15th of September 2009 and a program executing wait(P3DT10H) will wait
during three days and ten hours.
Throw
void throw(faultName, faultVariable?)
Throw is used to raise a fault inside a program. The first parameter defines the name associated
with the fault (e.g. “connection lost”). The second one defines the data associated with the
fault, this data is used for debugging purpose.
Catch/CatchAll
faultVariable? catch(faultName) and <faultName, faultVariable> catchAll()
Those commands serve to “identify” faults raised in programs. They can only be used inside
faultHandlers (see below). The parameter of a catch is the name of the fault to be caught
and the command returns the data associated with it. CatchAll catches all faults. Once a
fault is caught, it outputs its name and associated data.
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Exit
void exit()
Exit simply terminates the execution of the program (all running commands are stopped), it
is similar to exit(0) in the C programming language.
Assign
Assign
Copy
from
to
End Copy
...
Copy
from
to
End Copy
End Assign
Programmers use this command to assign values to variables. It is similar to any assignment
in a classic programming language except that, in this case, one can do several assignments at
once. XPath can be used to define the from and to parameters.
Structured commands. Structured commands orchestrate SMEPP primitives and SMoL
(basic or not) commands. This part of the text intends to give an informal description of each
command. In the following, command refers to any SMoL command.
Sequence
Sequence
command
...
command
End Sequence
Basically, a sequence provides a way to execute a set of commands in lexical order. In a classic
programming language, one would have used semi-colons between each command.
Flow
Flow
command
...
command
End Flow
This command allows several commands to be executed at the same time, that is concurrently.
The execution of the Flow terminates when all of its child commands have finished their exe-
cution. This construction is somewhat similar to the notion of “thread” in the C or the Java
programming language.
While
While boolCond
command
End While
While has the same semantics in SMoL than in other programming languages. It executes the
command as long as boolCond is satisfied and the condition is evaluated before each cycle. The
condition is assumed to be defined with XPath.
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RepeatUntil
RepeatUntil boolCond
command
End RepeatUntil
RepeatUntil is similar to While but it evaluates boolCond after each cycle. Thus, in any case
command is always executed at least once.
If-then-else
If boolCond
command
Else
command
End If
This command implements simply the classic conditional control-flow. It executes either the
first command if boolCond is evaluated to true or the second one if it is evaluated to false.
Note that the Else branch is optional.
Pick
Pick
<callerId, input?> = receiveMessage(groupId?, operationName)
command
...
<callerId, input?> = receiveEvent(groupId?, eventName)
command
...
wait(for?, until?)
command
...
End Pick
The Pick command introduces non-deterministic choices in SMoL. The branch to be executed
is chosen depending on the time elapsed and the messages/events received by the program.
Thus, the execution of pick amounts to wait for an invocation message to be received, an event
to be raised or a timer to go off. The first event or message received selects the command to
be executed. However, if a timer terminates before, its branch is executed. It is important to
insist that in any case, only one command is executed.
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InformationHandler
InformationHandler
command
<callerId, input?> = receiveMessage(groupId?, operationName)
command
...
<callerId, input?> = receiveEvent(groupId?, eventName)
command
...
wait(for?, until?, repeatEvery?)
command
...
End InformationHandler
This command executes a main command, while in parallel, it receives and processes mes-
sages/events as well as alarms. The main command is placed in first position inside the
InformationHandler. The command is similar to a Pick, it specifies a set of messages,
events and alarms, each of them associated with a command. However, the execution of an
InformationHandler terminates when its main command finishes. In addition, it can receive
several messages/events during its lifetime. Furthermore, the repeatEvery parameter of the
wait command can be set to execute repeatedly a command. It is important to note that when
the InformationHandler finishes, the running commands (inside receive and wait branches)
must be allowed to terminate.
FaultHandler
FaultHandler
command
faultVariable1? = catch(faultName1)
command
...
faultVariablen? = catch(faultNamen)
command
<faultName, faultVariable?> = catchAll()
command
End FaultHandler
The FaultHandler serves to process faults which may be raised inside a program (i.e. the
main command associated with the FaultHandler). When a fault is raised, the execution of
the main command is stopped and the list of catches is processed until one of the clauses
matches. Then, the command associated with the matching catch is executed. If no match-
ing catch can be found, the command associated with the catchAll branch is executed. Note
that a FaultHandler without a catchAll branch is assumed to have an implicit catchAll
branch which forwards every fault to the outer FaultHandler. In case it is the outermost
FaultHandler, the fault is forwarded to the environment (e.g. to the human user). The struc-
ture and the purpose of this construct is similar to a try/catch block in Java.
2.3.3 Abstract model
In order to focus on the coordination challenges implied by the service model presented above,
we need to define a more formal model for it. This model abstracts many details which are
not relevant from the coordination point of view such as input/output data types and optional
parameters.
The model we propose is based on [13], which defines a calculus for SMEPP primitives.
We extend it with group related security and a comprehensive calculus for SMoL, while trying
to make some concepts easier to understand. This is achieved thanks to the following modifi-
cations. We represent the entities using always the same notation, while in [13] the notation
differs depending whether the peer is authenticated or not. Moreover, the modelling of event
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publications and subscriptions are simplified by using two sets belonging to a group instead of
using the so-called polling-context. Finally, we present the rules in a more readable format by
clearly separating different classes of conditions (on groups, on peers, etc.).
Let us first introduce some notations. Let P be the set of peer identifiers, S the set of
service identifiers, E the set of event names and G the set of group identifiers. We assume that
G contains a special group “0” which gathers all the peers of a SMEPP application. In the
same vein, let I be a set which contains every possible input for every event and C be the set
which contains every service contract.
Thanks to these notations, each system entity is identified by a middleware uniform resource
locator (MURL), g.p.s ∈ G×P×S. Moreover a service is denoted by a triple, <s,cs,p>, where
s ∈ S, cs ∈ C (the set of service contracts) and p ∈ P. We assume the operation signatures to
be included in the contracts.
We model a group g protected by a password pwd by a 4-tuple : 〈P, Sr, Sb, Pb〉g,pwd, where:
 P ⊆ P represents the peers members of g,
 Sr ⊆ S represents the services published in g,
 Sb ⊆MURL× E represents the subscription of an entity g.p.s to an event and
 Pb ⊆ MURL × MURL × E × I represents the set of event publications. Note that
(g.p.s,g’.p’.s’,n,in) is the instance of an event n raised by g.p.s to be received by g’.p’.s’
containing the input in.
As described below, a peer executes its peer code which may offer services. Both peer and
service code are modelled by: [A]g.p.s,pwdlist, where g.p.s is the entity’s MURL and pwdlist
is the password list known by the peer. Note that if the program is not yet identified by the
SMEPP application, g.p.s is equal to ∅.
Let Π be the set of agents or programs running in the considered SMEPP application. In
general, a program or agent code A meets the syntax given in Figure 2.5. There, “0” represents
the empty program and “b” is a catch() command. The operators are the classical ones: “.”
represents the prefix, “‖” is the parallel composition, “⊕” is the guarded non-deterministic
choice. Also, as in [98], we use the “@” operator to model exception handling. The “Es”
element is a sequence of guarded (by catch constructions) non-deterministic choices. Please
note that [A]g.p.s is written as a shorthand for [A@[]]g.p.s ; this equivalence helps to completely
define the exception handling rules. We finally pose Γ as the set of groups available in the
SMEPP application.
The first element (A) of Figure 2.5 represents a SMEPP instruction which can be either a
SMoL command or a SMEPP primitive. A SMoL program is a SMEPP statement. SMoL has
two kinds of commands: basic commands and structured ones. There are four basic commands:
 Empty is the empty program, modelled as 0,
 Exit() terminates the execution of a program,
 Wait(x) blocks the execution of the code during “x” time intervals or until time “x”,
 Throw(e,in) raises an exception “e” with the parameters “in”.
Structured commands contain SMEPP instructions and/or logical expressions. The following
lines explain the reduction rules referring to the structured commands.
 Assign(CFT), where CFT is a list of (from x to y) constructs, reduces to the execution
of the first element of CFT to y=x, executed in parallel with the application of the rule on
the rest of the list (using the operation “ ‖”),
 Sequence(As) reduces to the execution of the first element of As (a SMEPP instruction)
prefixing the application of the rule on the rest of the list,
 Flow(As) reduces to the parallel execution of the first element of As and the result of the
application of the rule on the rest of the list,
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A ::= Empty() | Exit() | Wait(x) |
Throw(e,in) | Assign(CFT) |
Sequence(As) | Flow(As) | While(BL,A)
| RepeatUntil(BL,A) | If(BL,A1,A2) |
Pick(Bs) | InformationHandler(A,Is) |
FaultHandler(A,Es) | P
Empty() ::= 0
Exit() ::= termination of surrounding program
execution
Wait(x) ::= delays the execution for ‘‘x’’ time
intervals or until the time ‘‘x’’
Throw(e,in) ::= raise(e,in)
Assign((from x to y):CFT) ::= y=x ‖ Assign(CFT)
CFT ::= [] | (from x to y):CFT
Sequence(A:As) ::= A.Sequence(As)
Flow(A:As) ::= A ‖ Flow(As)
As ::= [] | A:As
While(BL,A) ::= if BL then A.While(BL,A)
RepeatUntil(BL,A) ::= A.While(BL,A)
If(BL,A1,A2) ::= if BL then A1 else A2
BL ::= logical expression
Pick(BR(A):Bs) ::= BR(A) ⊕ Pick(Bs)
InformationHandler(A,Bs) ::= (x=true).A.(x=false) ‖ IHB(Is)
IHB(BR(A):Bs) ::= While(x,BR(A)) ‖ IHB(Bs)
Bs ::= [] | BR(A):Bs
BR(A) ::= receiveEvent().A | receiveMessage().A |
wait().A
FaultHandler(A,Es) ::= A@Es
Es ::= [] | (b.A):Es
b ::= catch(e,in)
P ::= x = newPeer(pwdlist) | createGroup(g)
| joinGroup(g,pwd) | leaveGroup(g) |
x = publish(g,cs) | unpublish(m) | x
= getServices(m,cs) | startSession(m)
| subscribe(g,n) | unsubscribe(g,n) |
event(g,n,in) | 〈x,in〉 = receiveEvent(g,n)
| x = invoke(m,n,in) | reply(m,n,out)
Figure 2.5: Program syntax.
 While(BL,A) reduces to the evaluation of the condition BL prefixing the execution of A
which is followed by the application of While(BL,A), recursively.
 RepeatUntil(BL,A) reduces to the execution of A prefixing the application of While(BL,A),
 If(BL,A1,A2) reduces to the well known if then else statement, where BL is the boolean
condition, A1 is the then branch, and A2 is the else one.
 Pick(Bs) reduces to a non-deterministic choice between the first element of Bs and the
result of the rule application on the rest of the list, where BS is composed of BR(A)s,
 InformationHandler(A,Bs) reduces to the parallel composition of the branches (BR(A))
contained in Bs and the main command A, surrounded by a boolean flag modelling A’s
state of execution,
 BR(A) models the possibles branches of Pick and InformationHandler commands. Such
a branch reduces to the execution of a primitive (which must be one of the list) followed
28 Chapter 2
by its attached command A,
 FaultHandler(A,Es) is modelled using the “@” operator, the semantics of “@” is detailed
later in the exception handling rules. Es is a list of catch clauses.
As in [13] and [98], we have simplified the input and output of the primitives for the sake
of simplicity and to better highlight the coordination challenges. The signature considered for
SMEPP primitives is defined as g for groupId, cs for serviceContract, m for MURL, n for
operation, in for input, out for output, pwdlist for the credentials, pwd for one group key and
e for an exception name.
In order to ease the reading of the rules, we give the semantics of the primitives using rules
of the form:
(ex rules)
Various provisos
Provisos on Π
Provisos on Γ
State of Π
State of Γ
Remember that Π is the set of running agents/programs and Γ is the set of active groups. We
apply the rules in a top-down way, until the program codes in Π are terminated (i.e. Π = ∅)
or locked (i.e. Π 6= ∅ and no more applicable rules).
Peer management
(newPeer)
(0, ApKey) ∈ pwdlist
Π, [(x = newPeer(pwdlist).A)@Es]∅,pwdlist
Γ ∪ 〈P,∅,∅,∅〉0,ApKey
Π, [(A[p/x])@Es]0.p.0,pwdlist
Γ ∪ 〈P ∪ {0.p.0},∅,∅,∅〉0,ApKey
The above rule represents the semantics of the newPeer() primitive. The first proviso line
requires a peer to have the couple (0, ApKey) in order to access the universal group (0), with
ApKey, the SMEPP application password. The second line requires the existence of a non yet
authenticated peer (labelled by ∅) which is about to execute newPeer(). One can also see that
the future peer has a list of password pwdlist. The third line models the state of the groups in
the SMEPP application. The universal group (0) is highlighted. By definition this is a special
group which does not contain any service or event. Note that we pose that g.p.s 6= ∅ for each
g.p.s ∈MURL. In this way, a program cannot call other primitives before calling newPeer().
As a result, the program “A” gets labelled with 0.p.0 and not g.p.s (which could be the
MURL of a service). This ensures that the program is considered as a peer code instead of a
service code (remember a service cannot call newPeer()). In the rest of A’s code, the result of
newPeer() replaces the free occurrences of x. This is modelled by the first line of the conclusion.
In the second line, the peer is added into the set of peers of the universal group: P ∪ {0.p.0}.
Group management
This paragraph gives the semantics of group management primitives. We detail three primitives:
createGroup(), joinGroup() and leaveGroup().
(createGroup)
(g, pwd) ∈ pwdlist
Π, [(x = createGroup(g).A)@Es]0.p.0,pwdlist
Γ; 〈∗, ∗, ∗, ∗〉g,pwd /∈ Γ
Π, [A[g/x]@Es]0.p.0,pwdlist
Γ ∪ 〈{0.p.0},∅,∅,∅〉g,pwd
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This rule gives the semantics of the createGroup() primitive. The first line enforces the caller
peer to have the password (pwd) associated with the group it wants to join (g). The second line
shows that the set of executing programs contains a peer (identified by 0.p.0) which is about to
execute createGroup(). This peer has a list of password pwdlist. The third line requires that
the SMEPP application does not yet contain a group labelled by g and protected by pwd.
As shown in the first line of the conclusion, the peer code continues by replacing every free
occurrence of x by g. The last line models the addition of the newly created group g to Γ, the
set of groups.
(joinGroup)
(g, pwd) ∈ pwdlist
Π, [(joinGroup(g, pwd).A)@Es]0.p.0,pwdlist
Γ ∪ 〈P, Sr, Sb, Pb〉g,pwd
Π, [A@Es]0.p.0,pwdlist
Γ ∪ 〈P ∪ {0.p.0}, Sr, Sb, Pb〉g,pwd
The rule modelling joinGroup() is similar to createGroup(), but this time the group g pro-
tected by pwd must already be in Γ. As a consequence of the rule, the peer 0.p.0 is added into
the peers set of g.
(leaveGroup)
Π, [(leaveGroup(g).A)@Es]0.p.0,pwdlist
Γ ∪ 〈P ∪ {0.p.0}, Sr, Sb, Pb〉g,pwd
Π, [A@Es]0.p.0,pwdlist
Γ ∪ 〈P, Sr\{g.p.∗}, Sb\{(g.p.0, ∗)}, P b\{(g.p.0, ∗, ∗, ∗)}〉g,pwd
This rule gives the semantics of leaveGroup(). A peer 0.p.0, member of the group g (protected
by pwd), is about to execute leaveGroup(), as shown in the first line. The second line gives the
condition on the groups: the group g protected by pwd must exist in the SMEPP application.
The result of the rule shows (in the last line) that the peer is removed from g’s P set. The
services and events related to the leaving peer must also be removed, this is done by removing
the couples (g.p.0, ∗) from Sb and all the couples (g.p.0, ∗, ∗, ∗) from Pb where we consider ∗ as
the traditional wildcard, which matches every identifier.
Service management
This paragraph gives the semantics of the service related primitives. Publish(), unpublish(),
getService() and startSession() are modelled in the following four rules.
(publish)
(s, cs, p) /∈ Sr
Π, [(publish(g, cs).A)@Es]0.p.0,pwdlist
Γ ∪ 〈P ∪ {0.p.0}, Sr, Sb, Pb〉g,pwd
Π, [A@Es]0.p.0,pwdlist, [program(cs, p)]g.p.s,pwdlist
Γ ∪ 〈P ∪ {0.p.0}, Sr ∪ {(s, cs, p)}, Sb, Pb〉g,pwd
The rule above models publish(). The first line asserts the specified service is not published
in g (i.e. it is not in g’s Sr set). The next line shows the peer is about to execute the primitive.
Note that it is labelled by 0.p.0 to enforce the primitive to be executed by a peer code (and
not a service). The two primitive arguments are the group in which the service has to be
published and the service contract (cs), respectively. The third line simply shows that the
group g protected by pwd exists.
As a result, the first line of the conclusion states that the primitive has been executed and a
new program is part of the SMEPP application: an agent [program(cs, p)]g.p.s,pwdlist is added
to Π in order to represent the running service. The last line states that the service is added to
g’s Sr set.
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(unpublish)
Π, [(unpublish(g.p.s).A)@Es]0.p.0,pwdlist, [program(cs, p)]g.p.s,pwdlist
Γ ∪ 〈P ∪ {0.p.0}, Sr ∪ {(s, cs, p)}, Sb, Pb〉g,pwd
Π, [A@Es]0.p.0,pwdlist
Γ ∪ 〈P ∪ {0.p.0}, Sr, Sb\{(g.p.s, ∗)}, P b\{(g.p.s, ∗, ∗, ∗)}〉g,pwd
This rule models unpublish(). The first line shows that 0.p.0 is about to execute the primitive
in order to remove g.p.s. Another agent is present, representing the running service to be
removed. The second line models the fact that g.p.s is published. It is an element of g’s Sr set.
The first line of the conclusion requires that the execution of the service is terminated, while
the second requires that the service is removed from Sr and that all event elements related to
g.p.s are removed from Sb and Pb, as done in leaveGroup().
(getServices)
g′′.p′′.s′′ ≤ g′.p′.∗
Π, [(x = getServices(g′.p′.∗, cs).A)@Es]g.p.s,pwdlist
Γ ∪ 〈P ∪ (0.p.0), Sr ∪ (s′′, cs, p′′), Sb, Pb〉g,pwd
Π, [(A[g′′.p′′.s′′/x])@Es]g.p.s,pwdlist
Γ ∪ 〈P ∪ (0.p.0), Sr ∪ (s′′, cs, p′′), Sb, Pb〉g,pwd
The above rule provides the semantics of service discovery (getService() primitive). An
entity looks for a service identified by g′.p′.∗ (where g′ and/or p′ can be left unspecified, using
∗) providing the service contract12 cs. In order to use the wild card notation, we define an
ordered relationship inMURL extended by adding ∗ to G, P and S, defined by g.p.s ≤ g′.p′.s′
if and only if g = g′ or g′ = ∗, and p = p′ or p′ = ∗, and s = s′ or s′ = ∗. Note that without
loss of generality, we simplify the primitive so that it returns only one service identifier, instead
of collecting service identifiers.
The first line of the rule requires that the service to be returned matches the specified
argument, while the second shows the entity g.p.s is part of the SMEPP application (note this
is the first time we present a primitive which a service can call). The third line models the set
of groups where the group g contains a matching service (described as the triple (s′′, cs, p′′).
The first line of the conclusion states that the peer code execution continues by replacing
x by the primitive result. The last line states that the conditions on Γ are not affected by the
primitive.
(startSession)
Π, [(startSession(g.p′.s′).A)@Es]g.p.s,pwdlist, [Program(cs, p′)]g.p′.s′,pwdlist
Γ ∪ 〈P ∪ {0.p.0, 0.p′.0}, Sr ∪ {s′, cs, p′}, Sb, Pb〉g,pwd
Π, [A@Es]g.p.s,pwdlist, [Program(cs, p′)]g.p′.s′,pwdlist, [Session(g.p′.s′, n)]g.p′.s′n,pwdlist
Γ ∪ 〈P ∪ {0.p.0, 0.p′.0}, Sr ∪ {s′, cs, p′}, Sb, Pb〉g,pwd
This rule models the session creation, i.e. startSession(). The first line shows that an
entity is about to execute the primitive on the (assumed) session-full service g.p′.s′. This service
is also modelled in the first line as a running entity. The second line shows that the invoker
and the provider are in the same group, g. Furthermore, it enforces the service g.p′.s′ to be
published in g.
The first line of the conclusion shows that a new entity is added to Π, this entity represents
the newly created session. The session is identified by the service identifier (g.p′.s′) and a
session instance number (n). The second line remains the same.
Note that when an entity invokes an operation exhibited by a session-full service, it must
specify the session identifier, i.e. the session instance number appended to the service identifier
(e.g. g.p′.s′n).
Message management
This paragraph gives the semantics of message related primitives. The two first rules give
the semantics of the invoke() and receiveMessage() primitives according to which kind of
12We assume, for the sake of simplicity, that the service contract is complete, i.e. it is not a template contract.
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operation is called (one-way/asynchronous or request-response/synchronous). The last one
describes reply().
(invoke(sync))
n ∈ cs
Π, [(x = invoke(g.p′.s′, n, in).A)@Es]g.p.s,pwdlist,
[(〈x, inp〉 = receiveMessage(g, n).B)@Fs]g.p′.s′,pwdlist′
Γ ∪ 〈P ∪ {0.p.0, 0.p′.0}, Sr ∪ {(s′, cs, p′)}, Sb, Pb〉g,pwd
Π, [(suspend().A[out/x])@Es]g.p.s,pwdlist, [(B[g.p.s/x, in/inp])@Fs]g.p′.s′,pwdlist′
Γ ∪ 〈P ∪ {0.p.0, 0.p′.0}, Sr ∪ {(s′, cs, p′)}, Sb, Pb〉g,pwd
The (invoke(sync)) rule gives the semantics of the invocation primitive in the synchronous
case. The first line expresses the fact that the operation n is part of the service contract cs. The
second line models an entity g.p.s which is about to invoke an operation n (with parameters, in)
on another entity, g.p′.s′. The latter (in the third line) is about to execute receiveMessage()
in order to receive an invocation message concerning the operation n in the group g (protected
by pwd). The fourth line shows that both entities are members of the group g and 0.p′.0 has
published a service s′ (with a service contract cs) in g.
In the first line of the conclusion, one can see that both entities have executed their prim-
itives. The code in g.p.s is now “suspend().A” which represents A’s execution blocking (until
a corresponding reply() is called). Every free occurrence of x and inp are replaced by g.p.s
and in in g.p′.s′’s code, respectively. This models the reception of the invocation parameters
by g.p′.s′. The last line remains the same.
(invoke(async))
n ∈ cs
Π, [(invoke(g.p′.s′, n, in).A)@Es]g.p.s,pwdlist,
[(〈x, inp〉 = receiveMessage(g, n).B)@Fs]g.p′.s′,pwdlist′
Γ ∪ 〈P ∪ {0.p.0, 0.p′.0}, Sr ∪ {s′, cs, p′}, Sb, Pb〉g,pwd
Π, [A@Es]g.p.s,pwdlist, [(B[g.p.s/x, in/inp])@Fs]g.p′.s′,pwdlist′
Γ ∪ 〈P ∪ {0.p.0, 0.p′.0}, Sr ∪ {s′, cs, p′}, Sb, Pb〉g,pwd
The (invoke(async)) rule gives the semantics of the invocation primitive in the asynchronous
case. The condition part of the rule is the same as in the synchronous case. However the
conclusion is slightly different. Since a one-way call to invoke() does not block the caller, one
can see that g.p.s code is not suspended. In contrast, it continues its execution normally.
(reply)
Π, [(suspend().A[out/x])@Es]g.p.s,pwdlist, [(reply(g.p.s, n, out).B)@Fs]g.p′.s′,pwdlist′
Γ ∪ 〈P ∪ {0.p.0, 0.p′.0}, Sr ∪ {s′, cs, p′}, Sb, Pb〉g,pwd
Π, [A[out/x]@Es]g.p.s,pwdlist, [B@Fs]g.p′.s′,pwdlist′
Γ ∪ 〈P ∪ {0.p.0, 0.p′.0}, Sr ∪ {s′, cs, p′}, Sb, Pb〉g,pwd
The above rule models the reply() primitive. In the first line, one can see that an entity
g.p.s is blocked, waiting for the result of a request-response invocation (see (invoke(sync)).
Another entity, g.p′.s′ is about to execute a reply() answering to the previous invocation of
n by g.p.s. The second line shows that both entities are members of g (protected by pwd) and
that 0.p′.0 has published a service s′ (with a service contract cs) in g.
The conclusion shows that g.p.s continues its execution, replacing every free occurrence of
x by out (the result provided by reply()). The last line remains unchanged.
Event management
This paragraph gives the semantics of the event related primitives. In the following, we detail
subscribe(), unsubscribe(), event() and receiveEvent(). Note that the primitives are
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simplified with regard to the model as it is only allowed to (un)subscribe to a specified event
in a specified group13.
(subscribe)
Π, [(subscribe(g, n).A)@Es]g.p.s,pwdlist
Γ ∪ 〈P ∪ {0.p.0}, Sr, Sb, Pb〉g,pwd
Π, [A@Es]g.p.s,pwdlist
Γ ∪ 〈P ∪ {0.p.0}, Sr, Sb ∪ (g.p.s, n), P b〉g,pwd
The (subscribe) rule models the subscription of an entity g.p.s to an event n published in a
group g. Its first line shows the caller entity is about to execute subscribe(). The second one
shows the peer containing the entity (or the entity itself if it is a peer) is member of the group
g.
The conclusion models the addition of a subscription. One can see that a pair (g.p.s, n) is
added to g’s Sb set in the second line of the conclusion. In the first line, the primitive is simply
removed from the code to be executed.
(unsubscribe)
Π, [(unsubscribe(g, n).A)@Es]g.p.s,pwdlist
Γ ∪ 〈P ∪ {0.p.0}, Sr, Sb ∪ (g.p.s, n), P b〉g,pwd
Π, [A@Es]g.p.s,pwdlist
Γ ∪ 〈P ∪ {0.p.0}, Sr, Sb, Pb〉g,pwd
The above rule gives the semantics of unsubcribe(), which is the dual of subscribe().
The first line shows that the entity is about to call the primitive, willing to unsubscribe from
an event n in a group g protected by pwd. In the second line, one can see a pair (g.p.s, n) is in
g’s Sb set, representing the subscription to remove.
As a result, the rule shows that the pair (g.p.s, n) is removed from Sb (in the second line).
The first line simply removes the primitive from the code.
(event)
Π, [(event(g, n, input).A)@Es]g.p.s,pwdlist
Γ ∪ 〈P ∪ {0.p.0}, Sr, Sb, Pb〉g,pwd
Π, [A@Es]g.p.s,pwdlist
Γ ∪ 〈P ∪ {0.p.0}, Sr, Sb, Pb〉g,pwd
∀{(g.p′.s′, n)} ∈ Sb : ∃{(g.p.s, g.p′.s′, n, input)} ∈ Pb
The (event) rule models the release of an event n (with some payload, in) in a group g.
The first line models the primitive call with its parameters, while the second one shows that
the entity is member of the group g, protected by pwd.
The first line of the conclusion simply removes the primitive call from the code. The second
one remains unchanged. The third line gives conditions on P ∈ Γ. This line models the fact
that a 4-tuple (g.p.s, g.p′.s′, n, input) is added into Pb for each entity being subscribed to n.
(receiveEvent)
Π, [(〈x, in〉 = receiveEvent(g, n).A)@Es]g.p.s,pwdlist, [B@Es]g.p′.s′,pwdlist
Γ ∪ 〈P ∪ {0.p.0, 0.p′.0}, Sr, Sb ∪ {(g.p.s, n)}, P b ∪ {(g.p′.s′, g.p.s, n, input)}〉g,pwd
Π, [(A[{input/in, g′.p′.s′/x}])@Es]g.p.s,pwdlist
Γ ∪ 〈P ∪ {0.p.0, 0.p′.0}, Sr, Sb ∪ {(g.p.s, n)}, P b〉g,pwd
The above rule gives the semantics of receiveEvent(). One can see in the first line that
the entity g.p.s is about to call the primitive and store the results in 〈x, in〉 where x is the
provider of the event and in is the payload. This line also models that another entity (g.p′.s′)
is active. The second line shows that
 two entities 0.p.0 and 0.p′.0 are members of g (protected by pwd) (i.e. 0.p.0 and 0.p′.0
∈ P ),
13In the SMEPP service model, one can subscribe to all events in a group, or an event in all groups or all
events in all groups.
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 g.p.s is subscribed to n, Sb ∪ {(g.p.s, n)},
 the event provider (g.p′.s′) has published an event n (with a payload input).
The two last points imply that a 4-tuple (g.p′.s′, g.p.s, n, input) ∈ Pb, since such a tuple is
added to Pb for each subscribed entity when an event is published.
The conclusion shows that the result of the primitive are replaced in g.p.s’s code, in the
first line. The second line shows that the instance of the event intended to be received by g.p.s
is removed from g’s Pb’s set.
Exception composition
This paragraph gives the semantics of the program behaviours when exceptions occur.
(parallel(1))
Π, [(A ‖ raise(e, in).B)@Es]g,pwdlist
Γ ∪ 〈P, Sr, Sb, Pb〉g,pwd
Π, [raise(e, in)@Es]g,pwdlist
Γ ∪ 〈P, Sr, Sb, Pb〉g,pwd
(parallel(2))
Π, [(raise(e, in).A ‖ B)@Es]g.p.s,pwdlist
Γ ∪ 〈P, Sr, Sb, Pb〉g,pwd
Π, [raise(e, in)@Es]g,pwdlist
Γ ∪ 〈P, Sr, Sb, Pb〉g,pwd
Those two first rules show what happens when two programs run in parallel (inside the
same entity), surrounded by a same FaultHandler (“@” notation), and one of them raises an
exception “e”. The rules state that both programs are stopped by this exception being raised.
In the first line of each rule, one can see an entity having two programs running in parallel,
surrounded by the same FaultHandler. The second line shows simply that the entities are in
a group.
The conclusions are the same for each rule. Both A and B got their execution stopped. It
only remains the raising of an exception e surrounded by the FaultHandler Es.
(append)
Π, [A@Es@Fs]g.p.s,pwdlist
Γ ∪ 〈P, Sr, Sb, Pb〉g,pwd
Π, [A@Es+ +Fs]g.p.s,pwdlist
Γ ∪ 〈P, Sr, Sb, Pb〉g,pwd
This rule (append) gives the semantics for nested FaultHandlers. The first line models an
entity having a program surrounded by a FaultHandler Es itself surrounded by another
FaultHandler, Fs. In the conclusion, one can see that they are merged in a single FaultHandler
composed by Es and Fs (using ++ operator), keeping the same order.
(throw)
Π, [(throw(e, in).A)@Es]g.p.s,pwdlist
Γ ∪ 〈P, Sr, Sb, Pb〉g,pwd
Π, [raise(e, in)@Es]g.p.s,pwdlist
Γ ∪ 〈P, Sr, Sb, Pb〉g,pwd
(peerNotInGroup)
Π, [(leaveGroup(g).A)@Es]0.p.0,pwdlist
Γ ∪ 〈P, Sr, Sb, Pb〉g,pwd; (P ∩ {0.p.0}) = ∅
Π, [raise(peerNotInGroup, someInput)@Es]0.p.0,pwdlist
Γ ∪ 〈P, Sr, Sb, Pb〉g,pwd
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The two last rules provide the semantics of an exception raising. When an exception is
raised, either with calling throw() or when a primitive misbehaves, the rest of the program
code is replaced by “raise(e, in)” which models the triggering of exception handling.
The second rule gives an illustration of exception modelling. The (peerNotInGroup) rule
models the misbehaving of the leaveGroup() primitive when a peer wants to leave a group it
does not belong to.
For the readability of the document, we did not include the rules corresponding to all the
primitives. Indeed, that would have needed to write a rule for each exception throwable by
each primitive. Note that all these rules are simple adaptations of the above rules.
Exception handling
This paragraph gives the semantics of exception handling. The three rules show that the catch
list is processed in sequential order. In case the (caught) rule is applicable, the program code is
replaced by the code associated with the catch. If no corresponding catch clause can be found,
the program exits.
(caught)
E = catch(e, x).C
Π, [raise(e, in)@E : Es]g.p.s,pwdlist
Γ
Π, [C[in/x]]g.p.s,pwdlist
Γ
This rule shows the case in which the first catch clause of the FaultHandler matches the
raised exception e. The code C related to the catch clause E is then executed.
(uncaught)
E 6= catch(e, x).C
Π, [raise(e, in)@E : Es]g.p.s,pwdlist
Γ
Π, [raise(e, in)@Es]g.p.s,pwdlist
Γ
The above rule is the dual of the first one. The catch clause does not match the raised
exception e, the processing of the FaultHandler continues with the rest of the list, Es.
(stop)
Π, [raise(e, in)@[]]g.p.s,pwdlist
Γ
Π, [exit()]g.p.s,pwdlist
Γ
This last rule shows that if no matching catch clause is found, the program exits. In the first
line, one can see the FaultHandler is empty ( this is modelled by “[]”). The exit() operation
represents the termination of the program in g.p.s.
2.4 Scope of the thesis
As part of our master thesis, we had the opportunity to work with the team of Professor A.
Brogi from the University of Pisa, in the SMEPP project. During our internship in Pisa, our
objective was to develop a proof-of-concept of the SMEPP service model. To be more precise,
the goal was to create a (prototype) software which takes as input a piece of code written in
SMoL and outputs an executable program. The implementation was twofold. An API of the
SMEPP primitives would provide a basic SMEPP middleware, while a SMoL translator using
this API would produce executable code.
In the four months devoted to our stay in Pisa, it was not reasonable to think of implementing
the SMEPP middleware. Hence, in a mutual agreement with the team in Pisa, we decided that
the prototype implementation would have the following limitations.
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 SMEPP intends to provide wrappers to allow any kind of program to be part of a SMEPP
application. We decided that our implementation would only consider peers and services
defined in SMoL.
 SMoL being a specification language and our goal being to produce executable code,
we decided that some additional coding would be needed by the programmer after the
translation, to make the program actually executable. In particular, SMoL envisions
to use XPath to describe data. We decided to simplify the data representation using
traditional XML flags and strings.
 The SMEPP service model borrows concepts from the web service technologies. In
particular, service contract are matched14 by using the Web Service Description Lan-
guage (WSDL [109]) and ontology information defined with the Ontology Web Language
(OWL [108]). The problem of service contracts matching is a very important problem in
itself and we decided it was out of the scope of our work. Our implementation would only
consider syntactical comparison of contracts.
 We decided our implementation would only implement the default level of security of
SMEPP (level 1 ). This is justified by the fact that this level is the de facto standard and
that the higher security level was still not well defined. Note that the no security level
(level 0 ) is implicitly covered in level 1 since it suffices to use “empty” keys.
 Finally, our goal is to emphasise on coordination issues and not on platform-specific ones.
For instance, we do not address the problems induced by motes and other sensors (such
as little battery autonomy, lack of computing power etc.).
The objectives of our work being defined, the next step is to select a suitable coordination
language on top of which the SMEPP proof-of-concept can be built. In order to direct the
research, we elicited the requirements we expect from this language. The next section details
them.
2.5 Middleware requirements
This section intends to elicit the requirements that the target coordination language has to
meet. To build this list we take into account the key features of SMEPP and the goal of our
master thesis. The rest of the section details each requirement.
R1 Peer-to-peer orientation. As the SMEPP project is by essence peer-to-peer oriented, we
have to find a decentralised middleware. That is, the system cannot rely on a pre-existing
infrastructure (i.e. no centralised server). Only the peers form the network. Furthermore,
the project aims to be used in embedded environment, where devices can join and leave
the network whenever they want (depending on the peers’ will and the availability of the
connection). Thus, we have to find a middleware which handles transient connection of
peers. This means the system has to feature mechanisms to take into account the fact
that a connection between two peers can be lost at any moment.
R2 Security. SMEPP defines a configurable model of security which, by default, uses sym-
metric keys to manage access rights: one preshared symmetric key to access a SMEPP
application (i.e. to become a SMEPP peer) and one preshared symmetric key for each
group. In addition to access control, SMEPP defines group and service visibility restric-
tions. A peer can only discover groups and services of which it has the corresponding
key.
In order to implement this model of security, the coordination middleware has to provide
some mechanisms to protect the data transferred between two peers. It also has to restrict
the access to the communication to authorised peers. Since we intend to implement the
default level of security, simple mechanisms using symmetric keys could be enough.
14See getServices() in Subsection 2.3.1.
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R3 Available implementation. The purpose of our work is to implement the SMEPP
service model by using a coordination language, not to make a new implementation of
an existing language. Having an executable language gives us a twofold opportunity. On
the one hand, it allows to prove the service model is usable in a real environment. On
the other hand it shows the suitability of coordination languages to implement a complex
middleware.
R4 Java-integrability. The reference implementation of the SMEPP project will be Java-
based. This means that the complete implementation of SMEPP will be developed with
the Java programming language. This implementation intends to be used on computers
(smaller devices such as mobile phone or mote would require a particular implementation
of the SMEPP middleware). We decided to develop our implementation using Java, in
order to give useful feedback from our proof-of-concept, in particular with regards to the
local management of peers and services. Thus, we needed a middleware providing Java
integrability (i.e. a Java-based API).
The four previous items are, of course, a minimal set of requirements our target has to
meet. A language providing more relevant functionalities, such as asymmetric keys based
security mechanisms or implementation running on embedded operating systems, would provide
additional ways of extending our implementation.
Chapter 3
State of the art
This chapter intends to achieve two goals. The first is to make the reader comfortable with
what coordination languages are and to highlight that the underlying abstract model of tuple
space based languages suits well the implementation of complex distributed systems. This first
objective is covered by Section 3.1 which describes the families of coordination languages and
which explains why one of them is well adapted to open systems. The second goal is to survey
tuple space based coordination languages according to their features and the coordination issues
they intend to solve, in order to choose one of them to implement our SMEPP proof-of-concept.
Section 3.2 highlights the main issues having to be tackled by them and explains how these
issues intervene in the context of SMEPP. Section 3.3 presents a general classification for these
languages. Buildt upon the two previous ones, Section 3.4 presents a framework helping us
to choose a relevant language according to the SMEPP middleware requirements presented
in Section 2.5. Finally, Section 3.5 describes the implementation of the chosen coordination
language.
3.1 Coordination models, languages and systems
This section, essentially based on [85], aims firstly at making clear what is meant by coordination
languages. In order to do this, we must first introduce the concept of coordination model, which
is, according to [82], the basis of two notions: coordination languages and coordination systems.
A coordination language represents a linguistic reification of a coordination model, whereas a
coordination system provides a programming environment, an architectural framework, or an
infrastructure for the model implementation.
The notion of coordination model introduced in [82] can be defined according to two different
points of view. The first defines a coordination model as a formal framework for expressing
the interaction among components in a multi-components system [32], whereas the second,
closer to [51], defines a coordination model as a conceptual framework for shaping the space
of component interaction. Although these two definitions can seem very similar, they are
representative of two different points of view, respectively the one of computer science and
the one of computer engineering. The first definition represents a coordination model as a
formal framework providing symbols and rules to model the coordinated systems and all the
interactions occurring in them. The main purpose of this approach is to provide computer
scientists with theoretical tools to model, analyse and validate properties of the interaction
space.
The second definition represents a coordination model as an abstraction helping developers
to effectively manage the space of inter-component interactions. This definition makes sense
because, when considering the engineering of Internet-based multi-agents systems, interaction
can be recognised as an independent dimension. Gelernter and Carriero formulated in [51] a
simple equation claiming the separation between the specification of the components and the
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specification of their interactions. This equation is the source of the term Coordination in
computer science:
Programming = Computation + Coordination
meaning the process of separating computation from communication concerns. When taking
this second coordination model definition into account, coordination models focus on effectively
easing engineers’ task to manage complex interactions in multi-components systems, rather than
to focus on formal properties of the model.
Various coordination models have been, at first, exclusively designed by taking into account
the first definition ([31, 66, 81, 115]), or the second (the most famous being Linda [50], but
also [35, 48, 83, 113]). However, the absence of formal semantics has led to inconsistent imple-
mentations of, at first sight intuitive, primitives functions dealing with the interaction space of
the components [21]. Consequently, we would like the reader to be aware that a fundamental
issue of the research on coordination is to take both definitions into account. Indeed, because
coordination models and languages are more and more used in the engineering and modelling of
complex systems of tomorrow, especially in the context of agents societies interacting with each
other through open environments such as the Internet. Such applications (multi-agent- and/or
Internet-based) need to cooperate, coordinate and share their information with other applica-
tions, either with or without user intervention. They interact in an environment where data
and resources are distributed. Therefore, it is really important to develop suitable coordination
technologies [86].
Currently, coordination solutions are proposed at different levels. One proposal, referenced
by [86], is that the basic services including coordination of activities and information should be
provided directly by the Web infrastructure. This results in the development of coordination
architectures for building collaborative applications. A more classical approach is to design a
coordination language and its associated coordination model to offer programming notations,
providing solutions to the problem of specifying and managing the interactions among comput-
ing agents. Actually, they offer mechanisms to compose, configure and control architectures
made of independent or distributed active components [20]. The fact is that coordination
models are often used as an ontology for agent-based software design, taking their purpose of
managing active components architecture into account. Currently, the designers of such models
are often interested in defining the concept of an agent, which can be mobile, autonomous,
“intelligent”, etc.
This point of view, developed in [20] seems to be true when looking at different projects
dealing with the coordination of entities in open environments (e.g. POPEYE [89], WORKPAD
[90] and SMEPP [98]). For instance, SMEPP peers can be considered as mobile agents searching
groups or services to respectively join or invoke them. Thus, as SMEPP matches the definition
of a coordination model, it is relevant to survey existing coordination languages and systems in
order to implement it.
Existing coordination systems in general have a common objective: to facilitate the interac-
tion of applications, programs or agents executing on distributed heterogeneous environments.
Because of this objective, they are often referred to as middlewares, situated between the ap-
plication and the network layers, helping the abstraction of the interactions by hiding details
related to the physical properties of the environment. These middlewares differ mainly in the
way they model the communication and in the communication related services they offer.
In [86] and [94], two classifications of coordination systems are proposed. Although they
introduce different levels of classification, we can identify two similar categories in both ap-
proaches: basic coordination infrastructures and coordination frameworks. The former only
introduces the elementary enabling technologies for building coordination systems. These sys-
tems focus essentially on communication and can be seen as the lowest level of coordination.
The latter, focuses on the coordination activities by providing mechanisms to model them and
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by considering them as its core elements. This approach deals with issues particularly relevant
to Internet-based applications. For instance, providing ways of searching, reading and deleting
information in distributed data collections. The “coordination level” of this approach is con-
sidered higher than the one of basic coordination infrastructures as it offers richer coordination
mechanisms.
In order to determine which of these approaches is best-suited to the SMEPP middleware,
we present the two most widely used [94] interaction mechanisms: message passing and remote
procedure call (RPC), that we classify under basic coordination mechanisms. Then, we present
the tuple space based coordination systems that we classified under coordination frameworks.
3.1.1 Coordination systems based on the message passing and RPC
paradigm
The services of message passing based coordination systems focus on the emission and reception
of messages. They help to pack information into messages understandable by heterogeneous
applications, by proving a standard Application Program Interface (API). A standard API
enables the same source code to be compiled on many different platforms. Another common
service of message passing systems is to help managing each of the network members’ messages
queues. Well supported and mature examples of such systems [94] are PVM [103] and MPI
[47]. Although a good programmer using message passing systems can produce very efficient
distributed programs, the task is not really easy. Rowstron (in [94]) compares that difficulty
to the one of producing better machine code than a compiler. These systems are very low-
level and thus, provide only basic coordination mechanisms. Using message passing in order to
implement SMEPP could be an efficient solution, but does not abstract enough coordination
mechanisms to ease its development.
Remote Procedure Call (RPC) [9, 76] also focuses on easing communication between het-
erogeneous applications. RPC-based middlewares communication abstraction is to consider a
method invocation on a distant computer as the one of a locally invoked method. The middle-
wares will provide services to pack methods parameters and to send them through the network.
In addition, they also provide services to retrieve the result of an invocation. RPC has become
very popular [94] and is used in DCOM [64], CORBA [54] and Java RMI [65]. Common RPC
applications are designed in a client-server form: a program provides services that a client can
invoke by getting in contact with the server. However, it is possible to design applications act-
ing as both client and server, so SMEPP applications could be developed using RPC. Still, we
consider RPC-based middlewares being at the same level than message passing systems. They
offer slightly richer coordination mechanisms helping for instance to retrieve results of meth-
ods invocations, saving some efforts regarding the emission of messages, but using RPC-based
systems to develop the SMEPP middleware is still rather complex.
For instance, modelling group communications and catching exceptions thrown by peers
disconnections is much more difficult using RPC than using a coordination framework. Here,
a group member, in order to send a message to the group, would have to call a procedure on
a host (himself or a distant host) being responsible of the message publication. The message
publication process would have to send the message to each group member. In most RPC
implementations, the communication is synchronous, meaning that the sender and the receiver
are bound during a period required to communicate. Exceptions could occur during this process:
one of the invoked hosts could disconnect and threads could stay interrupted waiting for an
answer because of the communication synchrony. Therefore, one can see that components
communicating with each other are tightly coupled in space and time. However, the high
dynamics in ad hoc networks raises the necessity of employing a communication paradigm that
decouples application components in space and time [57].
The discovery of peers, groups and services would require a way to model an entity, which
would have to be contacted at any time, responsible of registering the available groups, peers
and services. CORBA NamingService [53] could for instance be used to achieve this goal,
but the fact that SMEPP requires a decentralised approach implies that a peer cannot know
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in advance all the possible peers and the objects they could register in the NamingService.
Furthermore, the SMEPP decentralisation requirement comes into conflict with the centralised
implementation of the CORBA NamingService.
In the light of the difficulties to implement the SMEPP middleware with basic coordination
infrastructures, we now present the tuple space paradigm, that we classify under coordination
frameworks.
3.1.2 Coordination systems based on the tuple space paradigm
Currently, different approaches are proposed, providing richer coordination models than mes-
sage passing and RPC. However, the systems implementing them are often based on one of
these two paradigms. In general, coordination frameworks are not standalone, general purpose,
programming languages. They are often designed as language extension and focus only on
coordination issues [20]. Examples of such coordination models include event based systems,
distributed shared memory or objects, tuples or data spaces systems as in Linda [50], various
forms of “multiset” rewriting as in Gamma [5] and models with explicit support for coordina-
tors as in Manifold [3] and Reo [4]. The fact is, according to [94], that none of the middlewares
based on these models is likely to become the reference middleware because each of them suits
different applications. For instance, it is quite difficult to conceive video streaming through
shared spaces, but control information could be retrieved from a tuple space in order to stream
videos.
While a great number of models have been designed, a few have been as successful as Linda’s
data space model [50]. Implementations extending the basic ideas of this model have become
ubiquitous and are widely used in the context of web-based applications [94]. The popularity
of this model, which has been the first considered as a coordination language, is such that the
notion of coordination language is often confused with it.
In order to explain the suitability of the data space model to implement distributed open
systems such as SMEPP, we present here the key concepts of Linda and the main advantages
of the tuple space paradigm.
The key concepts of Linda are a shared data space, called tuple space, where tuples can be
put or retrieved from, and a small set of coordination primitives providing means to manipulate
the tuple space. The primitives are orthogonal to any particular language, they are part of the
coordination language and can be added to any other computation language [93].
The main primitives are out, in and rd. They respectively allow to put a tuple on the
tuple space, to retrieve (and remove) a tuple matching its parameter from the tuple space and
to read the content of a tuple matching its parameter. Matching is determined by a matching
rule: a template is provided as parameter of the in and rd primitives, and the tuple matching
this template is returned. In the case of multiple tuples matching the template, Linda does not
specify which tuple is retrieved. Here is an example of out and in primitives to understand
better the matching process: out(<"string",10,a>) puts a tuple containing three fields (a
string, an integer, and the content of the program variable a) to the tuple space. Now, if
in(<"string",10,?b>) is called, the tuple matching the template <"string",10,?b> will
be a tuple having its first field containing the string “string”, its second field containing the
integer 10 and its last field containing a value of the same type as the program variable b. The
notation ?b indicates that the value has to be bound to the variable b after retrieval.
Both in and rd operations are blocking, they suspend the execution of the program as long
as a matching tuple cannot be found. Non-blocking versions of these primitives are inp and
rdp returning true when a matching tuple is found and false otherwise.
The last Linda primitive is eval. Its role is to emit an active tuple in the tuple space, a
tuple where one or more fields do not have a definite value, having to be computed by function
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calls. When an active tuple is emitted, a new process is started for each of the fields having
to be computed. If all these processes finish their computation, this tuple is replaced by a
“normal”, or passive tuple, where the to-be-computed fields are replaced by the results of the
processes. This primitive enables dynamic creation of processes in Linda systems [93].
As we can see, the key concepts of Linda are pretty simple and there is only a small set
of primitive functions. However, it has been demonstrated that Linda is expressive enough to
build parallel applications [28], to express major styles of coordination for parallel applications
[27], to design distributed computing platforms [111, 113] and to program agent-based systems
[34, 37]. This demonstrates the expressiveness and the relevance of tuple-space systems, which
are much more than simple and elegant.
D. Rossi, summarises in [93] the advantages of Linda-based systems for programming open
application:
 Uncoupling. Using a tuple space as a coordination medium uncouples the coordinated
components both in space and time. The agent performing an out in the tuple space does
not have to care about the presence of the agent that will retrieve it. This agent can even
terminate before the tuple will be retrieved. This feature added to the fact that agents
do not have to be in the same location to interact with the tuple space eases the task of
managing interactions in open environments.
For instance, in SMEPP, this feature could be of great use to handle arbitrary peer
disconnection.
 Associative addressing. The way tuples are retrieved using templates specifies what
kind of information is requested, rather than which tuple. This enables more abstract
ways of retrieving information than just retrieving a specific message.
This feature could be very useful in the context of SMEPP to retrieve lists of services or
groups matching user’s criteria.
 Asynchrony and concurrency. The tuple space abstraction can be used to model
parallel applications and can ease the way of dealing with processes concurrency [28, 27].
 Separation of concerns. Coordination languages as Linda are not influenced by char-
acteristics of the host programming language.
In the context of SMEPP, this is an important feature as it targets the interaction of peers
running in heterogeneous systems and invoking services built with different programming
languages.
The tuple space abstraction provides an easy way of mapping specific SMEPP concerns.
For instance, one could model group communication by using different tuple spaces or by us-
ing partitions of the same tuple space. And, one could model an event emission by sending a
tuple corresponding to it in a tuple space. Thus, the tuple space paradigm seems particularly
well suited to SMEPP applications and appears as an interesting way to ease SMEPP imple-
mentation compared to RPC or message passing middlewares. However, there are emerging
coordination issues to be solved when tuple space based coordination systems are used.
3.2 Emerging issues of coordination
This section aims at presenting the emerging issues of coordination in tuple space systems
and to show their implications in the SMEPP middleware implementation. Presenting these
coordination issues also highlights the required features of coordination systems that could be
used in order to develop the SMEPP middleware.
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3.2.1 Run-time systems implementations concerns
Every tuple-based implementation requires a run-time system, often called tuple-space manager,
TS Manager, TSM, etc. We can compare it to the kernel of the system [94]. The designers
of kernels take design decisions influencing the purpose of the systems. The most relevant
feature to study is whether implementations are open or closed, as programming techniques
to implement these two kinds of systems are very different. A closed implementation is an
implementation which needs all the information about entities that will communicate through
the tuple space at the kernel startup. In such systems, it is therefore impossible to join or leave
the network at will. This kind of system does not suit at all the SMEPP requirements. In
contrast, an open implementation does not require the kernel to have this kind of information.
The kernel in such systems is distributed as a set of kernel processes among the entities of the
system. In these systems, entities can join and leave the network at will. Closed implementa-
tions suit better parallel computing while open implementations are well adapted to Wide Area
Network (WAN) based applications and ad hoc networks. Usually, open implementations do
not emphasis on efficiency (as closed implementations do) but on supporting security, reliability,
heterogeneity and availability [94]. This leads to different techniques to implement both kinds
of systems.
All open implementation kernels require a number of design choices to be made. We want
to focus on the following choices:
 Tuple distribution: how are the tuples going to be distributed across kernel processes?
 Tuple format : how are the tuples represented?
 Tuple storage: how are the tuples stored within a single kernel process?
Tuple format and storage mainly influence the performance of the kernel. There is usually
a tradeoff between the complexity of the data structure chosen to store tuples within a process
and the cost of comparing tuples and templates [94]. For instance, the number of tuples to
be checked in order to find a tuple matching a template can vary according to tuple storage
choice. The bigger the number of checks to perform is, the higher the cost of the communication
is. One can reduce the cost of checking tuples against templates by choosing a simple tuple
format. It is also important to define whether the language needs a language-independent way
of encoding the tuples in case the language aims at supporting various host languages.
We want now to focus on explaining the different tuple distribution techniques. Four tech-
niques are presented in [94]:
 Centralised. A unique kernel is called by every processes to perform tuple-space opera-
tions and all the tuples are stored in it. The advantage of this approach is that the kernel
is kept simple and that it is easy to know the state of the tuple space at any time. The
main problem of this approach is that the single kernel becomes a bottleneck and a point
of failure when a high number of processes perform concurrent tuple space operations.
This approach is not well suited to large-scale environments but is more adapted to a
small set of processes having to communicate via the tuple space.
 Uniform Distribution. There is more than one kernel and the tuples are distributed
evenly over them. They are often designed in such a way that every application commu-
nicating in the tuple space owns two kernel processes: an in-set and an out-set. When a
tuple is sent to a tuple-space, it is broadcasted to all the kernel processes’ out-set. When
a tuple is required from a tuple space, the request is broadcasted to all the kernel pro-
cesses’ in-set. In the case of an in operation, kernel processes have to synchronise their
contents in order to prevent the same tuple to be retrieved twice. This approach suits
more the concept of distributed and decentralised applications such as SMEPP but can be
enhanced in terms of performance using the Intermediate Uniform Distribution approach.
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 Intermediate Uniform Distribution. This is a particular form of Uniform Distribu-
tion where the cardinality of the in- and out-set is equal to the square root of the number
of applications (nodes) communicating in the tuple space. For instance, if 16 nodes are
used, there will be 4 in-sets and 4 out-sets, meaning that in-sets and out-sets will be
shared. The sharing is done in such a way that 4 nodes share the same out-set but these
same nodes do not share the same in-set. This form of distribution has been proved
optimal in terms of the number of nodes involved in an in primitive and an out primitive
[1]. This approach is used in the Linda machine [1, 62], providing hardware means to
ensure the consistency of the tuple spaces after several in primitives. When used without
specific hardware, as in [46, 104], it is shown [46] that the cost of synchronisation is too
high. Indeed, kernel processes of the in-set concerned by an in operation must first agree
on which of them will answer the query, then, the elected one must inform the kernel
processes of its out-set that the tuple is being removed, then, these processes will have
to synchronise their contents. This can easily lead to inconsistencies in the tuple spaces
because of the high number of messages being sent between different processes.
 Distributed Hashing. This technique is also used in the context of distributed kernels.
The kernel process in charge of a tuple is selected upon properties of the tuple itself.
A hashing function is applied to the tuple or to a template, to determine which kernel
process will be in charge of it. This saves time to search in which kernel process resides the
tuple corresponding to a template because the hashing function applied to the template
returns the kernel process in which the corresponding tuple is stored [10]. A good hashing
function has to possess two properties: to provide a unique mapping between every tuple
and templates matching it to a single kernel process, and to provide a good distribution
of the tuples. However, such an approach has only been efficiently achieved on closed
implementation systems [94]. For open implementations, efficient algorithms have not
been found yet because of the limited amount of information provided within a template
and the lack of compile-time analysis of all tuples and the templates used within a system.
Still, this approach can be used in open implementations as follows: hashing functions
will match a tuple to a unique kernel processes, but templates will be matched to several.
As a consequence, the request must be either broadcasted to every kernel processes or
sent to a specific one. In the first case, the user application will have to take measures
if multiple tuples are returned, while in the second case, the request will have to be
forwarded again if a matching tuple is not found in the selected kernel process. Thus,
in open implementations, the communication overhead of this approach makes it not as
efficient as in closed implementations.
In conclusion, any kind of uniform distribution would be suited to SMEPP as we can consider
they give similar results on hardwares not particularly designed to enhance the distribution
mechanisms.
3.2.2 Coordination and mobility
The notion of mobility requires that there exist entities performing moves, a space where move-
ments are observable and rules governing the motion. An important aspect regarding mobility
is that entities should have ways of observing changes occurring in the space to better perceive
their environment and take decisions according to it. This ability is often referred to as context
management, i.e. the wordlview of the individual units [91]. In this section, we want to dis-
cuss the issues introduced by the above mentioned concepts of mobility when considering tuple
spaces as the space in which entities interact. The topics of the issues we want to present are
related to the space of interactions itself and to context management.
As we explained in Subsection 3.1.2, uncoupling is one of the advantages of tuple space
based coordination systems. They allow an agent to send a tuple in the tuple space without
having to care about the presence of an agent who will potentially retrieve it. Moreover, this
kind of systems allows the tuple to be retrieved even after the disconnection of the agent who
has sent the tuple. The question is whether this statement holds in the context of mobile ad
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hoc networks? The fact that a tuple can be retrieved after an agent’s disconnection requires the
presence of an always present and shared entity responsible of storing and managing the tuples
as agents do not know each other and as they enter and leave the network at will. This does
not embody the concept of mobile ad hoc networks and decentralised peer-to-peer networks
that cannot rely on a central entity. It is therefore needed to rethink the space of coordination
itself in order to be useful in such kinds of applications. A realistic situation requiring this kind
of communication could be cars on a highway exchanging information among themselves when
being physically close enough. Interesting models have been proposed to deal with mobility, in
particular, Lime [75], a middleware designed to provide transient and transitive sharing of tuple
spaces. In this model, “mobile agents reside on mobile hosts that can form ad hoc networks
when in proximity of each other. When this happens, the agents appear to share a common
data environment (tuple space) and have the opportunity to jump from one to another [91]”.
We shall not detail here the concepts of Lime, as this will be done in Section 3.3 along with
other tuple space based systems.
Another issue when considering this kind of mobile applications and tuple space based
coordination systems is context management. How can mobile agents be aware of the presence,
arrival and departure of new agents in the network? Such a notification feature could be
implemented using the tuple space model by adding a tuple containing presence information
in a shared tuple space. This solution induces again a central entity which is not appropriate
to mobile applications. Moreover, the management of the presence information can be difficult
in the case of sudden disconnections of an agent. In this case, the agent cannot communicate
its new status to the central entity. Therefore it should be responsible of checking at regular
intervals of time the presence of agents.
The SMEPP middleware has to deal with the above mentioned issues induced by mobility.
Indeed, peers must discover groups and services in a unpredictable environment. They are also
responsible for the consistency of the data sent which is an additional complication in the case
of sudden disconnections. It is therefore important to chose a tuple space based coordination
language providing means easing context management in a decentralised environment.
3.2.3 Coordination and security
So far, we did not introduce the notion of security in tuple spaces. In the current situation,
there is no guarantee that a tuple sent to a tuple space by an agent A to an agent B would
be actually retrieved by B. This issue, together with other security issues having to be tackled
by tuple space systems, are presented in this section by introducing an architectural solution
proposed by [16]. While explaining the concepts of this architecture, we present its suitability
in the SMEPP security model.
We start by presenting the above mentioned general security architecture for tuple space
systems. A secure system must possess a trusted computed base (TCB) [29]. A TCB is the
set of code and data needed to secure system operations. It can be used to store access rights,
encryption keys and to house authentication and authorisation procedures. The primary com-
ponent of a TCB is the reference monitor [29]. Its role is to intercept each access by an agent
to a tuple space to verify that this access is allowed by the security policy, being the set of rules
specifying how sensitive information has to be accessed in a computer system [29]. Figure 3.1
illustrates a reference monitor for the shared space model. Its role is to intercept every tuple
space operation and to consult the security policy in order to allow or refuse it.
The first comment we can make regarding the suitability of this architecture to the SMEPP
security model is that the reference monitor cannot be a centralised unit intercepting every
tuple space operation. The reference monitor should be local to every peer in order to keep the
implementation decentralised. As a consequence, the security policy will not be managed by a
trusted central entity. It follows that the security policy must rely on a pre-defined and static
basis.
CHAPTER 3. STATE OF THE ART 45
Figure 3.1: The shared space model with a reference monitor.
A TCB must also provide mechanisms for identifying agents (authentication) and for veri-
fying their privileges in the shared space (authorisation) by defining a flexible security policy.
Flexibility in the context of security policies means that a wide range of policies can be sup-
ported, from a policy allowing or refusing full access to a tuple space to a policy controlling
which tuples can be accessed and what operations are allowed on them. Flexible security poli-
cies could be used in the context of SMEPP to deal with different security levels giving more
or less privileges to specific peers, for instance, granting access to a limited number of groups.
Now that we have introduced the main components required by a TCB, we want to present
protocols proposed by [16] to manage authentication and authorisation in tuple space based
systems.
Authentication is a pre-condition for authorising a request. It is needed to determine the
access rights that can be granted to an agent [29]. Authentication is more general in open
systems, as an agent can personify one or more individuals. To be authenticated, agents are
not forced to show their real identities but are assumed to show a set of data called credentials
sufficient to recognise them. This idea is the starting point of what Bryce, in [16], calls the
reference authentication protocol, the protocol authentication process, or PAP, shown in Figure
3.2. It is called reference protocol because of its generality. Basically, a user wishing to be
authenticated shows its credentials to the PAP. If the authentication is successful, the PAP
returns an authentication token to the agent. Then, when the user wants to communicate
using the tuple space, the authentication token is joined to every of his request. In this way, the
reference monitor checks which permissions are associated with this authentication token and
decides whether the request is allowed or refused. Either symmetric or asymmetric cryptography
can be used to implement authentication protocols in general.
C. Bryce ([16]) proposes an implementation of the PAP protocol over tuple spaces that can
be summarised as follows:
 It is assumed that each entity and the PAP own a pair of keys used for asymmetric
encryption. One of the keys is public and the other is kept secret. A data encrypted with
a public key can only be decrypted using the corresponding secret key and a data signed
with a private key can only be verified by using the corresponding public key. The term
signed is used when encrypting with a private key because only the owner of the private
key can compute this encryption. Thus, it is considered as the owner’s signature.
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Figure 3.2: The protocol authentication process.
 The communication between the PAP and the entities is done using the same tuple space
for every entity.
 A client wishing to be authenticated emits a tuple encrypted with the public key of the
PAP so that only the PAP can read it. This tuple contains the credentials of the client
signed with its own private key to ensure it has been emitted by him. Note that even if
this tuple is retrieved by someone else than the PAP, its real content will not be revealed.
 In case of successful authentication, once the PAP retrieves the previously sent tuple, he
answers a tuple encrypted with the client public key. Thus, only the client can know its
real content. This tuple contains the authentication token signed with the private key of
the PAP so that the client can be sure the token was created by the PAP.
Although this implementation suits well systems where a central entity can act as the PAP,
it is not well adapted to decentralised systems because the PAP must know at startup what
kind of authentication token it must grant to every possible user. This is actually impossible
in an environment where all users cannot be known in advance. What could be done to keep
this kind of implementation in decentralised systems is to gather users in categories to which
is associated a specific authentication token to ease authentication management. Moreover,
the notion of a centralised PAP does not meet decentralised systems ideas and, consequently,
does not fit in the context of SMEPP. As a result, one of our tasks in this thesis is precisely to
implement authentication by adapting the reference protocol in a decentralised setting.
As explained before, the authorisation process grants a token determining the privilege of
the authenticated entity. The process concerned with defining, enforcing and protecting access
rights privileges is called authorisation. The main problem, regarding tuple space systems, to
store and protect access rights, is that tuple spaces can be accessed by any agent, leaving access
rights readable and alterable. One issue to consider, helping to solve this problem, is then
the granularity of access rights: whether rights are granted to agents for tuples attributes, for
tuples, or for spaces [16]. For instance, one could consider a PAP tuple space, where agents
could only perform read operations to avoid access rights to be deleted. The problem of this
solution in a decentralised peer-to-peer environment is that it requires a special entity being
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able to perform out operations on that PAP tuple space. This concept does not embody the
decentralised nature of the environment. Thus, another task in the implementation of the
SMEPP middleware will be to determine how to deal with authorisation in a decentralised way.
In the SMEPP environment, there is the need to bind a peer to its access rights, being the groups
it can join and the services it is allowed to discover. This binding is referred as a Capability in
[16]. The issue is to define, as we said earlier, how these capabilities can be safely stored in a
tuple space, but also how to manage their creation: can capabilities be dynamically modified
or do they have to be static? The issue of allowing dynamic modifications of capabilities in a
decentralised peer-to-peer environment where peers are untrusted seems to be unsolvable if we
do not accept that some trusted peers or stationary security entities exist. Therefore, adopting
a static way of managing capabilities seems to be the most attractive solution in this kind of
environment, as SMEPP security guidelines enforce the absence of trusted peers or stationary
security entities.
3.3 A taxonomy for tuple space based systems
Sections 3.1 and 3.2 have highlighted the relevance of tuple space systems to implement open
systems and have explained coordination issues to be tackled by them as well as some limitations
of the Linda model. To overcome these limitations, many projects have extended the Linda
model under different aspects and designed tuple space coordination systems implementing the
modified models. This section presents a number of tuple space systems by using a taxonomy,
proposed in [93], in order to determine the systems we could use to implement the SMEPP
middleware proof-of-concept. Three categories are proposed:
 Systems extending the primitives. These systems extend the set of Linda primi-
tives by adding new ones or modifying existing ones. Such systems are often specifically
designed for a certain context.
 Systems adding programmability. These systems give the capability of modifying the
behaviour of the tuple space by programming it, without changing the set of primitives.
 Systems modifying the model. These systems enhance Linda by modifying its model.
Again, these systems are often designed for specific contexts and purposes.
We present the languages falling into these three categories using a set of criteria, proposed in
[93], wide enough to include most aspects of tuple space models and small enough to include
only the relevant ones. This set is based on the authors’ experience in designing, developing
and using tuple space systems. This set can be summarised as follows:
 Extensibility considers the following properties: can new coordination primitives be
added? Can the behaviour of the primitives be changed? Can the matching mechanism
be customised?
 Data space structure considers properties of the data space: can one or more tuple
space be defined? how are the tuple spaces created and distributed? In the case of
multiple spaces, are they considered as a flat collection or hierarchically organised? What
kind of data are exchanged via the space?
 Platform-related issues consider the influence of the tuple space system host language
and its architecture on the coordination language. They also consider the portability of
the system and what kind of run-time system is used.
 Technological Additions consider transaction support, mobility support, security sup-
port and development/analysis tools support.
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3.3.1 Systems extending the primitives
Jada
Jada [36, 92], developed by D. Rossi and P. Ciancarini, is a coordination language for Java
designed to coordinate parallel and distributed components. The Jada model extends the Linda
model by adding new primitives and by allowing the creation of more than one ObjectSpace1,
a specialised object container. Local concurrent programming can be achieved by using the
jada package while distributed programming API resides in the jada.net package [92]. The
additional jada primitives are: readAll, inAll, getAll and getAny. Respectively, the first
two read and retrieve all the objects matching one template, while getAll returns all the objects
matching a set of templates and getAny returns any object matching a set of templates. Every
primitive can be used with a timeout, being the time within which a primitive must be executed.
Additionally, out primitives can specify a time-to-live in order to express the time that the data
sent must remain in the ObjectSpace. All the in-like and read-like primitives are non-blocking.
They output an instance of the Result class, serving the purpose of checking the actual result of
the primitives: either a failure (in case of a timeout or by process abortion), or the data result.
The retrieval methods on the Result class are blocking, until the result is actually available.
The Jada matching policy is customisable thanks to the JadaObject interface. The matches
method must be implemented to define how a template matches a tuple.
Distributed programming in Jada is inspired by the client/server paradigm. ObjectServers
store ObjectSpaces and listen on a port waiting for client request. ObjectClients are cre-
ated given the hostname and the port of ObjectSpace they want to communicate with. This
approach cannot be used in a decentralised ad hoc network environment where agents cannot
speculate on the presence of other agents and cannot rely on a central entity managing the
communication. Security in Jada can be done at two levels: at the tuple space level by defining
access control policies and at the communication level by supporting encryption of the content
being transferred. Jada has been used for several research projects [93] to implement quite
different systems, from parallel computing to Internet-based card games, from distributed col-
laborative applications to mobile agents systems. Code mobility in Jada is possible as Jada
implements the eval primitive, evaluable objects are moved to a remote JVM in order to be
executed as new threads on it. Jada has also been used to provide coordination for applications
based on PageSpace [38] (see page 59 for a description of PageSpace).
T Spaces
T Spaces [113], is a Java-based coordination middleware from IBM Research division, targeting
a broad range of software architectures, from small embedded systems to large-scale distributed
systems. Interaction with tuple spaces is done in the same way as Jada, monolithic tuple space
servers are accessed from remote Java-based clients. A server contains one tuple space, but
creating multiple tuple spaces on the same host is possible by running several instances of
the server applications. A client wishing to access a tuple space server must specify its host
address and port in order to perform tuple space operations. As for Jada, the way T Spaces
manages communications is not suited to decentralised ad hoc environments because network
members cannot speculate on the presence of other members and are not supposed to know
every possible host/port couple at startup. Using such systems to develop decentralised ad hoc
environment would require to build context management features on top of it. T Spaces tuples,
classes extending the abstract SuperTuple class, are sequences of potentially named fields which
can be any Java object implementing the Serializable interface. T Spaces primitives are
extensible, users can define new primitives and download them to the tuple space server. Built-
in primitives are the standard Linda primitives, to which are added the aggregate primitives
(multiple rd and in) and the blocking rendezvous primitive (rhonda), which takes a tuple and
a template as arguments, and succeeds when another client performs another rhonda operation
with a matching tuple/template pair.
1An ObjectSpace is the implementation of a tuple space.
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The standard matching process in T Spaces is as follows: a template and a tuple match if
the tuple type is a subtype of the template type, the tuple and the template have the same
number of fields, each tuple field is an instance of the type of the corresponding template, and,
for each non-formal2 field of the template, the field value matches the value of the corresponding
tuple field.
Another way of accessing the tuple spaces is to use queries enabling matching operations to
be combined using or and and operators. This helps to perform SQL’s Select-like operations.
T Spaces provides mechanisms ensuring consistency in the tuple space server for both intra-
operation and inter-operation consistency. The first is ensured by a checkpoint/recovery mech-
anism while the latter is ensured by a transaction system as in relational databases.
Security in T Spaces is achieved through an authentication process based on a simple login/-
password mechanism and by access control at the tuple space level (each tuple space operation
is defined with a set of attributes that an entity must possess in order to be allowed to execute
the operation). However, C. Bryce, in [16], details flaws of T Spaces security mechanisms. It
does not implement the concept of a reference monitor (see Section 3.2.3) which is prone to
problems due to the lack of total mediation in open environments. Moreover, the cryptography
applied to authentication and authorisation in T Spaces supports only very basic features [16].
T Spaces is actually reflecting too much its designers’ background in database systems.
They consider tuple spaces as databases and therefore implement mechanisms to deal with its
consistency by using complex transaction systems. Indeed, this is useful to search for large
amounts of data using complex queries, but it can be the source of low performances in systems
where there are only a few tuples. Therefore, we consider T Spaces more suited to large scale
centralised systems rather than to decentralised open systems in general.
JavaSpaces
JavaSpaces [48], is part of Sun’s Jini [111] framework which allows interconnections of all sorts of
devices that run Java virtual machines. JavaSpaces aims at providing distributed repositories of
information, similar to Linda tuple spaces, to ease the design and implementation of distributed
applications.
JavaSpaces are tuple spaces containing tuples represented as Java objects implementing the
Entry interface. Thus, any object implementing it can be stored in a JavaSpace. Access to
a space is specified in the JavaSpace interface. This interface allows to take, read and write
Entry objects in the JavaSpace. Moreover, it allows to notify agents previously registered when
an entry matching a given template is written in the space.
Each tuple is associated with a lease time, i.e. the tuple’s lifetime. When it is over, the
tuple is removed from the space. This feature associated with the notification feature can be
useful to represent SMEPP events, as registered agents could be warned that an event has been
produced and as no longer valid events would be automatically removed.
As in T Spaces, JavaSpaces allows to define transactions using external transaction services,
for example the one supplied by the Jini technology.
JavaSpaces matching is static and is specified as follows: a tuple template which is an
instance of class A matches a tuple which is either an instance of class A, or an instance of
a class B which is a subclass of A if their fields match. Field matching is determined by the
serialised form of the fields, being a byte array representation of the object. Two fields match
if their serialised forms match. Linda matching mechanism is thus extended with subtype
matching and field type matching.
JavaSpaces does not really tackle security. Any agent that owns a reference to a space can
write, read or remove tuples from this space. For this reason, JavaSpaces is not yet ready to
support secure applications [16].
JavaSpaces provides a mechanism to look up for newly created JavaSpaces by using the so-
called LookUp service relying on the Jini lookup service. Entities wishing to publish a JavaSpace
2A formal field specifies a data type (e.g. string, integer, etc.), while an actual (i.e. non-formal) field contains
an exact value (e.g. “abcd”, 10).
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must first obtain a proxy to this central LookUp service in order to publish it. Clients wishing
to discover a JavaSpace have to contact the LookUp service. It is responsible to provide them
JavaSpace references matching a template. This template specifies the properties the clients
are looking for.
The LookUp service can be compared to the CORBA Naming Service as it provides a way to
register and discover distributed objects [53]. Consequently, context management in SMEPP
could be implemented on top of the JavaSpaces LookUp service. However, this would induce
the difficulties presented in Section 3.1.1 regarding context management using CORBA Naming
Service (i.e. the centralised implementation of the LookUp service and its unpredictable content
due to the decentralised nature of SMEPP).
KLAIM
KLAIM [41], developed by R. Nicola, G.L. Ferrari and R. Pugliese, is a coordination model
allowing agents to be moved from one computing environment to another. An available imple-
mentation of the model, named KLAVA [8], has been developed in Java. The KLAIM model
is based on Linda but allows multiple tuple spaces and borrows operators from the process
algebra CCS [67]. In order to achieve its mobility goal, KLAIM processes are network-aware
and the network is composed of locations, considered both at logical and physical level, where
processes can move and execute.
The main concepts used to model the network are processes, nodes and nets. Processes
represent the active entities of the system and are located at a given location. Nodes represent
the locations and are modelled as triples of the form (s,P,ρ), where s is a site (a physical
location), P represents the set of processes of the node, and ρ is the allocation environment,
mapping logical localities to their associated physical localities (sites). Logical localities are
symbolic names for nodes while physical localities are their unique identifiers, i.e. their addresses
among the Nets. Nets are sets of nodes and represent a logical view of the network.
KLAIM tuples and operations are located at specific sites of a net. All operations can be
invoked by specifying a given location where the operation must be performed. For instance,
out(t)@l writes the tuple t at the location l. KLAIM operations are the classic Linda opera-
tions: in, inp, rd, rdp, out and eval. In addition, a timeout can be specified when calling in
or rd to specify the time within the operation must be accomplished.
Among nets, KLAIM provides a hierarchical structure for the nodes. Nets contains subnets
for which they act as gateways, they route the information of the subnets members if necessary.
For instance, let node A and node B be in the same subnet. If A wants to send a message to B,
A must forward its message to the gateway which then forwards the message to B. One can see
that this system does not suit decentralised architectures because of its hierarchical topology.
However, KLAIM allows another communication system, allowing a process to connect directly
to another one. The resulting communication is unidirectional. Therefore, there is no built-in
support for peer-to-peer bidirectional communication. Still, this feature can be programmed
by the application developer, but requires additional programming effort [7].
KLAIM deals with security using static access rights mechanisms enforced by the “network
administrator”. Access rights must be pre-defined at the agent startup. They restrict which
tuple spaces it can access and which operations it can perform. The granularity of this access
control mechanism is not fine enough to specify which tuples an agent is authorised to produce,
read or retrieve.
SecOS
In contrast to the models presented above, the SecOS model, developed by C. Bryce, M. Cre-
monini and J. Vitek, uses a dynamic security policy [17]. This means that the reference monitor
described in Section 3.2.3 exists at run-time and is integrated into the system [16]. The main
purpose of SecOS is to provide coordination mechanisms between agents in mistrusted environ-
ments.
The key concept of SecOS is that keys are associated with objects in tuples. An agent must
provide a matching key in order to access the corresponding tuple object. SecOS allows to use
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either symmetric or asymmetric keys. In the symmetric case, the same key used to lock the
object is used to unlock it. The same key is then shared by all the processes allowed to actually
unlock the object. In the asymmetric case, key pairs are used. When one key of the pair is
used to lock an object, the other is used to unlock the object. As we explained in Section 3.2.3
about the PAP protocol, one of the key is kept private while the corresponding key is public to
every process.
SecOS is implemented in Java [18]. It reuses security mechanisms introduced by JavaSpaces:
the reference monitor does not allow the matching process to be redefined and only copies of
objects are stored within the space.
SecOS provides two ways for implementing the locking mechanism. Within a Java environ-
ment, objects and key pairs are protected using Java typing. A specific type exists and can
only be interpreted as access right. No other data can be considered as an access right. Typing
safeguards against access rights fabrication and makes rights propagation easier to detect and
control [77]. However, this mechanism cannot be used when entities do not trust each other.
They question their mutual ability to produce trusted access rights. Type safety is also not
feasible when data are sent over the network, stored on disk or when tuples are stored in spaces
of untrusted environments [16]. To solve this problem, when an object and a key pair K:v are
used outside a trusted environment, an encryption key is associated with the key object K,
encrypting the object v. In this way, the object is never exposed in a untrusted environment.
Keys distribution is done by using the tuple space. Keys are stored in it and must be encrypted
with other keys in order to protect them.
Using SecOS, the PAP implementation proposed in Section 3.2.3 can be easily implemented
as it provides all the abstract mechanisms required. Therefore, any agent in SecOS can act as
a PAP to enforce an application security policy using asymmetric keys. However, the problem
of this security mechanism in the context of SMEPP is that it does not embody decentralised
systems as explained in Section 3.2.3 (PAP implementation). Moreover, SecOS does not provide
built-in mechanisms to deal with context management and mobility.
LindaCap
LindaCap [106] is an abstract run-time system implementing a coordination model developed
by A.Wood and N.I. Udzir. This model aims at proposing finer access control mechanisms than
those based on access control lists [24] or capabilities [17, 41, 43, 52, 56, 60, 71, 84]. A capability
can be seen as a “ticket” granted to an agent by the system. This ticket represents the binding
between an object and the agent’s right on it. It has been established that capabilities offer more
flexibility than access control lists [30, 95, 112], an important requirement for systems where
users can join and leave at will. Capabilities are held by the agents and can be transfered in an
agent-to-agent way. Therefore, using capabilities, an incoming agent wishing to access an object
simply has to request a capability from the other members of the system. When using access
control lists, numerous lists attached to the required object have to be modified and maintained,
making the process less flexible. The problem of capabilities is that they must refer to single
named objects. In the context of Linda, only tuple spaces are single named object, while tuples
are not. Therefore, capabilities for tuples cannot be defined. The LindaCap model intends to
provide a solution to this problem by introducing the concept of multicapabilities.
Multicapabilities allow to define rights bound to a set of unnamed objects, such as tuples. In
addition to this feature, multicapabilities allow agents to create private partitions of the tuple
space based on a set of tuple. This set is specified by a standard Linda template. For instance,
let two agents A and B interact with a tuple space ts in order to work with templates containing
two fields: a string and an integer. Before being allowed to perform an operation concerning
the set of tuples specified by this template, A and B must first obtain a multicapability for
it. A’s multicapability consists in a unique identifier α, the template and a set of permissions.
Permissions can be either i, r, o representing the rights to perform in, rd and out operations
related to the above mentioned template. B’s multicapability for the same template will be
identified by a different identifier, i.e. β. Let A perform ts.out(’a’,1) using its multicapability.
If B performs ts.in(’a’,1), no matching tuple will be found and the operation will block.
The reason is that a multicapability forms a private partition based on a template for an agent.
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To allow B to perform operations on A’s tuple, A must share the multicapability α with B.
Therefore, agents are the only actors deciding to grant access to their partitions, providing a
decentralised access control management. The way multicapabilities are shared and managed
will be explained later.
The LindaCap model allows to define both multicapabilities for templates and unicapabilities
(standard capabilities) for tuple spaces. Unicapabilities contain two parts: the tuple space
concerned and the set of operations allowed on it by the capability holder. The structure of the
model is based on the following rules:
 Every tuple space and every tuple operation require a capability. Each agent performing
an operation on a tuple must obtain a unicapability bound to the tuple space where the
tuple is stored (or where it will be written). In addition, a multicapability for a template
matching this tuple is required. Therefore, the unicapability for a tuple space and the
multicapability for a template are passed as arguments of every tuple space operation (in,
rd and out).
 Every request for a new capability returns a new and unique capability (even for identical
templates), with full rights. An agent can request a new full-right multicapability for a
template tmp by calling the newcap(tmp) method.
 An agent can create a tuple space by calling the TupleSpaceC() method. This method
returns a full-right unicapability to the agent.
 The system provides a universal tuple space (UTS) which exists independently of the
agents. It is publicly accessible as every agent possesses a default unicapability with full
rights on it. However, they must acquire multicapabilities for specific templates before
performing tuple operations on the UTS.
 Every agent owns a default multicapability allowing to write or read capability tuples.
Every agent can read any capability tuple by using the template ?cap as argument of a
read operation. This multicapability allows agents to share and discover multicapabilities.
Indeed, thanks to this multicapability, an agent can share one of its acquired capabilities
by sending it in the UTS. Then, other agents will be able to read this capability by
performing an rd(〈?cap〉) operation on the UTS.
 An agent owning a multicapability allowing operations on a template can produce from
it other lower privilege multicapabilities. These capabilities still allow to operate on the
same templates, but do not allow as many operations to be executed. This mechanism
can, for instance, be useful to define read-only tuples. An agent acquires a full-right mul-
ticapability for a specific template, and then only publishes in the UTS a multicapability
allowing read operations.
The advantages of LindaCap in the context of SMEPP are the following: multicapabilities
provide a way to define dynamic access control mechanisms in a decentralised way. The agents
are responsible of managing and sharing the access rights to their tuples and tuple spaces.
Therefore LindaCap’s security model can be used to implement a higher level of security than
SMEPP’s default level. LindaCap also provides means to deal with context management issues
by providing a default multicapability and the UTS tuple space. Once an agent joins the
network, it can use the default multicapability to discover capabilities which could represent
groups or services information. However, the main problem of LindaCap regarding SMEPP
requirements is that it does not embody the ideas of peer-to-peer systems. Indeed, the creators
of tuples, tuple spaces and capabilities have a specific role. All the above mentioned objects
are not publicly “shared” but created by one entity allowing or not access to them. Therefore
entities cannot be considered as peers. Moreover, in case of an object’s creator death, LindaCap
proposes the garbage collection of the created objects. The consequence is that when a tuple
space creator gets disconnected, LindaCap system could decide to delete the tuple space if
necessary3. This mechanism is extremely problematic in the context of SMEPP as a group
3For instance, when the memory usage is higher than a certain percentage.
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creator’s death does not result in the deletion of the group. Therefore, LindaCap cannot be
used as it is to implement the SMEPP middleware. However, its security model is an interesting
approach to deal with dynamic access control in a decentralised way.
SecSpaces
SecSpaces [52] is a coordination model, developed by N. Busi et al., supporting secure coordi-
nation in open environments. SecSpaces proposes access control mechanisms at the tuple level,
meaning that the control information is stored within tuples. This way of implementing access
control is inspired by the SecOS model [17]. In SecOS, a read operation is a succession of an
in operation followed by an out operation [17]. There are two consequences of this design.
The first is that there is no distinction between a destructive and a non-destructive operation.
Therefore, it is not possible to model an information which can only be read by specific agents,
and not retrieved. In SMEPP, this feature is interesting as the middleware must ensure that
an information published by a peer cannot be deleted by other peers. The second consequence
is that an agent can reproduce any tuple it previously read. Any reader automatically receives
producer permissions. This is problematic in the context of the SMEPP middleware. Indeed,
event publication can be modelled by a tuple sent from a producer to a tuple space. Therefore,
subscriber can discover the event by reading the tuple. The problem is actually that subscribers
automatically become event producers by reading the event tuple.
The SecSpaces model intends to solve these problems by introducing two field-based security
mechanisms: partition fields and asymmetric partition fields. Each of these two kinds of fields
has two variants: one used in case of a read operation, and the other used in case of an in
operation.
A Partition field provides a way to partition the tuple space by modifying the matching
rule. A template and a tuple match if the template provides the exact value of the partition
field of the tuple, and if the other fields of the template match the other fields of the tuple.
Therefore, a partition field can be seen as a symmetric key used to allow the agents knowing
it to access a partition of the tuple space. The main issue concerning partition fields is their
distribution. The implementation must decide whether or not distributing them as tuples in
a tuple space. If the system allows them to be distributed as tuples, a mechanism must be
found to ensure that they cannot be discovered by untrusted agents. Indeed, an agent wishing
to share a partition field within a tuple space certainly would like to share it with only specific
trusted agents.
SecSpaces introduces asymmetric partition fields as a mechanism ensuring this property.
Within a partition, an asymmetric partition field can be attached to a tuple. This field can
take two specific values, being either K or CO-K. K is only known by the agents authorised to
send the tuple to the tuple space, while CO-K is only known by the agents authorised to read or
retrieve this tuple. Therefore, the matching rule must be modified in such a way that only the
templates specifying CO-K match the tuples having their asymmetric partition field set to K, and
symmetrically. The problem is that the middleware must be able to check the correspondence
between K and CO-K, and that this information cannot be shared as tuples. Indeed, this would
trigger the same problem highlighted by partition fields as they could be read by untrusted
entities. Therefore, they must be static and private. Moreover, the implementation of the
partition fields must be done in such a way that an agent knowing K should not be able to guess
CO-K from it, and symmetrically.
An implementation of asymmetric partition fields matching rule has been proposed using
asymmetric cryptography. An asymmetric partition field is implemented as a triple (p, PubK, s),
where p is a string, PubK is an asymmetric public key and s is a string encrypted with an
asymmetric key. If s corresponds to the string p encrypted with the key k, s can be written
{p}k. Using this representation, the matching rule is defined as follows:
 Let PubK and PubK ′ be the public key associated with the private keys PrivK and
PrivK ′
 Let K = (p, PubK, s) and CO-K = (p′, PubK ′, s′)
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 K matches CO-K if s = {p′}PrivK′ and s′ = {p}PrivK
The first remark regarding this implementation is that an agent knowing only K is not able
to produce CO-K, and symmetrically. To produce K, an agent needs to know a private key
PrivK ′ and the public key PubK corresponding to the private key PrivK used in CO-K. As
the knowledge of PubK is not sufficient to produce PrivK, CO-K cannot be derived from K.
Therefore, if we assume that an agent A keeps K private and that every other agent knows CO-K,
it is impossible for a reader to reproduce a tuple protected by K4.
The second remark regarding the implementation is that it provides a way to create se-
cure communication channels between two agents. If an agent A wants to send a tuple to
and only to an agent B, A must set K to (p, PubKB , {p}PrivKA), and B must set CO-K to
(p, PubKA, {p}PrivKB ). Thanks to this mechanism, even if an agent C knows the string p, it
will not be able to produce a matching CO-K field as it does not know PrivKA.
The last addition proposed by the SecSpaces security model is to define two predefined
partition fields: one allowing read operations and the other allowing in operations. The same
addition is available for asymmetric partition fields. This allows to define a finer grained access
control policy discriminating between read and removal authorisations.
The SecSpaces security model provides mechanisms allowing to develop SMEPP default
security level and security level 2. Partition fields can be used to model group communications,
while asymmetric partition fields can be used to model access control policies. Moreover,
asymmetric partition fields allow to authenticate agents and to create secure communication
channels. The main issue is to find a decentralised way of distributing public keys within
tuple spaces. In order to do it, we could assume the presence of a universal tuple space, such
as LindaCap’s UTS [106], where the SecSpaces kernel could store agents’ identities. Having
SecSpaces enhanced with the UTS mechanism would also provide context management features
which are not foreseen by the current model.
SecSpaces is at the moment only a theoretical model without implementation. In addition,
the model does not provide mechanisms to deal with context management issues. Therefore,
it must be extended with such features and implemented in a decentralised way in order to be
used to implement the SMEPP middleware.
Bach
Bach is a coordination model, developed by J-M. Jacquet and I. Linden, which has been ex-
tended in [60] to provide support for mobile ad hoc applications. We present this language
incrementally by firstly explaining the core concepts of the bach model. Then, we present how
these concepts can be extended to suit mobile ad hoc applications.
Bach’s model conceive the network as a set of hosts identified by a name representing their
physical location. Every host can house one or more blackboards, i.e. tuple spaces. Therefore,
Bach provides remote communication between agents running on different hosts using black-
boards as communication media. Agents communicate through blackboards using four timed
primitives: (i) telln(bbn, t)@l allows to send the tuple t to the blackboard bbn hosted in l for n
units of time, (ii) askn(bbn, t)@l allows to check the presence of the tuple t in the blackboard bbn
hosted in l under the constraint that the operation fails if no result is returned within n units
of time, (iii) naskn(bbn, t)@l checks the absence of the tuple t in the blackboard bbn hosted in l
under the constraint that the operation fails if no result is returned within n units of time, and
(iv) getn(bbn, t)@l removes the tuple t from the blackboard bbn hosted in l under the constraint
that the operation fails if a matching tuple is not found within n units of time. In order to
avoid clocks synchronisation problem between hosts, Bach assumes that the primitives refer to
the clock associated with the host on which the targeted blackboard resides. In addition, Bach
must ensure unique naming for hosts. This can be accomplished, as proposed in [60], by using
MAC addresses as values for the l parameter.
Bach provides a way to ease remote blackboards access by allowing to define relations be-
tween them. These relations are used to assert the presence or absence of tuples on blackboards
4Excepted if the reader is A.
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from the presence or absence of (possibly other) tuples on blackboards [60]. Blackboards rela-
tions take the following form:
in(b1, t1), ..., in(bm, tm), nin(bm+1, tm+1), ..., nin(bn, tn)→
in(bn+1, tn+1), ..., in(bp, tp), nin(bp+1, tp+1), ..., nin(bq, tq)
This relation expresses that the presence of tuples t1, ..., tm on blackboards b1, ..., bm and the ab-
sence of tuples tm+1, ..., tn on blackboards bm+1, ..., bn implies the presence of tuples tn+1, ..., tp
on blackboards bn+1, ..., bp and the absence of tuples tp+1, ...tq on blackboards bp+1, ..., bq. A
variable can be used instead of a tuple t to express the conditions “any tuple present in a
blackboard” and “any tuple absent from a blackboard”. Moreover, a tuple having certain fields
set to variables can be used to match patterns of tuples.
Two semantics are possible for a blackboard relation: forward reading and backward reading.
Backward reading states that the presence of tk(n + 1 ≤ k ≤ p) can be deduced from the
presence of t1, ..., tm on b1, ..., bm and the absence of tm+1, ..., tn on bm+1, ..., bn. The same
condition determines the absence of tl(p + 1 ≤ l ≤ q). Forward reading states that when a
new tuple ti(1 ≤ i ≤ m) is inserted in bi, if the left-hand side of the relation is satisfied, the
right-hand side tuples must be appropriately created or deleted. The same process must be
performed when a tuple ti(m + 1 ≤ i ≤ n) is removed from bi. The reader noticed that the
evaluation of in(b, t) or nin(b, t) can result in the deletion of tuples from b. If the removal is
not wished, a non-destructive version of in and nin can be used by writing [in] and [nin].
When writing a blackboard relation, the programmer can explicitly specify whether he wants
to use the relation as a forward reading relation or a backward reading relation. The former
requires to write →f while the latter requires to write →b. For instance,
in(b1, 〈Namur, 12, X〉)→b in(b2, 〈Namur, 12, X〉)
states that the presence of any tuple of the form 〈Namur, 12, 〉 in b2 is sufficient to deduce its
presence in b1.
To ease remote communication, Bach predefines on each host a local blackboard bbv, called
the default blackboard, which contains two default blackboard relations. Whenever an agent
wants to communicate with a remote blackboard bbn, its request is firstly sent to bbv, which
will forward it to bbn using the first default blackboard relation. The second reaction non-
destructively forwards any tuple sent to bbn in bbv. Therefore, these two default reactions
create the illusion of a local bbn for the agent. It does not have to know anything regarding
bbn’s location.
In the original Bach model, Blackboards relations are stored as special tuples within a
centralised tuple space, because relations can concern blackboards on multiple host. Because of
a lack of centralisation and because of connections instability in ad hoc networks, this centralised
implementation could not be used in ad hoc context. Therefore, Bach’s adaptation for ad hoc
networks restricts reactions to those concerning only one blackboard. By restricting relations
to one blackboard, they can be stored and managed locally by the host housing the concerned
blackboard5.
As many blackboard relations can be defined on the same tuples, Bach provides priority
mechanisms to define their order of execution. Priorities are represented as an integer ranged
from 0 to 255 and are attached to a blackboard relation. By default, a relation is created with
the maximum priority, being 255. Bach executes relations from the highest priority one to the
lowest. In case of equality, an arbitrary choice is made by the system.
Bach’s extension for ad hoc applications comprises reaction mechanisms in response to
events. Observable events in Bach are the connection of a host with a host h, the disconnection
of a host from a host h, and the change of connection quality within a host h. In response
to these events, reactions can trigger specific actions. For instance, it is reasonable that upon
connection, a host offers a forward relation from its blackboards to the blackboards of the
connected host. This can be simply programmed by linking the default blackboard of the old
host with the default blackboard of the new host through a forward blackboard relation. This
reaction can be written as follows:
5The interested reader can find more details on the restrictions in [60].
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in(〈connected,X〉)⇒ tell([in(Y )@self ]→f [in(Y )@X])@X
where the⇒ arrow indicates that the forward reaction is activated as soon as a tuple matching
(〈connected,X〉) is found, where self refers to the name of the existing host and where X
represents the name of the newly connected host. Reactions can be extended by specifying
tuples on their left-hand side and a sequence of actions on their right-hand side.
Bach’s extension for ad hoc applications also provides access control mechanisms. Capabili-
ties are associated with each tuple and with each blackboard primitive. These capabilities take
the form of hidden attributes of tuples, blackboard relations and primitives. These attributes
are inherited from the process which has led to the creation of the considered tuple, the con-
sidered blackboard relation and the execution of the considered primitive [60]. For instance,
connection event tuples can only be sent by system processes. Any agent which cannot provide
capabilities corresponding to system processes is not able to delete this kind of tuple. Another
example is that a forward relation from X to Y requested by Y should be allowed by X. To en-
sure this, Y’s capability is bound to the blackboard relation. If this capability matches X’s one,
the forward relation is authorised. This last example can be useful in the context of SMEPP,
to only allow peers having the right credentials to use blackboards relations. These blackboard
relations could for instance model group communication.
As Bach provides context management and security mechanisms in a decentralised way, it
is a good candidate to implement the SMEPP middleware. However, it is at the moment only
a theoritical model. Moreover, the process of defining all the blackboards relations and the
process of allocating capabilities is a complex task in the context of SMEPP. In addition, the
way of allocating, creating and managing capabilities is not yet specified in [60].
3.3.2 Systems adding programmability
LuCe, ReSpecT and TuCSoN
LuCe (Logic Tuples Centre) is a coordination model, developed by E. Denti and A. Omicini, for
the construction of multi-agent systems involving autonomous, pro-active and possibly hetero-
geneous agents [45]. An implementation of the model, the LuCe system [42], has been developed
in Java over a lightweight Prolog engine. It allows to develop both Java and Prolog agents over
a web environment. The key contribution of the model is the concept of tuple centre, a pro-
grammable coordination medium [43]. The behaviour of a tuple centre can be defined by using
specific tuples called specification tuples. A tuple centre is then composed of two parts: the
tuple space, containing ordinary communication tuples, and the specification space, containing
specification tuples. The state of the tuple space provides a communication viewpoint while
the state of the specification space provides a coordination viewpoint. Indeed, the behaviour
of the tuple centre governs inter-agent communication, and specification tuples define the rules
of inter-agent coordination. Therefore, agents have two levels of action, reasoning on the com-
munication viewpoint and the coordination viewpoint, by possibly refining or changing the
coordination laws.
The feature of programming tuple centres behaviour allows to uncouple the actual represen-
tation of knowledge in a tuple centre from the agents’ perception of it [93]. Tuple centres can be
programmed to bridge the different representation of information shared by agents. They are
suitable to support the full monitoring of agents interaction and to house the laws for agents
coordination [44]. Taking these features into account, the tuple centre could be compared to the
notion of reference monitor we presented in Section 3.2.3, encapsulating and enforcing security
protocols such as authentication and authorisation.
The behaviour specification of a LuCe tuple centre is defined through the ReSpecT spec-
ification language [44], a logic-based language where reactions in response to communication
events are defined by means of first-order logic tuples, called specification tuples [93]. Observ-
able events are: a tuple sent, a tuple read, a tuple retrieved and no tuple matching a template
found. Additional information on the events can be obtained, such as: which agent triggered
the event, which tuple is involved in the event, which operation triggered the event, in which
tuple centre the event occurred and information about success or failure of an operation (pre,
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post, success, failure). Reactions can also produce tuple centre operations such as out, in and
rd, which can trigger a new reaction. Thus, chained reactions are allowed by the model. We
could therefore imagine an authorisation process that only allows a specific agent to retrieve
a specific tuple containing the agent’s permissions. However, in the context of SMEPP, it is
impossible to define entirely the behaviour of the tuple centre in order to grant such static
authorisations to all possible peers, as their number and identities are not known in advance.
In addition, the specification space is observable and alterable by agents. There appear to be
no mechanisms to secure it, making it unreliable in untrusted environments. Regarding mo-
bility concerns, LuCe does not provide mechanisms to ease context management in open and
decentralised environment.
An interesting feature of Luce is however to allow services to know the state of the tuple
centre. An agent can know the set of its tuples, the set of its pending queries and the set of its
reaction specifications. We can feel that LuCe targets more the development of autonomous
and decision taking agent societies rather than the development of decentralised and potentially
untrusted applications requiring mobility and security features.
TuCSoN [84], developed by A. Omicini and F. Zambonelli, is a coordination language highly
inspired by LuCe, from which it borrows the concept of tuple centre and the ReSpecT specifica-
tion language. The main difference between both models is that TuCSoN provides a hierarchical
infrastructure. Each tuple centre is associated with a node which can act as a gateway for the
other nodes of which it is responsible. Gateways are connected to each other in a tree way.
This enables, thanks to the ReSpecT specification language, to define nested protected domains,
each one controlled by a specific access control policy. This feature is interesting in the context
of groups and sub-groups. As SMEPP does not define the concept of sub-groups and, as a hi-
erarchical infrastructure is not suited to the decentralised peer-to-peer orientation of SMEPP,
TuCSoN’s architecture appear less suitable than LuCe’s architecture. The last feature we want
to highlight is how the communication is achieved using TuCSoN or LuCe. Using LuCe, tuple
centres are only accessed in a network-transparent way, meaning that entities do not have to
know any detail about the physical locations of other entities. In TuCSoN, the communication
can be either network-transparent or network-aware.
Law-Governed Linda
Law-Governed Linda (LGL, [71]), developed by N.H. Minsky and J. Leichter, is an instance of
the concept of law-governed architecture [70], which defines interactions governed by a global
law specified in the architecture. LGL includes the five basic components of the law-governed
architecture:
 Communication medium. This is the means used by system actors to communicate.
LGL defines the Linda tuple space as its communication medium.
 Sequential processes. Processes (or agents) are the system actors.
 Control states. It represents the information about processes and their history. Each
process has its own control state that is used to know the history of the accesses to the
communication medium.
 Global law. This unique law, composed of a set of rules, provides a way to govern
the interactions taking place in the communication medium. The rules are written in
Prolog and are of the form: on event if conditions do actions. A complete specification
of the law language can be found in [74]. This language can be compared to the ReSpecT
specification language, but adds more events and the possibility of taking context into
account by using control states.
 Law enforcement mechanism. A Controller is associated with every process, acting as
a mediator between the process and the communication medium. Its role is to enforce the
global law. As every process is associated with its own controller, the enforcement mech-
anism is fully decentralised. Every permission is authorised or refused by the controller in
charge of a process.
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As in LuCe, each access to the communication medium by an agent generates an event which
is caught by its associated controller. The controller searches the global law for a rule which
describes the occurred event and the actions to be taken in terms of primitive operations.
This process is called the ruling and is influenced by the process control state. The primitive
operations that the ruling can trigger are as follows. It can execute the operation (i.e. allowing
the operation), send a tuple to the tuple space6, remove a process from the system and allow
the tuple matching a template to be returned to the calling process.
LGL intends to provide a way to address the problem of peer-to-peer coordination within a
group of agents being governed by the global law. The remark we made regarding the absence
of built-in protocols for authentication and authorisation in LuCe also holds for LGL. However,
several kinds of security policies can be implemented by exploiting the programmability of the
law rules [72].
An extension of LGL, Law-Governed Interaction (LGI) [74, 73, 69], implemented in the
Moses middleware [74], aims at providing a coordination mechanism that allows open group of
distributed active entities to interact with each other. The interaction is ruled by an explicitly
specified security policy, called the law of the group. Groups are considered open as members
can join and leave different groups at will, being governed by different laws. Because of its
relevance to enforce security policies among different groups and because it provides a way to
program peer-to-peer communication, LGI might be a good candidate to implement the SMEPP
proof-of-concept. However, choosing this solution to implement SMEPP enforces us to define
a finite set of groups and thus, a finite set of laws. Indeed, the creator of the group in SMEPP
does not have more privilege than the other members and cannot specify himself the rules
applicable for its group. Furthermore, we cannot consider a central entity fixing dynamically
new rules and new groups. Therefore, the problem is to pre-define all the possible groups and
their associated rules.
We consider that the main problem to use LGI and other law governed systems is to deal
with authorisations in a unpredictable environment. In such systems, all the possible users
cannot be known in advance. Therefore, it is not possible (and not wanted in the case of
SMEPP) to define authorisation rules for each of them. A solution to this problem could be to
gather users into predefined categories for which laws and rules are established. In this case,
the user which does not match these predefined categories would receive fixed default rights.
Another problem is to determine how to solve mobility issues when using LGI as it does not
explicitly provide means to solve the issues of context management and unpredicted discon-
nections. The Prolog-law language offers however elements to tackle these issues as creation,
disconnection and reconnection of entities are observable events. It is not specified whether
unpredicted disconnections are observed, but if they are, on disconnection, the controller could
trigger the deletion of the disconnected entity’s tuples. This would solve the problem of space
consistency in case of unpredicted disconnections, but the cost of this solution in terms of tuple
space accesses and messages sent would be high. There is also the need to ensure that none
of the being-deleted-tuples would be accessed by other agents during deletion. This last point
seems difficult to express using the Prolog-like language.
MARS
MARS (Mobile Agent Reactive Spaces)[24], developed by G. Cabri, L. Leonardi and F. Zam-
bonelli, is a coordination architecture which supports programmable reactive tuples spaces for
Java-based mobile agent applications. Mobility in MARS concerns agents roaming the network
in a network-aware way. The network is modelled as a set of sites referenced by their physical
location. Each site can be seen as an execution environment, a host, for a finite number of
nodes. This way of considering mobility is not easing the task of modelling the way SMEPP
considers it, as peers do not know in advance the locations of other peers. The MARS model
assumes that there exists one specific unnamed tuple space in each site. This tuple space is
local, i.e. independent of the other space sites. It is the only mean for agents to communi-
cate locally on a site or remotely with other sites. When an agent is created on a site, the
6Which will not be considered as an event.
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system provides it with the reference to this local tuple space. The agent can therefore start
to communicate with other agents by using it. The choice of defining a local tuple space is a
fundamental property for mobile systems. It helps to overcome the resource binding problems
involved by the change of the execution environment [49] and leads to the implementation of
the context-dependent interaction concept. However, this concept is related to code mobility,
and not to physical mobility: it resolves problems related to the migration of an agent code on
a site and not problems related to the unpredicted disconnection and reconnection of entities.
The access to the tuple space is highly inspired by JavaSpaces. It is implemented in Java
with an interface extending the JavaSpace interface. MARS introduces two new methods to
the JavaSpace interface: readAll and takeAll. The former provides a way to read all the
tuples matching a template. It helps to solve Linda’s multiple read problem, that is, Linda’s
inability of reading each matching tuple exactly once [93]. The latter allows to retrieve all the
tuples matching a template.
As LuCe and LGL, MARS tuple spaces are programmable and reactive. They can be pro-
grammed in response to access events. The difference with the other models is that a MARS
reaction can influence the semantics of the access operations. Indeed, MARS allows the effects
of the existing primitives to be changed. For instance, a reaction may change the pattern match-
ing mechanism to let agents specify a range of value rather than a fixed value in the template of
an input operation [25]. Reactions are implemented using meta-tuples, stored in a local meta-
tuple space. When an access event occurs, the system searches a meta-tuple matching it. When
such a tuple is found, the system calls a method of this tuple modeling the reaction. In order
to avoid endless recursions, MARS does not allow reactions to be triggered by other reactions.
MARS meta tuples can be stored and retrieved at run time, allowing dynamic management of
reactions. These tuples can be manipulated by agents and by the “local administrator”.
MARS assumes the existence of a local administrator whose role is to define the reactions,
access control lists and roles. Security in MARS can be addressed by using these three concepts.
As in LuCe and LGL, reactions can implement a specific security policy. MARS goes further
than LuCe and LGL by allowing the administrator to define access control lists(ACL) for each
tuple. It models who can access tuples and what operations can be done on them. Roles can be
defined by the administrator to ease the management of ACL. Agent’s identities can be directly
mapped into roles defining the access rights associated with them. For instance, roles can be
reader, writer and manager. A reader can only read tuples, a writer can read tuples and store
their own tuples but cannot retrieve tuples produced by other agents. A manager (or local
administrator) can perform any operation on the tuple space, modify access control lists and
manage reactions by modifying the meta tuple space.
A Java implementation of the MARS model has been developed [23]. The implementation
is made in such a way that it wraps existing mobile agent systems. In order to perform the
integration of the agent system, the implementation defines an agent server component, in
charge of accepting and running new agents on a node. This component also provides new
agents with the local tuple space reference and acts as an interface to perform tuple space
operations. The implementation has been tested with the following agent system: Aglets [59],
Java-to-go [102] and SOMA [80].
3.3.3 Systems modifying the model
PageSpace
The PageSpace platform [38], developed by P. Ciancarini, A. Knoche, R. Tolksdorf and F.
Vitali, is a meta-architecture or a reference architecture for developing Internet-based appli-
cations [33]. This architecture relies on the notion of agents using a coordination technology
to interact. The coordination technology explored by the developers of the architecture are
Linda-like coordination languages. This is why we classify PageSpace as a tuple space based
coordination model while it is actually an architecture where the coordination technology can
vary. The coordination technology, or coordination architecture, can be seen as the operating
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environment of PageSpace. This is a shared workspace where agents live and communicate. Its
nature influences the way agents are created and the way they interact.
To understand the PageSpace architecture, it is important to make clear the notions of
applications, agents and users. Applications are composed of a set of independent agents
interacting with each other using the PageSpace (i.e. a shared data space). This inter agent
communication defines the applications behaviour. Users own a homeagent providing them
the PageSpace reference in order to communicate. Users are using WWW browsers in order to
communicate with the PageSpace. They are able to start or stop agents and to react in response
to agents’ messages. The PageSpace architecture provides a framework for supporting multi-
user applications and inter-application communication. It also offers support for changes in the
configuration of users and applications. Users logging into the PageSpace might use unreliable
and/or non-persistent connections, leading to unpredicted disconnections. This situation should
not interrupt the regular functioning of the application. Therefore, PageSpace provides ways
to allow the disappearance and reappearance of the users. Thus, it does not only tackle code
mobility problems, but also physical mobility ones. This results in the fact that PageSpace
provides mechanisms to deal with context management, which is an important feature required
for the SMEPP middleware.
To understand how the system actually works, we present an overview of the different agents
running in the coordination architecture:
 Homeagents are a persistent representation of users. As users can be absent or discon-
nected, homeagents collect messages addressed to their user, queue them in order and
deliver them on user request. They also can act on messages and requests from other
agents when the users are absent. Thus, every agent wishing to communicate with a user
addresses its message to the user persistent homeagent. Only this agent “knows” its user
presence information.
 Application agents are the agents performing the operations required by the application
specification. They can be started and interrupted by users. They can also communicate
with the shared data space and provide services to other agents. Some application agents
do interact with users and provide a user-interface agent in the form of a HTML document,
a Java applet, etc. This interface is reachable from the user browser and is the only way
to interact with the application. Other applications do not need to be controlled by users
and therefore do not provide interface agents. Such application agents just communicate
and offer services to other agents.
 Gateway agents provide access to the external world for PageSpace applications. Applica-
tions needing to communicate with other environments send requests to the appropriate
gateway agents, translating them to the destination environment. The gateway agent is
also responsible for translating and returning the corresponding response to the agent.
Each gateway agent is responsible for one specific destination environment.
 Kernel agents perform management and control tasks. The main components of the
kernel agents are:
– the agent store, responsible of storing the application agents’ programs. Each appli-
cation is mapped as a process within the kernel. This process executes the operations
and manages the exceptions occurring during the computation.
– the homeagent server, which stores homeagents and ensures their persistence.
– the Repository component, which models the shared data space and the operations
allowed on it.
– the agent connectors, which enable multi-agent communication on the same data
space.
– the kernel connector, which allows for communications between distributed kernels.
Kernel agents also manage agents/services discovery and naming. At agent or service
creation, meta information is written by the kernel agents in the form of a web page
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accessible through HTTP. Other users and agents can then discover newly created services
or users by querying this page maintained by the kernel agents in the form of a search
engine.
Implementations of PageSpace have been done using Jada [36] and Laura [105], which is a
tuple space language easing the development of service-oriented applications. However, these
implementations are not available regarding the project web page [6]. Moreover, the limitations
of PageSpace regarding the SMEPP proof-of-concept implementation are that it does not specify
any security mechanism and that the available documentation does not specify whether the
kernel implementation suits decentralised applications management. However, looking at the
homeagents, it appears that persistent servers should remain alive even if no users use the
system.
Lime
Lime (Linda In a Mobile Environment) [75], is a coordination model developed by L. Murphy,
G.P. Picco and G.C. Roman, addressing the issues of code and device mobility in shared data
spaces environments. Lime revisits the tuple space model in order to adapt its advantages of
time and space uncoupling to a mobile environment.
The key concept of Lime is the way tuple spaces are shared among mobile entities, leading
to the concept of transiently shared tuple space. Each mobile entity (either an agent or a mobile
device) is associated with an Interface Tuple Space (ITS). This tuple space is the personal space
of the entity, where tuples can be stored and retrieved from. An entity can have one or more
named ITSs, identified by a distinct name. When entities are physically connected, their ITSs
having the same names are merged. Thus, both ITSs are seen by the entities as a unique tuple
space containing the tuples of the two entities’ ITSs. When an entity moves, the Lime system
recomputes the transiently shared tuple space for that location, taking into account the tuple
spaces of the incoming entity. This process is called the engagement. The reverse process is
called disengagement. When an agent leaves the location, the disengagement consists in the
removal of the leaving agent’s tuples from the transiently shared tuple space. A mobile entity
can choose to keep one of its ITSs private by not engaging it. This provides a way to keep
private information.
To illustrate the engagement and disengagement processes, let two agents A and B connected
with each other, both having an ITS named ts. If A performs an out(t) operation on ts, then,
if B performs an in(t) operation on ts, t is retrieved by B because both ITSs merged.
Using the same example, if A decides to move to a new location before B performs the in(t)
operation, the tuple t is removed from the transiently shared tuple space. Therefore, when B
performs in(t), no matching tuple is found and B’s execution is interrupted. In order to avoid
this situation, A can send the tuple t to B’s ITS by performing an out[B](t) operation instead
of the classical out operation. In this case, even if A migrates, B is still able to retrieve the tuple
t as it is stored in its own ITS instead of A’s ITS.
In order to allow out[B](t) to be performed, Lime adds two specific fields to each tuple,
being their current location and destination location. The current location specifies which
agent is currently storing the tuple, while the destination location specifies the agent to which
the tuple will eventually be moved. If we assume that the agent A performs out[B](t), the
execution is done in two steps. Firstly, the tuple t is sent to A’s ITS, having its current location
set to A and its destination location set to B. If B is connected, the tuple is moved by the system
to B’s ITS and its current location is set to B. If B is disconnected, the tuple remains in A’s ITS
until B connects. In this case, the tuple is considered misplaced as its current location and its
destination location differ.
An interesting feature of Lime is the ability to program reactions in response to events. One
can program such reactions using the T.reactsTo(s,p) method, called reactive statement,
where s is the reaction code to be executed when a tuple matching the template p is found in
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the tuple space T. Thus, events in Lime only take into account tuples’ insertion. Lime provides
a second reactive statement allowing to unregister a reaction from a tuple space. Reactions are
executed in the following way: after every non-reactive statement, one of the registered reaction
is selected arbitrarily by the system. If the condition to trigger it is satisfied, the reaction is
executed. Otherwise, the system selects non-deterministically another reaction. This selection
and execution process stops when no more reactions can be triggered. In addition, Lime’s
reactions can be used in response to configuration change in the system. This is achieved by
using a default tuple space called the LimeSystem tuple space.
Every entity creates at startup its local version of the LimeSystem tuple space. Therefore,
whenever entities are connected with each other, the LimeSystem tuple space is always merged.
This tuple space helps to solve the issue of knowing which entities are currently in a particular
location or to know which entities belong to a specific set of connected peers. Withdrawal and
insertion of tuples in the LimeSystem tuple space is restricted to the run-time system. However,
every entity can read this tuple space to gather system configuration information or to register
reactions in response of configuration changes in the system.
Lime suits really well the development of mobile agents communities. Context management
issues are tackled by two of Lime’s features. On the one hand, the engagement and disengage-
ment process ensures consistency of the tuple spaces in case of agents’ arrivals or departures.
On the other hand, the LimeSystem tuple space provides a way for agents to discover other
agents by reading its content or registering reactions. Therefore, agents do not have to know
anything concerning other possible agents of the system. They even do not specifically have
to know which agents is using the system as the run-time system automatically merges tuple
spaces having the same name.
An open source implementation of Lime [88] has been made in Java and is well documented.
The features of Lime seem really relevant to ease the development of groups in the context of
SMEPP. Two other variants of Lime have been implemented: TinyLime [40] and TeenyLime
[39]. Both variants are adaptation of the Lime model for mobile devices. The former is an
adaptation of Lime for sensor networks, while the latter is designed for sensor and actuator
networks.
In addition to the features previously mentioned, Lime provides a tool for simulating a GPS
system. This tool is started along with every Lime application. It provides a fake GPS location
to the application and allows the programmer to move it across the space. This tool enables to
simulate an application disconnection due to its departure from the network and an application
reconnection due its arrival. This is very useful to simulate complex scenarios and to test space
consistency after unpredicted disconnections.
The main limitation of Lime is that it does not provide built-in security mechanisms except
the notion of private tuple space. This is not sufficient to model the notion of visibility of
groups and services in SMEPP. There must be a way to avoid specific agents to discover, join
and participate in groups to which they do not have access. However, as the implementation is
done in Java, the Java cryptography library [101] can be used to encrypt tuples with specific
keys related to the visibility of the agent.
MESHmdl
The MESHmdl middleware [57], developed by K. Herrmann, specifically aims to coordinate
applications in ad hoc settings. To deal with the dynamics of ad hoc networks, MESHmdl
introduces the concept of mobility aware applications. Such applications rely on a middleware
providing them information to self-adapt according to changes in their neighbourhood (i.e. the
devices within connection range). In the following, we present the design of the MESHmdl
middleware which supports the development of the aforementioned mobility aware applications.
MESHmdl is based on two key concepts: mobile agents and the tuple space model. On the
one hand, mobile agents are used because they can adapt to the dynamics of connectivity by
moving to a different location. Indeed, when a communication is known to take some time, the
invoker can move to the location of the provider to avoid disconnections due to connectivity
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problems. On the other hand, the tuple space model is used as it introduces a high degree of
uncoupling. Indeed, entities wishing to communicate do not have to exist in the same location
at the same time.
The architecture of the MESHmdl middleware is composed of six layers:
 the agent application layer is the top layer of the middleware. It contains all the running
applications (i.e. the active mobile agents).
 the agent runtime layer manages the running mobile agents. It consists in an Engine
component, running on every node, which hosts mobile agents and manages their migra-
tions.
 the space layer represents the tuple space. Every Engine runs a unique tuple space which
is the only way for agents to communicate with each other. An agent can communicate
with its local tuple space, but also with the neighbouring tuple spaces (i.e. the tuple
spaces managed by nodes in connection range). Note that the communication between
an agent and its Engine is also performed via the tuple space. Thus, the programmer is
provided with a uniform interface for all communication tasks [57].
 the interaction layer provides a way for agents to discover their neighbourhood. In con-
trast with Lime [75], this is not achieved in a transparent way, but in a network-aware
one. Every Engine is associated with a node entry which identifies it. The interaction
layer is in charge of sharing the node entries of the Engines in connection range. This
is achieved by an engagement protocol. When two nodes enter in connection range, the
engagement protocol is run and the nodes exchange their node entries. If the protocol
successes, each node stores the node entry of its new neighbour in its local tuple space.
When a node disconnects, the engagement protocol is run to delete the corresponding en-
try from one’s local tuple space. One can see that this protocol is similar to the blackboard
relation created in response to a connection event in the Bach coordination language (see
Section 3.3.1, p. 55).
Node entries are the key elements enabling remote communication. They act as a handle
to gain access to a neighbouring node [57]. When an agent wants to communicate with
one of its neighbour, it can specify the corresponding node entry as an argument to a
method named go. This method (handled by the Engine) migrates the agent to the
targeted neighbour where it can continue its execution. Please note that the migration is
performed through the tuple space. The agent’s data is wrapped inside a tuple written in
the targeted agent’s space. Upon arrival the tuple is retrieved, unwrapped and its content
is executed.
 the generic connection layer enforces the notion of neighbourhood and encapsulates the
network layer. It presents the aforementioned layers with neighbour nodes and primitives
for connecting to them [57].
 the network layer represents the networking technology (e.g Bluetooth, Wifi, etc.).
An interesting feature of the MESHmdl middleware in the context of SMEPP is the Xector
model. This model eases information diffusion in ad hoc environments. A Xector is managed by
the Engine and consists of a node template n, a data template d, a specifier being either collect,
inject or reject and a filter f which manipulates the entries before information diffusion. For
instance, a Xector < inject, d, n, f > is executed on a node X as follows: when a node whose
node entry matches n arrives in X’s neighbourhood, inject (put) every of X’s tuples matching
d into the space of the new neighbour. Before the actual transmission, each entry is filtered
by f . In general, inject implements a push strategy while collect implement a get strategy.
The reject mode allows to reject the insertion or the collection of tuples in one’s tuple space.
Again, the Xector model shows similar features to the ones provided by the programming of
blackboard relations in response to connection events with the Bach coordination language (see
Section 3.3.1 page 55).
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MESHmdl appears as an interesting candidate to implement our SMEPP middleware proof-
of-concept because of its relevance in ad hoc environments. Indeed, mobile agents combined
with the engagement protocol and the Xector model offer adaptation mechanisms in response
to environmental changes. However, MESHmdl does not provide enough security mechanisms
to model the SMEPP security model. Indeed, the reject mode of a Xector only allows to reject
entries pushed by specific agents and to reject entry requests performed by specific agents. The
problem is that SMEPP peers do not know in advance all the possible peers. Therefore, they
have no ways to statically specify a reject Xector for specific peers. They only can statically
define a Xector rejecting every peer.
Still, a reject Xector could be used to implement SMEPP group security if group members
were identified by a specific node identifier. Indeed, a group member could specify a Xector
concerning the group tuples which would reject every agent having its node identifier different
from the group one. However, the specification of MESHmdl seems to allocate such identifiers
for nodes, and not for agents. Moreover, in SMEPP, nodes belonging to different groups can
be executed on the same host. This complexes the attribution of node identifiers.
While reject Xectors do not appear relevant to model SMEPP group security, they offer an
interesting way to define dynamic exclusion policies. Indeed, a reject Xector can be registered
by a peer to exclude another peer identified as a maliciously behaving one.
In conclusion, the MESHmdl middleware cannot be used as it is to implement our SMEPP
proof-of-concept but offers an interesting framework to build ad hoc applications.
SecureLime
SecureLime [55, 56] is a coordination system, implemented by R. Handorean and G.C. Roman,
extending the Lime coordination model. It extends Lime with security features. Lime’s advan-
tages to model mobile agents communities are therefore preserved in SecureLime. The addition
to the original model intends to provide secure sharing of tuples and tuple spaces.
In Lime, the LimeSystem tuple space can be read by any agent. This tuple space contains
all the names of the existing tuple spaces, agents and hosts. While this tuple space can only
be read-only accessed, an agent can read the name of a tuple space. Therefore it can create
an instance of this tuple space which will be merged with the existing one in case of physical
proximity. Then, the agent gets full access to it.
To solve this issue, SecureLime introduces the concept of password protected tuple spaces: in
addition to its name, a password is associated with the tuple space. In Lime, the name of the
tuple space is the key required to access it. Therefore, in SecureLime, the associated password
is used to avoid that the fact of reading a tuple from the LimeSystem tuple space allows full
access on it. This feature is implemented in the following way: at tuple space creation, an
agent can decide to associate a password with it. If no password is chosen, the tuple space is
accessible by every agent. If a password is chosen, it is used to encrypt the name of the tuple
representing the tuple space in the LimeSystem tuple space. Therefore, when an agent reads
this tuple and extracts the name, if it creates a tuple space with this encrypted name, it will not
be merged with the actual tuple space. In order to be merged, the name of the tuple space must
be the one found in the LimeSystem tuple space decrypted with the corresponding password.
The advantage of this security feature is that it is fully decentralised: no central entity is used
to check passwords or to grant access to a tuple space.
In the default SMEPP security level, the credentials used to access groups are pre-shared
and static. Therefore password protected tuple spaces could be used to model SMEPP secure
groups as the only fact of knowing a password would grant access to the corresponding group.
SecureLime proposes another security mechanism: access control at the tuple level. When-
ever agents have access to a secured tuple space, they have full access to it. Therefore, agents
could perform denial-of-service attacks by retrieving all the tuples of the tuple space. However,
we can assume that this situation will not happen because the users of the tuple space can
be considered trusted as they own its password. While this attack is unlikely to take place,
another problem might occur at the tuple level because of Lime’s polymorphic matching rule.
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Every tuple field is a Java Object. Therefore, if an in operation with a template containing two
Objects is performed, every two-fields tuple will be retrieved. Agents performing this operation
might not be interested in every tuple, and are not likely to send them back in the local tuple
space they were retrieved from. The information represented by the retrieved tuples could be
permanently lost as the owner of these tuples would not be warned of their removal.
SecureLime provides two mechanisms to avoid this situation: read-only tuples and password-
based matching. The former allows the owner of a tuple (the agent who sent it to the tuple
space) to declare it read-only, meaning that it cannot be retrieved by any other agent. The
owner location is added to the tuple in order to implement this feature. When an agent intends
to perform an in operation on a read-only tuple, its location and the owner’s location are
compared. The operation is allowed only if both locations are the same. In the case the owner
decides to move this tuple to another location, SecureLime updates the location of the tuple.
The latter allows to read or retrieve a tuple according to the knowledge of a password
associated with the tuple. This is achieved by defining two password fields, one for remove pro-
tection and one for read protection, which cannot be matched using the standard polymorphic
matching rules. In order to match, the agent performing an in or rd operation must specify
the exact value of the password field corresponding to the operation. The other tuple’s fields
are not affected by a change of the matching rule and can then be matched in a polymorphic
way. In addition to the polymorphic and exact value matching, SecureLime provides the exact
type matching rule. This rule allows to use types in patterns’ fields7. Every tuple field of that
type will therefore match. This matching rule differs from the polymorphic one in such a way
that it does not allow wildcards8.
As these passwords are tuple fields, and as tuples can be remotely accessed, SecureLime
provides a way to protect tuples being sent across unsafe networks. A malicious entity could
catch on the network a packet corresponding to a tuple. Then, it could discover the tuple’s
content and the password fields. This process is called eavesdropping. Two mechanisms are
used to protect against eavesdropping. The first one is that, when sent over the network, tuples
belonging to a secure tuple space are encrypted with the tuple space password. In this way, if
a malicious entity eavesdrops this tuple, its content will not be readable if the agent does not
know the tuple space password. If the malicious entity knows the tuple space password, it can
decrypt the tuple’s content, but SecureLime avoids it to discover the password fields. In fact,
these fields do not contain the real values of the passwords. They contain a static predefined
string ‘‘secretText’’ encrypted with the actual passwords values. Therefore, an entity which
does not know the actual passwords cannot discover them by eavesdropping the tuple over the
network.
SecureLime security mechanisms appear to be an interesting way to deal with authorisations
in a decentralised way. The only flaw is that eavesdropping the content of a tuple is possible
for entities belonging to the same group even if password fields have been set. However, this
limitation is not constraining regarding the SMEPP security requirements because they assume
peers belonging to a group to be well-behaved. Moreover, performing this attack is complex.
The attacker must first capture a packet representing a password protected tuple. Identifying
this packet is a difficult task as the data is in raw byte form. Then, the attacker must translate
the byte representation in an Object representation. The final step is to decrypt the tuple
using its corresponding tuple space password. Deriving the tuple space containing the caught
tuple from its byte form is extremely complex as the tuple does not contain this information.
Therefore, the attacker must know the origin of the tuple only by analyzing its byte form.
3.4 Choice of the target language
This section presents the choice of the tuple space based coordination language on top of which
we shall implement the SMEPP proof-of-concept, taking into account the description of the
7These fields are called formal fields.
8In SecureLime, wildcards are formal fields of type Object.
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languages made in Section 3.3 and the SMEPP middleware requirements presented in Section
2.5.
A result of the tuple space based coordination systems survey made in the previous section
is that while there exist numerous extensions of the Linda model, few of them address context
management in ad hoc networking. Surveyed languages, such as MARS, KLAIM and LGL
present the notion of mobile agents roaming the network in a network-aware way, meaning
that information about the physical location of the entities is a requirement to communicate.
The problem is that these languages do not provide ways to manage unpredicted configuration
changes in ad hoc environments such as SMEPP. Moreover, they do not introduce mechanisms
to discover physical locations of the entities of the network, making context management difficult
to implement. The surveyed languages providing ways to deal with context management are
LGI, PageSpace, Lime9, LindaCap, Bach and MESHmdl.
LGI provides ways to monitor agents’ connections and disconnections by offering means
to react to these events. The problem is that it is not specified whether unpredicted discon-
nections are caught by the event monitor. Moreover, the task of ensuring space consistency
after disconnection must be implemented from scratch, in contrast to PageSpace, Lime and
SecureLime.
The PageSpace model provides mechanisms, such as the homeagent, to deal with the discon-
nection and reconnection of entities. The main problem of this system is that its implementation
does not seem available. The project page does not state the existence of any implementation
while the paper describing the project relates an existing one. Moreover, few details on the
run-time systems are available. Still, the features of the system tend to induce the notion
of centralised servers dealing with presence information. This kind of run-time systems can
obviously not be used in ad hoc environments.
LindaCap provides context management mechanisms through the default multicapability
present in the universal tuple space (UTS). This multicapability allows any new entity to
search for capabilities, which could help it to discover new tuple spaces and new tuples’ mult-
icapabilities. Moreover, multicapabilities allow to define complex security policies which could
be used to model SMEPP’s security. However, while an entity defines global authorisations
using multicapabilities, it seems difficult to define authorisations concerning only a specified set
of entities. In addition, as explained in Section 3.3, LindaCap’s model does not embody the
notion of peer-to-peer system. Finally, there is currently no available implementation of the
LindaCap model. Therefore, we cannot use this model to implement the SMEPP middleware.
Lime, in contrast, is explicitly designed to solve mobility issues in ad hoc environments. The
concept of transiently shared tuple space eases the development of mobile agents communities
and provides an interesting solution to tackle context management issues.
Bach, as Lime, tackles context management issues in a decentralised way. This is provided
by blackboard relations, by the default bbv blackboard easing remote communication and by
the reaction mechanism. Indeed, when a host connects to an existing host, a relation can be
defined by the existing host to forward its blackboards to the new host. All the aforementioned
mechanisms provide a way for entities to communicate with each other in a network-transparent
way, i.e. they do not have to know anything about physical locations. Bach, regarding reactions,
is more expressive than Lime. Indeed, reactions cannot only be triggered by the presence of
a tuple, but also by its absence. However, blackboard relations definition is a time-consuming
and error prone task. Indeed, one must appropriately declare events sending relations in black-
boards. Attention must be paid regarding non-destructive and destructive operations in black-
boards relations. It is also important to ensure the consistency of a set of blackboard relations.
In Lime, tuple spaces are transiently shared by the system, making the management task much
easier.
MESHmdl, as Lime, is explicitly designed to solve mobility issues in ad hoc environments.
Indeed, mobile agents combined to the engagement process and the Xector model offer inter-
esting adaptation mechanisms in response to changes in the environment. However, in contrast
with Lime, the MESHmdl middleware does not ease the implementation of group communi-
cation. In Lime, the transiently shared tuple spaces provide an intuitive way for modelling
9And its extension SecureLime.
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SMEPP groups. In contrast, MESHmdl defines a unique tuple space for each node in which
peers from different groups have to communicate. The problem is that we showed that MESH-
mdl security mechanisms do not permit to model SMEPP static group security (see Section
3.3.3 p. 64). Therefore, there is no way to avoid peers to discover information related to group
to which they do not belong. Finally, the MESHmdl implementation, related in [57], is not
available for download.
In conclusion, Lime and its extension SecureLime appear as the best languages according
to the peer-to-peer orientation requirement (R1 in Section 2.5) of the SMEPP middleware.
Moreover, both languages satisfy the Java-integrability (R4 in Section 2.5) requirement and the
available implementation requirement (R3 in Section 2.5).
Regarding the security requirement (R2 in Section 2.5), SecureLime appears to be an inter-
esting solution to model group security using password protected tuple spaces. SMEPP default
security level requires the use of pre-shared symmetric keys. These keys could be modelled
by tuple space passwords while groups would be modelled by the tuple spaces themselves.
Moreover, SecureLime provides a way to secure communications in a untrusted environment.
The limitations of SecureLime security policy are the following. Firstly, malicious group
members are able to eavesdrop tuples from a group tuple space. However, this limitation is not
an issue regarding SMEPP security requirements as group members are supposed to be well
behaved.
Another limitation is that SecureLime only provides symmetric cryptography mechanisms
at the tuple space and tuple level. Therefore, SecureLime can only be used as a coordination
technology to implement the SMEPP default security level.
SecOS and SecSpaces, in contrast, provide asymmetric cryptography mechanisms at the
tuple level, which could be used to implement the highest level of security envisioned by the
SMEPP middleware. The main problem with SecOS and SecSpaces is that these languages do
not conceive the network as a mobile network and therefore do not provide means to implement
context management features.
The last security limitation of SecureLime we want to highlight is that the granularity of its
access control mechanisms is lower than the other surveyed languages. It only allows read and
remove protections, while KLAIM, LuCe, TuCSoN, LGL, LindaCap, Bach and MARS allow to
define access control mechanisms for every tuple space operations.
In conclusion, SecureLime is the only surveyed language fitting mobile ad hoc environments,
offering decentralised security mechanisms and being implemented in Java. However, regarding
security, a number of the surveyed languages offer more possibilities. Still, SecureLime security
mechanisms appear expressive enough to implement the SMEPP default security level. We
therefore have chosen SecureLime to implement our SMEPP middleware proof-of-concept.
Table 3.4 summarises the features of each surveyed language relevant in the context of
SMEPP. Namely, these features are: the requirements of Section 2.5, support for timed primi-
tives, and support for event creation. While the requirements of Section 2.5 have been previously
detailed, the last two are additional features interesting in the context of SMEPP. On the one
hand, timed primitives allow to model tuples lifetime. They also provide a timed alternative
to read and remove operations. This avoids to use probe operations when blocking operations
cannot be used because of application requirements. On the other hand, the coordination sys-
tem’s ability to model events and their associated reactions provides an efficient way to model
reactive applications.
3.5 SecureLime API
Since our implementation, which is presented in the next chapter, is built on top of the Se-
cureLime API, it is necessary to give details about it. This section intends to make the reader
comfortable with the API by presenting its concepts used in the proof-of-concept implementa-
tion. Note that, since SecureLime is an extension of Lime, an important part of the following
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Languages R1 P2P R2 Security R3 Implementation R4 Java Timed Events
Jada no yes yes yes yes no
T Spaces no yes yes yes no no
JavaSpaces no no yes yes yes yes
KLAIM no yes yes yes yes yes
SecOS no yes yes yes no no
LindaCap no yes no no no no
SecSpaces no yes no no no no
Bach yes yes no no yes yes
Luce no yes yes yes no yes
TuCSoN no yes yes yes no yes
LGL no yes no no no yes
LGI - yes yes yes no yes
MARS no yes yes yes yes yes
PageSpace - no no no no no
MESHmdl yes no - yes no no
Lime yes no yes yes no yes
SecureLime yes yes yes yes no yes
Table 3.1: Summary of the surveyed languages’ features.
applies also to the Lime API10.
Lime Agent
A Lime agent is a Java-based program using the Lime API. Any Lime agent must implement
the ILimeAgent interface to access tuple spaces. Lime offers two classes implementing it:
StationaryAgent and MobileAgent. We only use the former. The latter provides code mobility
features, which is not used in the context of SMEPP. Every Lime agent has a “manager” which,
notably, holds an identifier for the agent. This identifier is in the form of an AgentID object.
AgentIDs are used to compute AgentLocations which are used as location parameters in tuple
space operations.
Lime Reaction
As explained before, Lime offers a system of reactions which triggers the execution of a code
when a tuple matching a specified template is found. It is implemented through the Reaction
interface.
The API offers two classes implementing Reaction: LocalizedReaction and UbiquitousReaction.
The former not only requires the tuple space to contain a matching tuple, but also requires this
tuple to match the current and destination locations11 specified at the reaction’s creation time.
The latter specifies location-independent reaction. The reaction is thus installed on the whole
tuple space.
Reactions are added to a LimeTupleSpace12 by calling addStrongReaction(LocalizedReaction[])
or addWeakReaction(Reaction[]) on it. The first method registers a group of reactions to a
tuple space. “The operation is performed atomically, i.e., even if some of the reactions become
suddenly enabled by the current state of the tuple space, none can fire until all of them have
been registered” [2]. This method requires the reactions to have locations fields specified. The
second method registers also a group of reaction to a tuple space. In this case, “the operation
is NOT performed atomically, as this would involve a distributed transaction”[2]. This method
allows to specify reactions without location parameters.
10This section is based on [56], [75] and the SecureLime API documentation [2].
11Note that the destination location is optional.
12Or SecureLimeTupleSpace.
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Any Reaction object is defined by a template (used to match the tuple), a reaction listener
(containing the code to be executed) and a reaction mode. The mode is specified by two
constants. On the one hand, the ONCE mode fires the reaction only once. On the other hand,
ONCEPERTUPLE fires the reaction every time a (different) matching tuple is found.
The ReactionListener interface defines a method (reactsTo(ReactionEvent)) which con-
tains the code to be executed. The method’s parameter is used to receive the information related
to an event that fired the reaction (i.e. the tuple that triggered the reaction, the associated re-
action listener and the agent owning the tuple space where the event occurred).
System tuple space
The LimeSystemTupleSpace is a special tuple space that all Lime agents possess. Agents can
only read this tuple space (no in() or out() operations allowed). The tuple space contains
tuples giving information about the environment. When a new entity (host, agent or tuple
space) is created, a tuple is added to the LimeSystemTupleSpace. When the entity is deleted (or
disconnected), an “anti-tuple”replaces the corresponding tuple. Whenever the entity returns,
its anti-tuple is removed and a new tuple is added.
 A tuple of the form < host,LimeServerID> means a new Lime host (i.e. a computer) is
connected to the network,
 A tuple of the form < agent,AgentID,LimeServerID> means a new agent (i.e. a pro-
gram) is connected,
 A tuple of the form < tuplespace,String,AgentID>, where String is the name of tuple
space, is created when a new tuple space is created.
Note that for each tuple, its “anti-tuple” has the same format but the tags are host gone,
agent gone and tuplespace gone. This gives the programmer the ability to add reactions
associated with “system” events.
Remember that in the case of SecureLime, the tuple space names in the LimeSystemTupleSpace
are encrypted.
Probe operations
Lime offers non-blocking version of in() and rd(). It is important to signal that the inp() and
rdp() operations are more restrictive than their original versions. Indeed, the API requires the
current location parameter to be specified while using these methods. Thus, it is impossible to
invoke those operations on the whole federated tuple space.
Aggregate operations
The aggregate operations are outg([]), ing([]) and rdg([]). They extend their original
versions by inserting or retrieving several tuples at a time. As in the case of the probe opera-
tion, these require the current location parameter to be specified. Thus, one cannot use these
operations on the whole federated tuple space.
Note that the SecureLime API does not provide a secure version of outg(). Thus, one
cannot insert several read and/or remove protected tuples at a time.
Protected tuple movement
SecureLime adds a specific restriction to tuple movements. It is forbidden for an agent to insert
a protected tuple into another agent’s tuple space. Indeed, the other agent may not have the
corresponding password to remove the tuple.
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Chapter 4
Proof-of-concept implementation
This chapter presents the SMEPP proof-of-concept implementation. This implementation con-
sists in two main components: the SMEPP middleware API and the Translator. The SMEPP
middleware API ’s roles are to provide a SecureLime based implementation of the SMEPP
primitives and a Java implementation of the SMoL commands, while the Translator ’s role is to
translate a SMoL specification to an executable Java application. Figure 4.1 gives a high level
view of the proof-of-concept design. Moreover, it shows the steps to be achieved in order to
translate a SMoL specification to an executable Java application.
Figure 4.1: High level view of the proof-of-concept design
The SMoL specifications of peers and services are represented by XML files validated by
XML schemas. These schemas specify syntactical constraints to be satisfied by the XML files.
In order to produce an executable application from a SMoL peer specification, one must
firstly provide its corresponding XML file to the SMEPP proof-of-concept middleware. Then,
the Translator checks its validity regarding the XML Validation Schemas. If this peer intends
to publish services, the translator automatically checks their validity. In case of success, it
produces the corresponding Java code. This process relies on Translation Rules and on the
SMEPP middleware API. Indeed, Translation Rules are used to define the translation process
for every SMoL commands, while the SMEPP middleware API methods are called from the
produced Java code. Finally, the peer and the service Java files must be compiled using a Java
compiler in order to be executed.
In the rest of this chapter, Section 4.1 presents the Translator ’s design and the issues related
to the translation of SMoL specifications. Section 4.2 presents the design and the SecureLime
based implementation of the SMEPP middleware API. Finally, Section 4.3 shows an example
of the translation of a SMoL specification and its execution.
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4.1 SMoL to Java translator
This section describes how the translation from a SMoL input file to a Java application is
done. The translation is twofold. Firstly, a careful study of the SMoL specification is needed in
order to produce a suitable design of the translator. This study is presented in Section 4.1.1.
Secondly, a parser, which takes as input an XML file (representing a piece of SMoL code), has
to be built. This parser generates the Java code from the input file. Section 4.1.2 highlights
parsing difficulties caused by the SMoL concrete representation. Finally, Section 4.1.3 describes
the link between the translator and the SMEPP middleware API.
4.1.1 Translator design
In order to design a suitable architecture for the translator, it is necessary to understand the
issues that the software has to face. Those problems to be solved come from the limitations
of the SecureLime API as well as from the specification of SMoL. We present them in three
points.
 The SecureLime API is very restrictive concerning the threads1 which can access a local
tuple space (or Interface Tuple Space, in SecureLime terms). Indeed, to invoke an op-
eration such as in() or out() on a tuple space, the caller thread has to be either the
creator of the Java Object representing the tuple space or one of the creator’s children.
Furthermore, the creator has to implement the ILimeAgent Java interface. The possible
children must implement the LimeThread interface. Note that this last interface provides
the only way to program concurrent execution using the SecureLime API.
 The specification of SMoL in itself defines strict execution behaviours. Some constructs
have special termination and/or synchronisation characteristics of which to be aware.
– The Flow construct terminates when all its children (which are executed concur-
rently) are finished. This means that the statements following a Flow cannot be
executed before all the Flow branches.
– InformationHandlers execute many commands concurrently. The main command
and each branch have to be modelled by a thread, as well as each command associated
with a branch.
– Each branch of a Pick has to be modelled by a thread too. Furthermore, since only
one branch can be chosen, all of them have to be synchronised.
 SMoL defines the management of faults in a quite different manner than Java does.
In SMoL, when a fault is thrown, all executions have to be stopped inside the closest
FaultHandler. In the example of Figure 4.2, if a fault is raised inside one of the Whiles,
the two branches of the Flow have to be stopped. Then, the command associated with
CatchAll() is executed. Intuitively translated to Java, this piece of code would become
a main thread (modelling the FaultHandler and the Flow) with two child threads, one
for each While. However, in Java, when an exception is raised inside a thread, only this
thread undergoes the consequences of the exception. The parent thread is not aware that
an exception has been raised in one of its children. Thus, it cannot notify the fault to its
other children.
Altogether, those problems restrict the architecture design. Indeed, a SMoL application is
intrinsically multi-threaded. Keeping in mind SecureLime’s restriction on tuple space access,
this means that every thread has to implement some SecureLime interfaces. And, when a fault
is raised in the code, several threads have to be stopped. Furthermore, because of the way Java
handles exceptions, it is not possible to simply translate SMoL faults into Java exceptions.
One could think to translate SMoL into Java directly, using anonymous Java threads to
model multi-threading. However, this is impossible since all threads wanting to access tuple
1In this chapter, a “thread” refers the Java thread class (i.e. an independent stream of instructions which
can be executed concurrently with others).
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FaultHandler1
Flow
While true
... 〈faults may be thrown here〉 ...
End While5
While true
... 〈faults may be thrown here〉 ...
End While
End Flow
10
catchAll()
〈do something to recover the fault.〉
FaultHandler
Figure 4.2: Fault handling example.
spaces have to extend LimeThread and implement ILimeAgent. This is impossible with anony-
mous threads because they are not defined in an independent class. Moreover, this solution does
not allow any mechanism to handle SMoL faults. A better solution would model all primitives
and constructs as objects extending LimeThread. This allows each command to be executed
concurrently and it permits to define methods in the objects to handle faults. Although this
design seems elegant, it induces an important overhead at runtime. Indeed, for each single
command, the creation of a Java thread is needed. Therefore, we have chosen a compromise
between the direct translation and the all-objects view.
We firstly divide the SMoL commands in two categories. The commands involving multi-
threading (i.e. Pick, InformationHandler and Flow) are translated to an object oriented view
by using Java interfaces. Other commands (such as wait, if-then-else, etc.) are translated
directly to Java. The FaultHanlder, while being a single-threaded command, is also translated
to a Java object. This translation allows to represent nested SMoL constructs by linking each
command to its parent. For instance, in Figure 4.2, the FaultHandler is the parent of the
Flow. Moreover, all commands (here, the two Whiles) inside the Flow are its direct children.
The modelling of a FaultHander as a Java object allows its children to use the FaultHandler
reference to forward SMoL faults.
Note that SMoL makes the implicit assumption that a root FaultHandler is the ancestor
of all commands. This FaultHandler is in charge of forwarding the faults to the environment.
In addition, each command has to know the SMEPP entity executing it (i.e. a peer, service or
session). This information is needed by child commands since some primitives behave differently
according as they are invoked by a service or a peer. Therefore, the root of a SMoL program is
contained in a SMEPP entity object.
Figure 4.3 presents the different objects used as a framework to translate SMoL. The rest
of this subsection gives details about those objects.
ThreadedCommand. The main purpose of this interface is to define a set of methods that
SMoL constructs have to implement in order to link the commands with each other (with regards
to faults forwarding). ThreadedCommand also allows the primitives to retrieve information about
the SMEPP entity which executes them. Furthermore, each object used as a SMoL command
extends the LimeThread object and implements the ILimeAgent interface. The former allows
multi-threading while using SecureLime and the latter makes the objects considered as Lime
Agents, so they can call tuple space related primitives.
The ThreadedCommand interface is implemented by every other translated command. The
top of Figure 4.3 shows the methods which must be implemented by the classes implement-
ing it. The first method (getUpperCmd()) returns the parent command of the current one.
GetContainer() is used to know whether the caller is either a peer, a service or a session.
The two following methods are in charge of the fault handling. IsStopped() allows an object
implementing ThreadedCommand to test whether it has to stop its execution or not, in case a
fault is raised in a sibling thread. To signal a fault to its parent, a child calls forwardFault().
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Figure 4.3: Translator’s objects hierarchy.
Finally, the last method contains the actual body of the command.
FaultHander. This object is the only one which represents a single-threaded command. The
execute() method simply contains the translation of its main command. The FaultHandler is
the only construct which handles faults. It implements differently the forwardFault() method.
Indeed, forwardFault() iterates on the list of catches to find a corresponding command to
execute. If no matching catch is found, then either the fault is forwarded to the parent or the
program is stopped (in case it was the outermost FaultHandler).
In case of a service or a session, when the service is removed (i.e. unpublished), its execution
has to be terminated. This is the role of stopCmd(), which is called by the service provider at
the unpublishing time. Other methods are used to actually create the mechanism to match the
catches.
Flow. The Flow object represents a branch of the corresponding SMoL construct. Every
branch of a Flow is linked to the same parent (via setUpperCmd()). Thus, in case a fault is
raised in a branch, the other children of a Flow can be aware of it by calling isStopped() on
their parent.
InformationHandler. An InformationHandler contains three kinds of thread. The first
one represents its main command which is executed on the main Java thread. Moreover, one
thread is necessary for each branch (IHBranch). Indeed, each receiveMessage(), receiveEvent()
and alarm needs to be executed concurrently. Finally, each time a branch is taken, a new thread
executes the command associated with the branch (IHBranchCmd). Thus, we use three objects
to translate an Informationhandler. The main one is used to synchronise the branches. Basi-
cally, the cmd ended variable and the isFinished() method are used by the branches to know
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when the main command is finished. In this way, they can terminate their execution as soon
as the command terminates. The two other objects are simply Java Threads, which implement
ILimeAgent and extend LimeThread. Moreover, they contain a reference to their parent to be
able to call isFinished().
Pick. The Pick is similar to the InformationHandler but requires more synchronisation
mechanisms. In this case, one kind of thread is needed, one for each branch. However, all
branches have to be synchronised with each other to assert that only one is taken. When
a branch is “ready” to be taken, it signals it to the Pick object. The branch has then an
“authorisation” to process. If its execution goes well (i.e. if it actually can execute the branch),
it notifies its success via setPicked(). After that, the associated command can be executed
and the Pick can terminate. More details on the synchronisation are available in Section 4.2.4
(see receiveMessage() and receiveEvent()).
As explained before, other SMoL constructs can be translated directly. A quick outline of
their translation is presented in the following.
 empty() is simply translated to a semi-column,
 exit() exits the program, thus, it is translated to a call to System.exit() in Java,
 wait(...) is translated using the system call Thread.sleep(...),
 assign is implemented using common assignation in Java (i.e. by using “=”),
 if-then-else is, obviously, translated to an if-then-else, and
 while and repeatUntil are translated to Java’s whiles.
Note that the assign command and the primitives handle variables. Thus, it requires to
transform SMoL variables into Java ones. This is done as follows. Each SMEPP entity (peer
or service) has a DataTable file associated. This file is a static Java class which contains all
the variables of the corresponding SMoL file. Variables are translated to static attributes of
the DataTable class. Accessing them amounts to access Java (public) attributes.
4.1.2 SMoL - concrete view
This section firstly presents an analysis of the SMoL concrete representation. The goal of
this analysis is to show the representation limitations compared to the SMoL service model
description. Then, we present a way to limit the impact of these limitations by implementing
appropriate features into the translator. Finally, this section highlights an important gap
between the concrete representation of SMoL and an executable representation.
Peers and services are written as XML files validated by two different XML schemas. Ba-
sically, the role of a schema is to define syntactical constraints that XML files must satisfy
in order to be validated by it. Peers have to satisfy the constraints of the SMoL.xsd schema,
available in Appendix A.2, while services have to satisfy those of the Contract.xsd schema,
available in Appendix A.1.2. This schema refers to the SMoL.xsd schema, allowing to specify
the behavior of the service and to the Signature.xsd schema, available in Appendix A.1.1. This
last schema allows to define the signature of the operations proposed by the service. Please
note that SMoL.xsd is actually inspired by the XML schema for BPEL processes [78] and that
Signature.xsd is actually a schema borrowed from WSDL specifying web services [109]. The
Contract.xsd schema has been developed by the SMEPP project to define service contracts
corresponding to the service model description.
The SMoL schema defines XML elements representing every basic and structured command.
Each of them is associated with a type which models the aforementioned syntactical constraints.
For instance, newPeer()’s type, tNewPeer, expresses that when newPeer() is used, an input
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parameter of type tInputNewPeer must be declared. In addition, tNewPeer states that an
optional output parameter of type tOutputNewPeer can be declared.
The SMoL schema defines a central element, Process, of type tProcess. This element
can be seen as the root of a SMoL-validated XML file. This element encapsulates all SMoL
commands. Therefore, this root element allows to write programs which do not respect the
service model description of SMoL. For instance, writing an XML file containing a Process
element which encapsulates only a catch operation is considered valid. However, this is not
semantically correct. A number of invalid programs which could be statically detected can be
defined because of the Process element. Therefore, we implement validation mechanisms to
avoid the execution of those programs. These mechanisms take the form of static checks made
during the translation. For instance, one of them checks that no catch operation is defined
outside a FaultHandler. Another one generates an implicit global FaultHandler if a program
does not start with one.
In case an invalid situation is detected during the translation, an error is reported to the
user and the translation is aborted. It is important to note that the current translator imple-
mentation does not ensure that every invalid program is statically detected. Actually, SMEPP
considers that it is the programmer’s responsibility to develop valid XML files. However, we
implemented these static check mechanisms to ease the debugging of SMEPP applications.
The Contract schema defines a central element named Contract. Its type requires the fol-
lowing elements to be declared: Signature and Grounding. Signature refers to Signature.xsd,
while Grounding represents implementation information concerning the service. In addition to
these two required elements, Contract allows to define three optional elements: Properties,
QoS and Behavior. Behavior refers to the SMoL schema and describes the SMoL behaviour of
a service. Properties and QoS have not been considered in the scope of our prototype. More-
over, Properties appears to be redundant as it declares the same elements as Signature. It
is important to note that the schemas have not been fully specified yet by the SMEPP project.
Therefore, their structure is prone to change and some of their elements (such as Properties)
have no definitive semantics yet.
This problem causes a gap between the current representation of SMoL and an executable
representation. Indeed, various information have not been bound to an XML flag representing
them. However, as we need to use these schemas in order to create executable programs, we
have fixed the semantics of specific XML elements to model the needed information.
The aforementioned gap is actually enlarged when taking into account SMoL’s XML rep-
resentation of manipulated data. A SMoL specification is actually able of manipulating data.
Indeed, as primitives are considered as simple commands in SMoL, their inputs and outputs
must be considered as data which have to be manipulated by SMoL programs. The problem is
that inputs and outputs of primitives cover a wide range of data types. For instance, primitives
such as invoke() or reply() allow to define any object as inputs. The resulting issue is to
express these data in XML and to ensure their translation into Java.
In the SMoL schema, there is currently no such data types definition. When studying any
XML flag representing an operation manipulating data, we can see they are all represented
in the same way. An operation input is represented by the type tFrom, while an operation
output is represented by the type tTo. The type tFrom allows to declare the literal value of
the input or to declare a variable containing the input value. The type tTo allows to specify a
variable which will store the operation output. The issue resides in the way that literal values
are represented by the XML schema. Actually, a literal value is an element of type tLiteral,
which can encapsulate any element. Therefore, as every primitive input can be represented as
a literal, a primitive can define anything as input, leading to invalid programs. For instance,
one can declare newPeer(3) without generating a validation error. To avoid this problem, we
implemented a set of data types in the SMoL schema. These data types represent the primitives
input and output types. For instance, such data types are peers credentials, entities identifiers,
etc. Therefore, we have a mean to check the type of an element contained in a literal.
When a primitive operation is translated, the translator checks that the literal value of input
parameters are of the expected type. If not, an error is reported to the user and the translation
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is aborted.
An issue regarding data types implementation is to define the types of the invoke() input
parameter and the reply() output parameter. Indeed, they can take any object as values. To
solve this problem, we implemented two specific data types: Input and Output, which allow to
encapsulate any Java Object. The encapsulation is achieved by writing the Object constructor
method within the Input’s or the Output’s literal element. Therefore, this is a limitation of
our implementation in the sense that it introduces language specific information in the XML
schema.
Another factor enlarging the gap is the assign operation. This operation allows to assign
any data type (represented by a tFrom type) to any variable (represented by a tTo type).
Therefore, the translator should be able to translate any data type to its corresponding Java
form. Moreover, the XML representation of the data should have to be language independent,
making the translation even more complex. This operation requires to scope every possible data
types, to implement them with an XML type2 and to foresee their translation into Java. In the
context of this prototype, we decided to scope the translation of data because of the complexity
of the previously mentioned tasks. Therefore, our prototype only translates into Java the data
types used within input and output of primitive operations. When other data types have to be
programmed, the programmer must manually modify the translated code. For instance, such
code modification can be the casting of an invoke input parameter in its original data type.
Indeed, we previously explained that the original input parameter is packed inside an Input
type object. Therefore, when the Input object is retrieved, the programmer must cast it in its
original type.
Other operations requiring manual code modifications are while, if and repeatUntil.
All of these operations contain a condition element representing their associated boolean
expression. The problem is that the type of the condition element does not specify which
operations and which data can be considered when writing a boolean expression. A boolean
expression can involve various data types and operations, not only the first order logic op-
erations and the boolean data type. Indeed, a boolean expression can be myVariable1 + 5
≤ myVariable2.anyMethod(). Such an expression refers to variable contents, to arithmetic
operations and to method invocation. The task of representing complex boolean expressions
in XML and to translate them in Java is not trivial, as the representation should be language
independent and as these expressions must be type checked. In the current implementation, the
translator skips condition elements. Therefore, in order to execute translated code contain-
ing condition elements, the programmer must manually program the corresponding boolean
expressions.
Services’ operations also require manual modifications of the translated code. Indeed, the
reader noticed that SMoL models services in terms of peer’s interaction (i.e. InformationHandlers,
receiveMessage(), invoke(), etc.). However, being a specification language, SMoL does not
feature any mechanism to actually model the body of service operations. For instance, it is
possible to model the way a thermometer publishes the temperature it reads but it is not pos-
sible to model the actual reading using SMoL. Therefore, once the translated SMoL code is
achieved, the programmer must manually modify it to include the corresponding code. Note
that these modifications are inherent to the nature of SMoL and are not the consequence of its
XML representation.
In conclusion, this gap is the reason why we have to scope the features of the translator. It
is not possible, because of the nature of SMoL and because of the issues induced by its XML
representation, to produce a fully executable translation from a SMoL specification. However,
we believe that the additional code modifications are, on the one hand, necessary because of
SMoL’s nature and, on the other hand, negligible in terms of programming efforts.
2This is required as the data are represented by the type tFrom. Therefore, to identify a literal value, it must
be encapsulated within a uniquely identifiable data type.
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4.1.3 Link with the API
Because of the way exceptions are handled in SMoL and the synchronisation requirements of
some commands, the middleware API needs information from the translator. In particular, the
primitives must be able to check whether a fault has been raised or not to terminate their execu-
tion if it is the case. In addition, the primitives invoked inside a Pick or an InformationHandler
need to be aware of the status of their parent command. This is modelled by providing the
reference of the parent command as parameter for each primitive. By using this reference, it is
possible to call methods exhibited by the ThreadedCommand interface since all command objects
implement it.
4.2 SMEPP middleware API
In order to present how our implementation of the primitives has been made, we firstly introduce
how the SMEPP basic concepts are modelled using SecureLime ones. Then, we will outline how
the software has been designed to comply with the SMEPP requirements. Finally, we detail
the implementation of the primitives.
4.2.1 High level design
An important part of SMEPP is the discovery of services and groups. In our implementation,
this is done by using two tuple spaces, playing the role of service (SD) and group (GD) direc-
tories. The tuples contained in these two tuple spaces constitute respectively a list of service
descriptions and a list of group descriptions. Consequently, the search for a group or a service
is achieved by means of a read operation on the corresponding tuple space.
A peer is mapped to a Lime Agent3 which has two default tuple spaces4: the SD and the
GD tuple spaces described above.
When a peer wants to create or join a group G, it has to :
 create a group tuple space G,
 put a tuple (called reference-tuple) describing G in GD, and
 put a tuple (called membership-tuple) in G to update the group membership list.
A group is a set of peers which have executed these three actions. The members of a same
group G use the group tuple space to communicate, as it will be illustrated in the scenarios
below. Remember that tuple spaces having the same name (and password) are merged to form
a federated one.
A service can be discovered through its service-tuple5 (providing its contract and identifiers),
see Figure 4.9. As for the service implementation, a service is simply a Java-based process using
our API.
Basically, an event is modelled by the release of a tuple in a group tuple space G. In order to
receive an event (receiveEvent() primitive), a peer creates a new SecureLime reaction waiting
for a tuple corresponding to the right event-tuple, see Figure 4.15.
Figure 4.4 illustrates the modelling of a peer and the groups to which it belongs. One can see
the two discovery tuple spaces, GD and SD. The peer is member of n groups. There is a tuple
in GD and a tuple space for each one. Each group tuple space contains a membership-tuple
representing the peer. Furthermore, the peer exhibits m services, which are listed in SD. The
figure shows also an example of event-tuple in the group 2 tuple space.
3See Section 3.5.
4Created by the execution of newPeer().
5Which is inserted in SD after a publish() call.
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Figure 4.4: Peer model.
4.2.2 High level security design
The security aspects of our implementation have been addressed by using the SecureLime’s
extensions of Lime. According to the SMEPP guidelines:
 every peer has an AppKey password granting access to a SMEPP application,
 every peer has a set of passwords (GKeys) granting access to groups.
In order to prevent illegal peers to get access to the SMEPP application, the directory tuple
spaces (SD and GD) are protected by using SecureLime secured tuple spaces with the AppKey
as password. In this way, every data passing through these tuple spaces is encrypted with the
AppKey.
Note that if the peer does not provide the right password at peer creation (newPeer()
primitive), it does not get an error message. Actually, it creates isolated directories (since
the secured tuple spaces do not merge if they do not have the same password, thanks to the
SecureLime federation mechanism). Furthermore, if an illegal peer creates a group, legal peers
will not be able to see it since they will not share the same directories.
To ensure that every peer sees only groups and services matching its credentials, we had to
prevent the tuples inside the directories from being visible to everyone. SecureLime made this
task pretty easy. It suffices to use the password of the group as read-password, thus a peer is
only able to see a group or service description if it has the password matching the group or
service visibility.
To restrict the access to a group, we protect the secured tuple space representing the group
with the GKey corresponding to it. In this way, when a peer tries to join a group, if it provides
the right password, the newly created tuple space is merged with the federated one. Otherwise,
it gets an empty tuple space, as in the case of a newPeer() call with an incorrect password.
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Figure 4.4 shows the keys used to protect a SMEPP application. The discovery tuple spaces
are protected with AppKey, while each group tuple spaces is protected with its own associated
GKey, GKey i in the figure.
4.2.3 Software architecture
Figure 4.5 shows the architecture of our software. This section explains more in details the role
of each package. Please note only the principal classes are represented in this class diagram.
Utilities package
In the utils package, one can find the TupleFactory which is a class gathering every method
producing a tuple. This enables the programmer to change the tuple structure in a consistent
way for each class of tuple. The TupleFactory is thus used by many classes.
The ids subpackage contains the identifiers used in the API. Those objects refer to the
identifiers defined in the SMEPP Service Model [98], for instance GroupServiceID corresponds
to groupServiceId. Let’s have a closer look to their structure.
 PeerID. This object has only one attribute: the AgentID returned by the SecureLime
API.
 GroupID. Since several different groups can have the same name in SMEPP, we have to
use more information to have a proper identifier. A GroupID is then composed of the
name of the group, the creator’s PeerID and a counter (local to the creator). This last
attribute is incremented every time the peer creates a group.
 ServiceID is an interface implemented by PeerID, SessionID, PeerServiceID and Group-
ServiceID. This interface finds its utility in primitives such as invoke(), getPeerId()
etc. It simply enables to use the same primitive implementation for different classes of
argument.
 SessionID is an object containing several components: the PeerID of the session initiator,
the PeerID of the session-full service provider, the service’s PeerServiceID and a counter
(to ensure the object to identify uniquely the session).
 Caller is an interface implemented by PeerID, SessionID and PeerServiceID. Those
entities run a piece of SMoL code. Thus, they can invoke operations. The interface in
itself is used to identify the sender of an event.
 CallerID has three attributes: an AgentID, a GroupID and an object which implements
Caller. When an entity invokes an operation, it uses this object to enable the provider
to reply in the right (local) tuple space.
 GroupServiceID consists of a string composed of the GroupID and a hashcode of the
service contract. This ensures that every service having the same contract and published
in the same group gets the same groupServiceId.
 PeerServiceID is an object with two attributes: the corresponding GroupServiceID and
the PeerID of the peer offering the service.
Peer package
The root of the peer package contains:
 the Peer class which implements SecureLime’s StationaryAgent interface. It is used to
contain the data hold by a SMEPP peer. Notably, it holds a boolean variable to ensure
the peer is connected to the SMEPP application, the peer identifier (PeerID), etc.,
 the Primitives class which gathers the implementation of all the primitives,
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Figure 4.5: Primitives API.
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 the SMEPPCaller interface which is implemented by the “running” classes (i.e. Peer,
Service and Session). It provides two methods which return the event and concurrency
manager (respectively) associated with the entity.
The package contains also a subpackage (managers) which gathers the managers of a peer.
Those classes are (notably) managing the membership of groups, the services offer and the
events subscriptions. We describe them in details in the following.
Groups. The role of this part of the program is to manage the groups to which the peer
belongs. When a peer creates or joins a group, the group is simply added to the list. In this
way, the peer can access the group tuple space easily. Also, when a peer leaves a group, the
group manager is in charge of disengaging the tuple space and cleaning all other informations
related to this group.
Services. The service management package manages the service publishing, the session cre-
ation, etc. This is a very important part of the API. Indeed, a service is also a SMEPP entity
and can thus call primitives to receive events, invoke operations, etc. If the service is session-full
it can have sessions which are the running instances of the service. Both Service and Session
extend the LimeThread class since SecureLime restricts access to tuple spaces to this class. Note
that in case the service is session-full, the running sessions are represented as objects contained
in its Service object.
This package contains also the ConcurrencyManager which is in charge of preventing
 a same entity to call the same method twice at the same time by keeping a list of
<entityId, operationName> couples,
 an entity to call reply() without having invoked a corresponding receiveMessage().
The class keeps a list of <callerId, operationName> to keep track of received message.
Events. This part of the API manages the event subscriptions. In SMEPP, one can subscribe
to all events at the same time and unsubscribe to them event by event, and symmetrically.
The implementation of such a mechanism is quite complicated since there is no way of know-
ing all available events. The EventsManager keeps a list of Event. This object represents a
(un)subscription to one event in a group, one event in any group, all events in a group or all
events in any group. For instance, if a peer subscribes to all events, we add a special event
“all”. Then, if the peer unsubscribes to “eventName”, we add an anti-event “eventName”.
This subpackage contains also two important classes. The EventListener class (which im-
plements ReactionListener from SecureLime) is used to retrieve an event with the receiveEvent()
primitive. The EventCleaner is a thread created after the release of every event, it deletes the
event after a few seconds to ensure the freshness of every type of event.
4.2.4 Primitives implementation
This section details how the SMEPP primitives are implemented with Java on top of Secure-
Lime. Each primitive is described from four points of view (when relevant). Firstly, they are
described as SMEPP defines them. In this way, the reader can fully understand what is needed
to implement them. Secondly, the coordination point of view of the implementation is out-
lined, referencing SecureLime. Thirdly, some implementation details are given. Finally, the
primitives’ exception management is described.
The primitive are organised as in Section 2.3.1. We start by presenting the peer management
related primitives. Then, we detail the ones concerning the group management. Subsequently,
we dwell on the service related primitives. The two last parts details the message and event re-
lated primitives. Some scenarios allow one to understand completely the interaction underlying
the main primitives. In the following, three important scenarios illustrate the implementation,
regarding group, service and event management.
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Peer management
The three peer management primitives are newPeer(), getPeerId() and getPeers().
NewPeer
peerId newPeer(credentials) throws exception invalidCall
Primitive description. A program calls the newPeer() primitive to become a SMEPP peer.
The credentials parameter is used to authenticate the peer. In our implementation
it consists of the so-called AppKey and a list of pairs <GKeys,groupName>. A call to
newPeer() returns a peerId which identifies the peer in the SMEPP application. The
invalidCall exception is thrown when a service tries to call the primitive.
Coordination view. As outlined above, the implementation of newPeer() consists mainly of the
creation of two tuple spaces: GD and SD, which represent the group directory and the
service directory, respectively. Those tuple spaces are created using standard names and
the provided AppKey. The peerId is produced by using the AgentID given by SecureLime
which is unique for each host running a SecureLime server.
Implementation details. Inside a peer code, no primitive can be called before newPeer(). A
boolean variable (set to true at the end of the method) is used to check that the peer is
well connected to the SMEPP application when invoking other primitives.
Exceptions handling. At the beginning of the method implementing the primitive, the API
checks which kind of “container” is the caller. Indeed, if the “container” is a service or a
session, the call is invalid and an invalidCall exception must be raised. This is done by
using the getContainer() method defined in the SMEPPCaller interface. This check is
done in other primitives available only to peers.
GetPeerId
peerId getPeerId(id?) throws exception invalidId
where id is either a peerServiceId or sessionId
Primitive description. This primitive behaves differently depending whether the id parameter
is provided or not. If an id is specified, then it returns the peerId of the peer which
has published the service referred by the peerServiceId or the sessionId. When the
primitive is called without parameter, the primitive returns simply the peerId of the peer
containing the caller. An exception is raised if the id does not refer to an existing service
or session.
Implementation details. SecureLime is not required to implement the core of this primitive since
the object representing a peerServiceId in our implementation contains the provider’s
peerId. Similarly, the sessionId contains the peerServiceId of the instantiated service.
Exceptions handling. In order to be able to raise the invalidId exception, we have to scan the
SD to find a service-tuple (see Figure 4.9), by using a rd() operation. If the tuple cannot
be found, this means the corresponding service or session does not exist, the exception is
then raised.
GetPeers
peerId[] getPeers(groupId) throws exception invalidGroupId, callerNotInGroup
Primitive description. The getPeers() primitive returns the list of peers which are member
of the group groupId. The invalidGroupId exception is raised if no group is identified
by groupId. CallerNotInGroup is raised if the group exists but the caller peer is not a
member, or if the caller service is not published in this group.
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<’ peer’,peerId,#,peerPwd>
where peerId is the identifier of the tuple owner,
# means no read-password is used,
peerPwd is the remove-password generated by the peer.
Figure 4.6: Membership-tuple.
Coordination view. The core implementation is trivial. Since every group member has put a
membership-tuple (see Figure 4.6) in the group tuple space, a simple rdg() operation6
retrieves an array of tuples. This array can be used (almost) directly to return the
expected result.
SecureLime restriction. SecureLime made things slightly harder by requiring to specify the
location parameter in the rdg() operation. Since every membership-tuple is in a different
location (remember those tuples are located in the local tuple space of each peer), we have
to make a rdg() operation on each connected agent (i.e. peer) specifying the location
parameters.
In order to get the list of locations in which one has to search, one uses the LimeSystem-
TupleSpace. Remember this tuple space contains, among other things, a tuple for each
connected agent. From this tuple, we can extract the agent’s AgentID and, then, compute
the associated location.
This request has been encapsulated in a method called getAgents() and is used in other
primitives, every time an aggregate or probe operation on a whole tuple space is needed.
Exceptions handling. To comply with the exceptions specified in the primitive signature, two
checks are needed. Firstly, we have to query the GD tuple space to ensure that the
groupId group exists. This is done by using the getGroupDescription() primitive.
Secondly, the API has to ensure that the peer is a member of the groupId group or the
service has been published in this group. This last check is done “internally” in the API
by using the GroupsManager and ServicesManager.
Group management
There are seven primitives which take the group management in charge: createGroup(),
getGroups(), getGroupDescription(), joinGroup(), leaveGroup(), getIncludingGroups()
and getPublishingGroup(). The implementations of these primitives make above all use of
tuple space creations and reference-tuples.
CreateGroup
groupId createGroup(groupDescription) throws exception invalidCall
where groupDescription stands for <groupName,securityInformation>
Primitive description. A peer calls createGroup() to create a new SMEPP group, this group
will be accessible for every peer having the corresponding password. The groupDescription
parameter encapsulates the group name, some security information and, possibly, some
further information (e.g. a textual description). However, in our implementation the
securityInformation parameter is not used since the access to a group is simply re-
stricted by the ownership of a password. Thus, to be able to access and see a group G,
one only needs the password associated with G. One can say that the security information
is inferred from the group name. Practically, the groupDescription parameter consists
of two parts, a (mandatory) name and an (optional) textual description. A service is not
allowed to call the createGroup() primitive, consequently such a call raises an invalidCall
exception.
6This operation uses a template corresponding to a membership-tuple.
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<’ group’,name,groupId,groupDescription,peerId,groupPwd,peerPwd>
where name is the group name,
groupId is the group identifier,
peerId is the id of the tuple owner,
groupDescription is the textual description of the group,
grouPwd is the read-password corresponding to name,
peerPwd is the remove-password generated by the peer.
Figure 4.7: Reference-tuple.
Coordination view. Basically, the translation of this primitive into SecureLime concepts is sim-
ply the creation of a new tuple space using the wished groupId and the corresponding
password as parameters. The groupId is computed using the peerId of the creator, the
group name and a counter associated with the peer.
In addition, the peer adds a membership-tuple (see Figure 4.6) into the newly created
tuple space. This tuple is used to manage the membership list of the group. Then, the
peer has to add a reference-tuple (detailed in Figure 4.7) in the GD tuple space in order
to make the group discoverable. Those actions are implemented using out() operations.
Exceptions handling. As usual, the invalidCall exception is raised if the “container” is not a
SMEPP peer (by using the getContainer() method).
GetGroups
groupId[] getGroups(groupDescription?)
Primitive description. This primitive returns an array of group identifiers. The groupDescription
parameter is used to filter the result. The SMEPP service model allows to filer on the
group name, the description and the security information. However, as stated before,
this last parameter is not used in our implementation. Instead, the primitive searches for
every group matching the name and/or description using every password the peer owns.
Coordination view. Since every group is referenced in the GD tuple space7, the peer has to query
it to retrieve group information. This query is implemented by successive rdg() operations
on the tuple space. The number of rdg() calls is equal to the number of GKeys the
caller owns. The template used in rdg() corresponds to the optional groupDescription
parameter. If no parameter is specified, the operation returns all tuples the peer has
access to.
Once all pertinent reference-tuples are retrieved, it suffices to extract their groupId field
and to return them as an array of groupIds. See Figure 4.7 for more details on reference-
tuples.
SecureLime restriction. In this case again, we have to face the SecureLime restriction on the
aggregate operations. So, as in getPeers(), we need to know the list of the connected
agents first and then iterate on the agent list specifying their location in the rdg() oper-
ation.
Implementation details. Since every peer has a reference-tuple (in its local GD) for each group
of which it is member, the rdg() operation potentially returns several times the same
groupId. To avoid this situation, a selection is made before returning the groupId array
to erase duplications.
GetGroupDescription
groupDescription getGroupDescription(groupId) throws exception invalidGroupId
7In the form of reference-tuples.
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Primitive description. GetGroupDescription() returns the description of a group. In our im-
plementation, it consists of the name and (potentially) the textual description of groupId.
It raises an invalidGroupId exception if no corresponding group can be found.
Coordination view. The implementation of the primitive is straightforward. Indeed, to retrieve
a group description it suffices to retrieve the reference-tuple corresponding to that group.
We use a rdp() operation with a template specifying the groupId to find a corresponding
tuple. As usual, since those tuple are read-protected by the group password, we have to
iterate on the peer’s password list to return the groupDescritpion accordingly to all the
GKeys owned by the caller.
Exceptions handling. If no matching reference-tuple can be found, an invalidGroupId exception
is raised.
JoinGroup
void joinGroup(groupId, credentials) throws exception accessDenied, invalidGroupId,
invalidCall
Primitive description. A peer uses joinGroup() to enter a SMEPP group. It has to provide
the groupId and its credentials (i.e. in our implementation, the list of <group name,
password> pairs). Remember that a peer can join several groups. Moreover, joining
several time the same group does not raise an exception.
The service model specifies three throwable exceptions: accessDenied if the peer does not
have the right credential, invalidGroupId if the group does not exist and invalidCall if
the caller is a service.
Coordination view. The implementation of the primitive is very similar to the createGroup()
one. Indeed, the peer creates a tuple space using the groupId and the password corre-
sponding to the group name. Then, it puts a reference-tuple (Figure 4.7) in GD and a
membership-tuple (Figure 4.6) in the newly created tuple space.
To fill those two last tuples, the groupId is not enough. That is why, the primitive
firstly fetches the corresponding reference-tuple and extracts the name and the (potentially
empty) description.
Exceptions handling. On the one hand, the invalidGroupId is raised if the group description
cannot be found in GD. On the other hand, the invalidCall is raised, as usual, if the
“container” is not a peer. Regarding the accessDenied exception, it is important to signal
that if the peer has a wrong password associated with the name of the group, it will not
get an exception. There is no way of preventing a peer to create a new protected tuple
space, but remember this tuple space will merge with another one only if they have the
same name and the same password. In our case, if the peer uses a wrong password, it will
create a “new” but isolated SMEPP group. The accessDenied exception is then raised if
no password is associated with the group name8 in the credentials.
LeaveGroup
void leaveGroup(groupId) throws exception invalidGroupId, peerNotInGroup, invalid-
Call
Primitive description. A peer uses the leaveGroup() primitive to exit a group it belongs to.
This primitive is also in charge of removing all services a peer has offered through the
group it wants to leave. Note that “if a peer leaves a group while having active service
instances in the respective group, then the middleware will not raise an exception. In
such a case service invokers will (possibly) receive an exception” [98].
As a service is not allowed to call the joinGroup() primitive, it is not allowed to call
leaveGroup(). This raises an invalidCall exception. Furthermore, if the groupId group
8Found in the reference-tuple.
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does not exist, it raises an invalidGroupId exception. If the peer is not a member of the
group, a peerNotInGroup exception is raised.
Coordination view. In order to exit a group, a peer has to disengage the group tuple space
corresponding to groupId. This deletes all the tuples concerning events and services in
this group. It has also to delete the groupId reference-tuple from GD and the service-
tuples representing the services it has published in this group from SD. This is done by
using inp() operations.
Implementation details. To stop the execution of the services published in the groupId tuple
space, the peer has to stop the execution of the root FaultHandler of every concerned
service (and possibly session). It uses the stopCmd() method9 to terminate the execution
of the FaultHandler’s body.
Exceptions handling. The invalidCall is, as usual, raised if the “container” is not a peer. A
call to getGroupDescription() is made to ensure the group exists, otherwise the in-
validGroupId exception is raised. The last check ensures the peer is well a member of the
group using the GroupsManager, otherwise one raises the peerNotInGroup exception.
GetIncludingGroups
groupId[] getIncludingGroups() throws exception invalidCall
Primitive description. GetIncludingGroups() returns an array containing the groups’ identi-
fiers to which the caller peer belongs. A service is not allowed to call this primitive. Such
a call raises invalidCall.
Implementation details. The implementation of this primitive is Java-based only since the peer
itself has all the information it needs. It returns the array thanks to the information held
by the GroupsManager.
Exceptions handling. The invalidCall primitive is raised if the caller “container” is not a peer.
GetPublishingGroup
groupId getPublishingGroup(id?) throws exception invalidId, invalidCall
where id is either groupServiceId, peerServiceId or sessionId.
Primitive description. The primitive behaves differently according to whether the parameter
is specified or not. If id is not provided, the primitive returns the group in which the
caller service has been published. Note that this implies a peer cannot call the primitive
without parameter (in such case, one raises an invalidCall exception). If the id parameter
is specified, the primitive returns the groupId in which the service identified by id has
been published.
Implementation details. The implementation of the primitive is really simple since our API
defines the groupId as a part of a service identifier: peerServiceId, groupServiceId
and sessionId have a groupId component.
Exceptions handling. Actually, this primitive uses SecureLime if the id parameter is specified.
Indeed, in this case, one has to check the service identified by id really exists. This is
done by trying to retrieve a service-tuple matching id from SD with a rdp() operation.
9Declared in ThreadedCommand interface.
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Figure 4.8: Group management.
Group management scenario
We assume that the ProviderPeer has created a group called GName, identified by groupId. The
InvokerPeer will execute “gid[] = getGroups()” and “joingroup(gid[0],myCredentials)”
to join this group. We also assume that the peers share the AppKey and the password to
get access to groupId, GKey. In Figure 4.8, only one group (groupId) has been created (by
ProviderPeer), a reference-tuple references it in GD. This tuple contains the name of the group,
its identifier and the reference owner. It is read-protected by GKey and remove-protected by
ppPwd10. There is also a membership-tuple for ProviderPeer in tempGroupId. This one contains
the peer’s identifier.
1. InvokerPeer invokes getGroups(desiredGroupDescription) to discover which groups it
can join. To do this, it performs a read operation on the federated GD tuple space using
GKey as read-password. With regards to the rdg() operation, desiredGroupDescription
corresponds to the name of the group (not used here). InvokerPeer gets the only tuple
present which contains the group name and its identifier which are the needed information
to join the group later.
2. InvokerPeer invokes joinGroup(groupId[0],myCredentials) which creates the new
SecureLimeTupleSpace object, representing the groupId group tuple space. The peer
has to use the group identifier (groupId[0]) and the password corresponding to it (GKey).
Since the two groupId tuple spaces have the same name and password, they automatically
merge to create a federated tuple space.
3. joinGroup() continues by putting a reference-tuple describing the group in the GD tuple
space. This step ensures that the group will be kept alive as long as the group contains at
10Remember that the last two fields of every tuple are respectively the read and remove-password. Here,
ppPwd (which has been securely generated by the peer) is used to ensure that only the tuple’s owner can remove
it.
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<’ service’,contract,gsid,psid,groupId,peerId,groupPwd,peerPwd>
where contract is the service contract (in a Java object form),
gsid is the service groupServiceId,
psid is the service peerServiceId,
groupId is the group identifier of the group in which the service has been published,
peerId is the id of the service provider,
grouPwd is the read-password corresponding to the service’s group,
peerPwd is the remove-password generated by the peer.
Figure 4.9: Service-tuple.
least one member. This tuple differs from the ProviderPeer ’s one by the remove-password
field (ipPwd) and the field expressing the tuple owner.
4. The last step of joinGroup() consists of putting the peer “membership-tuple” into the
groupId tuple space. The purpose of this tuple is to keep updated the group members
list.
Service management
Five primitives form the service management: publish(), unpublish(), getServices(),
getServiceContract() and startSession(). The creation of services and sessions involves
Java reflection [100] and the publication of service-tuples, while the service discovery is imple-
mented by performing service-tuple retrievals.
Publish
<groupServiceId, peerServiceId> publish(grouId, serviceContract) throws exception
invalidService, invalidGroupId, peerNotInGroup, invalidCall
Primitive description. This primitive is used by peers which want to offer a service (defined in
the serviceContract) in a group, groupId. It returns two identifiers: the peerServiceId
which identifies the instance of the service offered by the peer and the groupServiceId
which allows a SMEPP entity to invoke a service “blindly”. Remember that the ser-
vices having the same serviceContract and published in the same group have the same
groupServiceId.
Publish() raises four kinds of exception:
 invalidService if the service contract does not refer to a valid service,
 invalidGroupId if groupId does not refer to an existing group,
 peerNotInGroup if the caller peer is not a member of groupId,
 invalidCall if the primitive is called by a service.
Coordination view. From the coordination point of view, publishing a service consists of adding
a service-tuple in the SD tuple space. Service-tuples are detailed in Figure 4.9. This tuple
makes the service discoverable for peers having the right password (the same as the group
in which the service has been published). Thus, using an out() operation, a service-tuple
is added in the peer’s local SD tuple space.
Implementation details. Actually, the implementation of this primitive is slightly more com-
plicated. Indeed, before making the service discoverable, it is important to start its
execution.
The way a service is executed depends on its property of being session-full or not. On the
one hand, if the service is session-full, the body of the service is started after an invoker
calls a corresponding startSession(). In this way, the execution of a session-full service
amounts to wait for a session-tuple. The detailed mechanism of a session creation will be
90 Chapter 4
explained along with the startSession() primitive. On the other hand, if the service is
not session-full, its body can be directly executed. We use the Java reflection [100] to load
the class representing the service. Remember that this class is actually a FaultHandler.
Once this class is loaded, the service’s thread is started.
Exceptions handling. The following lines explain how the exceptions are handled in the imple-
mentation of this primitive.
 invalidService is never raised by our API since the service contract is checked at the
“translation time”,
 invalidGroupId is raised if the group description of groupId cannot be found in GD,
 peerNotInGroup is raised if groupId is not in the group list to which the peer belongs,
 invalidCall is raised when getContainer() returns that the caller is not a peer.
Unpublish
void unpublish(peerServiceId) throws exception invalidServiceId, peerNotService-
Owner, invalidCall
Primitive description. To stop offering a service, a peer calls the unpublish() primitive, spec-
ifying the peerServiceId corresponding to the service it wants to stop.
If the peer is not the owner of the service it wants to unpublish, one raises a peerNotSer-
viceOwner exception. In case the peerServiceId does not refer to an existing service,
one raises an invalidServiceId exception. Finally, similarly to the publish() case, one
raises an invalidCall exception if the primitive is called by a service.
Coordination view. The unpublishing of a service is done by deleting the corresponding service-
tuple from the SD tuple space, using an inp() operation.
Implementation details. As with leaveGroup() the service execution has to be stopped, as well
as the potentially running sessions. The execution is stopped by invoking the stopCmd()
method on the root FaultHandler representing the service.
Exceptions handling. Checking if the peer is the owner of the service is trivial. However, to
ensure to raise the invalidServiceId when needed, one has to query the SD tuple space
to find a corresponding service-tuple using a rdp() operation. As usual, invalidCall is
raised if the “container” is not a peer.
GetServices
<groupId, groupServiceId, peerServiceId>[] getServices(groupId?, peerId?, service-
Contract?, maxResult?, credentials) throws exception invalidGroupId, invalidPeerId,
invalidService
Primitive description. The goal of this primitive is to retrieve the service identifiers matching
the specified parameters (all optional excepting credentials). It returns an array of
triples (with max maxResult elements) consisting of groupIds, groupServiceIds and
peerServiceIds. Note that in our implementation the matching of the contract is only
based on the session type and the method names.
Coordination view. The implementation of the primitive is very similar to the getGroups() one.
Indeed, a rdg() operation using a template corresponding to the specified parameters is
invoked on SD to retrieve the matching service-tuple (Figure 4.9). As the services have
different read-protected passwords, one has to iterate on the password list contained in
the credentials.
SecureLime restriction. As in getGroups(), one has to specify the location parameters in the
rdg() operation. That is why, the primitive iterates on all the connected agents to retrieve
the matching tuples.
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<’ session’,peerServiceId,sessionId,#,#>
where peerServiceId is the peerServiceId of the aimed service,
sessionId is the sessionId computed by the caller,
# means no read-password is used,
# means no remove-password is used.
Figure 4.10: Session-tuple.
Exceptions handling. As in the publish() case, our implementation does not raise the invalid-
Service exception. However, invalidGroupId is raised if no groupId reference-tuple can
be found.
GetServiceContract
serviceContract getServiceContract(id) throws exception invalidId
where id is either groupServiceId, peerServiceId or sessionId .
Primitive description. This primitive returns the contract corresponding to the specified id.
If the parameter does not correspond to an existing service, the invalidId exception is
raised.
Coordination view. The implementation is straightforward. A rdp() operation on the SD tuple
space retrieves a matching tuple. Then, one returns the contract contained in the tuple.
Though, as the visibility of services is restricted by passwords, one has to iterate on the
list of passwords the peer owns.
SecureLime restriction. As in some of the previous primitives, we also have to iterate on the
connected agents since the location parameter is required with the “probe” operations.
Exceptions handling. If no matching tuple can be found, one raises the invalidId exception.
StartSession
sessionId startSession(serviceId) throws exception invalidServiceId, accessDenied,
cannotStartSession
where entityId is either groupServiceId, peerServiceId of a session-full service .
Primitive description. A SMEPP entity calls the startSession() primitive to open a new
session with a session-full service. The primitive returns a sessionId which identifies the
session uniquely and allows it to be shared amongst several entities.
Three kinds of exception can be raised:
 invalidServiceId if no state-full services are referenced by serviceId,
 accessDenied if the caller entity does not belong to the group in which the service is
published,
 cannotStartSession when the service cannot start a new session.
Coordination view. In order to request the creation of a new session, the caller entity sends a
session-tuple in the local group tuple space of the provider, using an out() operation with
the location parameter specified. Then, the caller waits for a session-ack-tuple. Those
two tuples are detailed in Figures 4.10 and 4.11, respectively. Assuming the provider
has published a corresponding session-full service, it created a LimeThread waiting for
session-tuples. Once the provider has got the needed information, it answers to the caller
using a session-ack-tuple acknowledging the creation of the session. This tuple is sent in
the caller’s local group tuple space. When the caller gets the expected session-ack-tuple,
it knows it can now use the session.
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<’ sess ack’,psid,sessionId,bool,#,#>
where psid is the peerServiceId of the concerned service,
sessionId is the sessionId computed by the session originator,
bool is the provider answer (if false, the session can not be started),
# means no read-password is used,
# means no remove-password is used.
Figure 4.11: Sessionack-tuple.
Implementation details. For the sake of simplicity, it is the caller which computes the sessionId.
It consists in the identifiers of the caller, the provider and the peerServiceId. The
provider checks the sessionId validity when it receives the session-tuple.
On the provider side, the session is executed as the execution of a service. Once the thread
representing the service gets a session-tuple, the provider uses the Java Reflection to load
the root FaultHandler representing the service. The thread executing an instance of the
service is then started. Also, a reference to the session is added to the Service object, in
order to be able to stop it later (in case of unpublish() or leaveGroup()).
Exceptions handling. CannotStartSession is raised if the service provider has considered the
sessionId as invalid, while accessDenied is raised if the peer has not the corresponding
group in its group list. Finally, invalidServiceId is raised either if serviceId is not a
peerServiceId or groupServiceId, or if no corresponding service-tuple can be found.
Message management
The invoke(), receiveMessage() and reply() primitives are interconnected with each other.
Thus, they use the same format of tuples (invocation-tuples and reply-tuples) to make pos-
sible the communication between peers. Following this section, an example scenario helps to
understand the mechanism of service invocation.
Invoke
output? invoke(entityId, operationName, input?) throws exception invalidPeerId,
invalidServiceId, invalidOperation, concurrentRequest, invalidInputParameter, invalid-
OuputParameter, accessDenied
where entityId is either peerServiceId, groupServiceId, sessionId or peerId.
Primitive description. The invoke() primitive is used to call an operationName operation on
an entity identified by entityId. Remember there are four kinds of invocation depending
on the kind of interaction the service offers:
 if the aimed service is state-less, the entityId must be either peerServiceId or
groupServiceId.
 if the aimed service is state-full session-less, the entityId must be peerServiceId,
since the groupServiceId does not keep track of client.
 if the aimed service is state-full session-full, the entityId must be sessionId.
 finally, if the caller wants to directly call a peer, the entityId must be peerId. Note
that, in this case, the operation is always assumed one-way.
If the type of entityId does not comply with the aforementioned invocation restrictions,
invalidServiceId exception is raised. As one can guess, the input and output parameters
are the input message and output message, respectively. Note that our implementation
does not check the type of those elements. Thus, the API never raises invalidInputPa-
rameter and invalidOuputParameter which are supposed to be raised in case the input
and/or output do not match the signature of the operationName operation.
Invoke() behaves differently according to the operation type:
CHAPTER 4. PROOF-OF-CONCEPT IMPLEMENTATION 93
<’ invoke’,opName,input,psid,caller,#,#>
where opName is the name of the invoked operation,
input is the input operation parameter,
psid is the identifier of the aimed service,
caller is the identifier of the caller,
# means no read-password is used,
# means no remove-password is used.
Figure 4.12: Invocation-tuple.
<’ reply’,opName,caller,output,fault,#,#>
where opName is the name of the invoked operation,
caller is the identifier of the caller (which is waiting for the tuple),
output is the output of the operation,
fault is the produced fault in case of an operation erroneous behaviour,
# means no read-password is used,
# means no remove-password is used.
Figure 4.13: Reply-tuple.
 if the operation is one-way, invoke() blocks until the provider does a corresponding
receiveMessage().
 if the operation is request-response, invoke() blocks until the provider does a reply()
corresponding to the invoked operation.
The SMEPP model requires that concurrent calls to a same request-response operation
by the same entity are forbidden. The primitive raises a concurrentRequest exception if
the caller entity tries to invoke an operation Op while it is concurrently waiting for the
response of another Op call.
Invoke() raises an invalidOperation exception if the provider does not support the
operationName operation and an accessDenied exception if the caller does not belong
to the provider’s group.
Coordination view. The mapping to SecureLime concepts is done as follows. Firstly, the peer
inserts (out()) an invocation-tuple in the local group tuple space where the service has
been published. This tuple is illustrated in Figure 4.12. If the aimed entity is a peer, then
the API has to find a common group between the caller and the provider. This is done
by iterating on the groups the caller belongs and calling getPeers() on them.
Once the peer has sent its invocation-tuple, it waits for a reply-tuple (see Figure 4.13) using
an (in()). Even in the case of a one-way operation, the peer waits for a “fake” reply-tuple.
This ensures that invoke() blocks until a corresponding receiveMessage() is done. In
case the operation is request-response, this tuple possibly contains the operation’s output.
Implementation details. In order to ensure that the provider gets enough information to be able
to answer the caller, the invocation-tuple contains a CallerID Java object which contains
the groupId used for the communication as well as the caller’s AgentID and entityId
(peerServiceId, peerId or sessionId). Without this object, the provider would not be
able to answer since it does not know the group in which it has to answer.
SecureLime restriction. An important issue met with SecureLime is the fact that blocking op-
erations (e.g. in() and rd()) are “passive blocking”11. This induces that there is no way
to stop a thread which is waiting for such an operation to terminate. However, it is not
11“Passive blocking” means the thread does not check regularly whether it can resume its execution.
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compliant with the SMoL semantics which requires an execution to stop as soon as an
exception is raised.
To get round this problem, we implemented “active waiting” versions of in() and rd().
Those methods loop every second to make an inp() or rdp() operation. On each loop,
they check if the execution has to be stopped or not (through the isStopped() method
defined in the ThreadedCommands). This allows the API to comply with the specification
and also to implement a time-out in case the provider does not answer. Concretely, in
this last case a timeoutException is raised.
Exceptions handling. To handle the concurrency restriction, the API uses the ConcurrencyManager
attached to the caller entity. At the beginning of the method, in the request-response case,
a pair <entityId, operationName> is added in the manager. If such a pair already ex-
ists, a concurrentRequest exception is raised. When the reply-tuple is received, the pair
is removed from the manager, allowing new call of the operationName operation.
ReceiveMessage
<callerId, input?> receiveMessage(groupId?, operationName) throws exception invalid-
Operation, invalidGroupId, callerNotInGroup, invalidInputParameter
where callerId is either peerServiceId, sessionId or peerId.
Primitive description. Entities use receiveMessage() to get an operation request. The prim-
itive returns the callerId of the operation caller and the specified input message.
The primitive raises four exceptions :
 invalidOperation if the operation is not specified in a published service contract (if
the caller is a service),
 invalidGroupId if no group corresponds to groupId
 callerNotInGroup if the caller does not belong to the groupId group,
 invalidInputParameter if the input parameter does not match the operation’s sig-
nature. Note that this last exception is not raised by our implementation.
Coordination view. To receive a message, the caller entity has to make an in() operation on
the corresponding groupId local tuple space. The template of this operation contains
the operationName and the location parameters specified to look in the appropriate lo-
cal tuple space. Once the tuple is retrieved, one has to extract the callerId and the
input parameter to return them. In the case operationName is one-way, the primitive
terminates its execution by sending a “fake” reply-tuple. This unblocks the invoker.
SecureLime restriction. Given that the groupId is an optional parameter, if it is not specified,
the primitive has to explore every group to which the peer belongs. Again, one uses the
“active blocking” in() operation previously introduced. A loop on groups waits several
seconds for a potential invocation-tuple in the current group. The loop continues until a
tuple has been found in a local group tuple space.
Implementation details. Since a reply() (see in the following) is only allowed if a corresponding
receiveMessage() has been done before, a pair <callerId,operatioName> is added to
the caller entity’s ConcurrencyManager. This allows to check the existence of such a
message in the corresponding reply().
Other difficulties arise when the primitive is called through Pick and InformationHandler
SMoL commands. In those cases, the primitive has to be synchronised with other potential
receiveMessage() or receiveEvent() branches. The following details the implementa-
tion for those cases, assuming the groupId is specified12.
 Pick. While no tuple is found, no other branch is taken and no exception has been
raised, the following steps are executed.
12Otherwise, the primitive also loops on the groups to which the peer belongs.
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1. One does an rdp() operation13 on the group tuple space.
2. If the tuple has been found, one signals it to the parent Pick object, through the
setReady() method14. If rdp() returns null, the thread sleeps for one second
and restarts the loop.
3. Then, one executes an inp() operation to actually retrieve the tuple located
before15.
4. If the tuple is well retrieved, the parent Pick is warned that it can finish its
execution through the setPicked() method. Otherwise, the loop restarts.
5. The tuple can now be returned.
 InformationHandler. The InformationHandler case is simpler. One loops while
no tuple is found, no exception is raised and the main command is still running
(isFinished() method). The body of the loop contains only an inp() operation
and a sleep() call in order to retrieve the tuple while avoiding the CPU to be
overloaded.
Exceptions handling. InvalidOperation is raised if no available (i.e. published) contract contains
an operationName operation. InvalidInputParameter is never raised because of the gap
between variable types defined in SMoL and Java objects (see the scope of the thesis in
Section 2.4). Other declared exceptions are raised similarly as in previous primitives.
Reply
void reply(callerId, operationName, output?, faultName?) throws exception invalid-
PeerId, invalidPeerServiceId, invalidOperation, missingReceiveMessage
where callerId is either peerServiceId, sessionId or peerId.
Primitive description. This primitive terminates the execution of a request-response operation.
The caller of reply() must have previously invoked a corresponding receiveMessage().
Otherwise, a missingReceiveMessage exception is raised. The faultName parameter is
used to signal the operationName invoker that an erroneous behaviour has occurred.
Exceptions raised by reply() are similar to the one raised by invoke().
Coordination view. Basically, reply() is implemented by the sending of a reply-tuple to the
operation caller’s local group tuple space, using an out() operation (with location pa-
rameters specified). This tuple unblocks the invoker. The reply-tuple format is detailed
in Figure 4.13.
Implementation details. We use the ConcurrencyManager to ensure that the caller of reply()
has previously done a corresponding receiveMessage(). If a pair <callerId, operationName>
cannot be found, the primitive is stopped and a missingReceiveMessage exception is raised.
Exceptions handling. The exception handling is the same as in invoke().
Message management scenario
The following scenario illustrates the invocation of an operation provided by the TempReader-
Service service. We assume that two peers take part in the SMEPP application. ProviderPeer
offers a session-full service identified by psid. InvokerPeer wants to invoke an operation (op-
Name) exhibited by the service contract of psid. Here are the SMEPP primitives executed by
the peers:
InvokerPeer ProviderPeer
sessionId=startSession(psid); <cid,in>=receiveMessage(groupId,opName);
tmp=invoke(sessionId,opName,’input’); reply(cid,opName,’output’,-);
13Remember the invocation-tuple is sent in the local group tuple space of the provider.
14This method blocks until no other branches are “ready”.
15If the tuple is different, it does not matter.
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Figure 4.14: Service invocation.
Figure 4.14 shows that both peers are members of the groupId group since they have the
groupId tuple space, the reference-tuple and the membership-tuple. ProviderPeer has published
the psid service16, thus there is a tuple in SD containing the service contract, the peer service
identifier (psid), the group service identifier (gsid), the group in which it has been published
and the provider. It is read-protected by GKey and remove-protected by ppPwd, a password
generated by ProviderPeer.
1. The first action represents what directly follows the publication of a session-full service.
The ProviderPeer waits a session-tuple by doing an in() operation on its local group
tuple space. The template of this tuple contains psid, the service identifier.
2. InvokerPeer requests a session creation by calling startSession(psid). This puts a
session-tuple in the local groupId tuple space of ProviderPeer.
3. Then InvokerPeer waits its session to be acknowledged by the provider. This is done
by doing an in() operation on its local group tuple space. The template contains its
identifier and the sessionId it offered.
4. Once the provider gets the session-tuple and accepts it, it runs an instance of the psid
service, which becomes the sessionId session.
5. ProviderPeer can now confirm to InvokerPeer that its session is started by sending a
session-ack-tuple in its local group tuple space. This tuple contains the invoker’s identifier,
the sessionId and a boolean.
16We assume this service to be session-full.
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6. InvokerPeer calls invoke(sessionId,opName) which firstly puts an invocation-tuple into
ProviderPeer ’s local groupId tuple space. This tuple contains the operation name (opName)
and its parameters (input), the service identifier (here the sessionId) and the identifier
of the caller.
7. Since invoke()’s execution must be blocked until the provider has done a receiveMessage(),
InvokerPeer will perform a (blocking) in() operation, waiting for the reply-tuple related
to the opName operation.
8. When receiveMessage(groupId,opName) is called by sessionId, it retrieves an invocation-
tuple from the local tuple space of its container (ProviderPeer) by doing an in() operation
on it. The template of this operation contains only the operation name (opName).
9. Here the service instance (i.e. the session) actually executes the operation.
10. SessionId calls reply() which puts a reply-tuple into the local groupId tuple space of
InvokerPeer (opName caller). This tuple contains the operation name, the caller identifier,
the operation result and a possible fault. This last action will unblock the invoker’s
execution.
Event management
There are four primitives in event management: event(), receiveEvent(), subscribe() and
unsubscribe(). The first two involve the release and reading of event-tuples in tuple spaces,
while the last two have a Java-based only implementation.
Event
void event(groupId?, eventName, input?) throws exception invalidGroupId, caller-
NotInGroup, invalidEvent
Primitive description. Entities call event() to raise an eventName event. Some data can be
associated with it by using the input parameter. The groupId parameter, if specified,
can restrict the visibility of the published event. If the group is not specified, the event is
published in every group to which the caller peer belongs, in case the primitive is called by
a peer. If the caller is a service, the event is released in the service’s group. The SMEPP
model requires the event to be published in the service contract in case of a service call
(it would raise an invalidEvent exception otherwise). However, when we implemented
our API, the definition of the service contract was not mature enough to allow such a
verification, i.e. no event section was available.
Regarding the two other exceptions, it is obvious that invalidGroupId is raised if no
groupId can be found and callerNotInGroup is raised if an entity wants to release an
event in a group to which it does not belong.
Coordination view. Basically, an event publication is done by using an out() operation on the
local group tuple space(s), which releases an event-tuple. This tuple is detailed in Figure
4.15. Nevertheless, to ensure the freshness of each event, event() deletes the (potential)
previous eventName event (located in the caller’s local group tuple space). Also, after
releasing the event-tuple, a thread is started. It waits a few seconds and then deletes the
event-tuple, this ensures the “factual” property of the event.
Implementation details. Since several entities share the same local group tuple space17, one has
to prevent an entity to delete an event published by another one. This is done by using
the field (of the event-tuple) containing the id of the caller in the inp() template.
Exceptions handling. The two exceptions (callerNotIngroup and invalidGroupId) are raised in
the usual cases. See above for more details.
17The services published in a same group share the local group tuple space of their containing peer.
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<’ event’,name,input,callerId,#,peerPwd>
where name is the event name,
input is the data associated with the event (optional),
callerId is the sender identifier,
# means no read-password is used,
peerPwd is the remove-password generated by the peer.
Figure 4.15: Event-tuple.
ReceiveEvent
<callerId, input?> receiveEvent(groupId?, eventName) throws exception invalidGroupId,
callerNotInGroup, invalidInputParameter
where callerId is either peerServiceId,sessionId or peerId.
Primitive description. ReceiveEvent() is similar to receiveMessage(). Its purpose is to re-
trieve an eventName event from the groupId group, optionally specified. If the group pa-
rameter is not provided, the primitive searches in all groups to which the entity belongs18.
The primitive returns the event content (input) and the callerId of the provider.
Note that the call to receiveEvent() implies a previous subscription to eventName.
Coordination view. The implementation of receiveEvent() uses the SecureLime reaction. A
WeakReaction is added to every group tuple space concerned (depending whether the
groupId parameter is specified or not). This reaction reacts to a tuple (released in
the tuple space to which it belongs) which matches the event-template (containing the
eventName). The primitive then loops until the EventListener gets the expected event-
tuple (Figure 4.15).
Once the reaction is triggered, it sets the newly published tuple inside the EventListener
which allows the primitive to finally get unblocked and access to the event-tuple.
Implementation details. As with receiveMessage() the primitive has to behave differently if
it is called inside a Pick or an InformationHandler command. However, the problem is
simpler than in the receiveMessage() case, since the tuple is only read (and not deleted
from the tuple space). If the primitive is executed inside such commands, it has to be
possible for it to be stopped before it gets the event. Indeed, the branches of a Pick must
be terminated when one of them is taken and the branches of an InformationHandler
must terminate when the main command terminates. Thus, the implementation is made
in such a way that the loop waiting for the EventListener to be full can also end if the
parent command is terminated.
Exceptions handling. As in receiveMessage(), no check is made concerning the input param-
eter format. However the two other exceptions are raised in the usual cases.
Subscribe
void subscribe(eventName?, groupId?) throws exception invalidGroupId, callerNot-
InGroup
Primitive description. Entities call subscribe() to get subscribed to events. Depending on
which parameters are specified, an entity can register itself to:
 every eventName raised in groupId, or
 every eventName raised in any group the caller belongs to, or
 every event raised in groupId, or
 every event raised in any group.
18If the container is a service, we assume the service belongs to the group it has been published in.
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The two throwable exceptions are similar to the previous primitives.
Implementation details. The subscription to an event is internally handled inside an entity.
Each entity uses its attached EventManager to manage the subscribed events. This man-
agement is made complex because of the flexible way an entity can register and unregister
itself to events. For instance, a peer can subscribe to all events in any groups and later
unsubscribe itself to an eventName event. Since available events are not published any-
where, one has to use a list of events and so-called anti-events. Then, when an entity
wants to subscribe to all events, one adds a new special “all-event” to the list. After, if it
unsuscribes to an eventName event, one adds an “anti-event” corresponding to eventName
in the list.
Exceptions handling. The two exceptions are raised in the usual cases.
Unsubscribe
void unsubscribe(eventName?, groupId?) throws exception invalidGroupId, caller-
NotInGroup, notSubscribed
Primitive description. Unsubscribe() is the dual of subscribe(). Entities call this primitive
to unregister themselves as event listeners. A call to this primitive can cancel, partially
or not, a subscription.
Implementation details. The implementation of this primitive is similar to subscribe(). It
adds or removes event and anti-event in/from the EventManager attached to the caller
entity.
Event management scenario
This scenario illustrates how peers interact to publish and receive events. We assume two peers
are part of the SMEPP application: InvokerPeer and ProviderPeer. The first peer subscribes
to an event, which is released by the second one. Here are the SMEPP primitives executed by
the peers:
InvokerPeer ProviderPeer
subscribe(evName,groupId); event(groupId,evName,’someInput’);
receiveEvent(groupId,evName);
Figure 4.16 shows that both peers are members of the groupId group since they have the groupId
tuple space, the reference-tuple and the membership-tuple.
1. InvokerPeer begins by subscribing to the evName event. This is done internally in the
peer.
2. The peer continues by calling receiveEvent(groupId,evName). This will add a new
WeakReaction on the groupId tuple space. This reaction reacts to an event template
containing the event name. When the reaction is triggered, it executes the body of
evLis1, an EventListener object.
3. Then, InvokerPeer waits evList1 to be filled with an event-tuple received from the reac-
tion.
4. ProviderPeer releases an event by calling event(). The added tuple contains the event
name, the caller identifier and some associated data (someInput).
5. This last operation triggers the reaction added by InvokerPeer, the body of evLis1 is
executed and unlocks the execution of receiveEvent() by adding a tuple inside the
EventListener object.
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Figure 4.16: Service invocation.
4.3 Practical use
This section intends to present how the implementation actually works. Firstly, we introduce
the reader to the steps to follow to use the software. Then, we illustrate the practical use by
an example. Each step, from the translation to the executable program, is detailed.
4.3.1 General information
The result of our work consists in a Java “jar” file. This file has two purposes. Firstly, it is
used to generate the Java code from a SMoL file. Secondly, once the Java files are compiled,
the jar file is used to launch the newly created peers.
Basically, four steps are required to obtain a running SMoL peer (and its possible services).
The procedure is as follows.
1. Write a SMoL code describing the behaviour of a peer with any text editor. This results
in a XML file. If the peer has services, each service has to be written in a separate file.
2. Run the jar file to generate the Java code. In a command prompt, one must use:
java -jar SMoL2Java.jar -p <input file.smol>.
This command outputs several Java files, the number of files depends on the complexity
of the SMoL file.
3. Edit and compile the Java files. The programmer can here add some code in the gen-
erated files. Furthermore, the programmer must fulfil the boolean conditions of all
the While, RepeatUntil and If-Then-Else constructs. To compile, one must use:
javac -cp SMoL2Java.jar *.java.
4. Launch the peer. Once the .class files have been generated by the Java compiler, the
user can launch the peer with:
java -jar SMoL2Java -v <port number> <input file>RootFH19. SecureLime sends
coordination information by using UDP multicast on the specified port number. Note that
SecureLime requires the port numbers to be separated by 3, at least.
19Note that <input file>RootFH is the name of a Java class. The file name is the combination of the input
file name and the string “RootFH”, standing for “Root FaultHandler”.
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Sequence1
myCredentials = 〈(SMEPPkey,SMEPPpwd),(TempReaderGroup,MyGroupNamePassword)〉
newPeer(myCredentials)
myGroupDescription = <TempReaderGroup>
tempGroupId = createGroup(myGroupDescription)5
Flow
While true
Sequence
temp5s = 〈opaque〉
event(tempGroupId, ‘‘temp5s’’, temp5s)10
wait(PT5S)
End Sequence
End While
While true
Sequence15
temp10s = 〈opaque〉
event(tempGroupId, ‘‘temp10s’’, temp10s)
wait(PT10S)
End Sequence
End While20
End Flow
End Sequence
Figure 4.17: TempReaderPeer’s code.
4.3.2 Example
In this example, three peers interact. They all have the same credentials: one key to ac-
cess the SMEPP application and one key to access the group called TempReaderGroup. The
TempReaderPeer reads a temperature and publish the measurement via two event types (at
intervals of 5 and 10 seconds). Those events are raised in a group created by TempReaderPeer.
The first client (ClientPeer1) monitors the temperature through the “every 5 seconds” event.
The second client (ClientPeer2) publishes a service (ClientService) which monitors the tem-
perature during 30 seconds through the “every 10 seconds” events.
Step 1: Peers modelling
As explained above, the first step of the creation of a SMEPP peer consists in the writing of its
code. Thus, we begin our example by giving the code of the three peers. We chose to present
the code in a high level manner. However, the XML code is available in Appendix B.1.
TempReaderPeer. Figure 4.17 gives the code of TempReaderPeer. The peer starts by calling
newPeer() with its credentials. Then, it creates the TempReaderGroup. The core of the peer’s
code is a two branches Flow. The first branch reads a temperature20 and publishes it at interval
of 5 seconds. The other branch does the same at interval of 10 seconds. The temperatures
are published via events raised in TempReaderGroup. The complete code, written in XML is
available in Appendix B.1.1.
ClientPeer1. Figure 4.18 gives the code of ClientPeer1. The two first statements are similar
to the first peer. However, this client searches for the group TempReaderGroup by using the
getGroups() primitive. Once the peer has the group identifier, it joins it. Then, it subscribes
to the event corresponding to the temperature at interval of 5 seconds. The main part of
the code is an InformationHandler. Its main command waits for one hour. Meanwhile, the
unique branch waits for events (of the type “temp5s”). At each event reception, the peer “does
something” with the event. This step is deliberately not specified in SMoL. The XML version
of the code is available in Appendix B.1.2.
20This could require access to some hardware. Thus, it is not specified in SMoL.
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Sequence1
myCredentials = 〈(SMEPPkey,SMEPPpwd),(TempReaderGroup,MyGroupNamePassword)〉
newPeer(myCredentials)
desiredGroupDescription = <TempReaderGroup>
gid[] = getGroups(desiredGroupDescription)5
join(gid[0],myCredentials)
subscribe(‘‘temp5s’’, gid[0])
InformationHandler
Sequence
wait(PT1H)10
unsubscribe()
End Sequence
<cid, temp> = receiveEvent(gid[0], temp5s)
〈use the event for something〉
End InformationHandler15
End Sequence
Figure 4.18: ClientPeer1’s code.
Sequence1
myCredentials = 〈(SMEPPkey,SMEPPpwd),(TempReaderGroup,MyGroupNamePassword)〉
newPeer(myCredentials)
desiredGroupDescription = <TempReaderGroup>
gid[] = getGroups(desiredGroupDescription)5
join(gid[0],myCredentials)
clientServiceContract = 〈ClientServiceContract〉
<gsid, psid> = publish(gid[0], clientServiceContract)
wait(PT30S)
invoke(psid, monitor, gid[0])10
End Sequence
Figure 4.19: ClientPeer2’s code.
ClientPeer2. The code of ClientPeer2 corresponds to Figure 4.19. The behaviour is simple.
Likewise in ClientPeer1’s code, the peer starts by joining the SMEPP application and, then,
the TempReaderGroup. Once it has become a group member, the peer publishes a service,
ClientServiceContract. Then, it waits during 30 seconds before invoking an operation exhibited
by the service it just published. See Appendix B.1.3 for the XML version of the code. The
signature of the service is showed in Figure 4.20.
ClientService. Figure 4.21 gives the code of the service published by ClientPeer2. The
service starts by retrieving an invocation message corresponding to the “monitor” operation.
Then, the service subscribes to the “temp10s” events which are raised in the group in which
the service is published. The core of the service is an InformationHandler with one branch.
Its main command waits during 30 seconds, then it cancels the subscription to the event. The
only branch waits for “temp10s” events and, likewise in ClientPeer1, uses the event data for
something. When the InformationHandler execution terminates, the service replies to the
“monitor” invocation providing some data. The XML version of the service is available in
Appendix B.1.4.
serviceName = ClientService
serviceType = session-less
request-response operation = monitor(groupId)
Figure 4.20: ClientService’s signature.
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Sequence1
<caller, input> = receiveMessage(monitor)
gid = getPublishingGroup()
subscribe(‘‘temp10s’’, gid)
InformationHandler5
Sequence
wait(PT30S)
unsubscribe(‘‘temp10s’’,gid)
End Sequence
<cid, temp> = receiveEvent(gid, temp10s)10
〈use temp for something〉
End InformationHandler
reply(caller,monitor,someData)
End Sequence
Figure 4.21: ClientService’s code.
Step 2: Java code generation
In order to generate the Java files, the following commands have been used:
java -jar SMoL2Java.jar -p tempreaderpeer.smol
java -jar SMoL2Java.jar -p clientpeer1.smol
java -jar SMoL2Java.jar -p clientpeer2.smol
Note that the application finds itself the XML file representing the service contracts referenced
in the peers. Indeed, the name of the file is required in the representation of the publish()
primitive.
This step outputs the following files:
 TempReaderPeer files:
TempReaderPeerBRootFH.java: The FaultHandler21 which is the root of the code.
TempReaderPeerBDataTable.java: The class containing the variables used in TempReaderPeer.
TempReaderPeerBFlow11.java: The first branch of the Flow.
TempReaderPeerBFlow12.java: The second branch of the Flow.
 ClientPeer1 files:
ClientPeer1BRootFH.java: The FaultHandler which is the root of the code.
ClientPeer1BDataTable.java: The class containing the variables used in ClientPeer1.
ClientPeer1BIH11.java: The class representing the InformationHandler.
ClientPeer1BIH11Branch1.java: The receiveEvent() branch of the InformationHandler.
ClientPeer1BIH11Branch1Cmd.java: The command associated with the branch.
 ClientPeer2 files:
ClientPeer2BRootFH.java: The FaultHandler which is the root of the peer code.
ClientPeer2BDataTable.java: The class containing the variables used in ClientPeer2.
ClientServiceRootFH.java: The FaultHandler which is the root of the service code.
ClientServiceDataTable.java: The class containing the variables used in the service.
ClientServiceIH11.java: The main class representing the service’s InformationHandler.
ClientServiceIH11Branch1.java: The receiveEvent() branch.
ClientServiceIH11Branch1Cmd.java: The command associated with the branch.
All the files are given in Appendix B.2. In the following, we show some pieces of them in
order to illustrate the code generation.
21Note that all FaultHandlers are implicit in this example.
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Headers. Each file imports some packages from the SMEPP middlware API. For instance,
TempReaderPeerRootFH.java begins with
import java.util.Vector;1
import java.util.Iterator;
import peer.*;
import peer.managers.services.*;
import sMoLTranslated.*;5
import utils.*;
import utils.exceptions.*;
import utils.ids.*;
public class TempReaderPeerBRootFH extends FaultHandler{ ... }10
The two first imports are typical Java ones, while the others import classes from the API we
developed. Furthermore, one can see that the object defined here extends the FaultHandler
abstract class.
Body. The main part of a generated file is the execute() method. It contains the ac-
tual command of a construction. For instance, these following lines are the translation of
TempReaderPeer:
public void execute(ThreadedCommand parent) {1
Pair tempPair = null;
TempReaderPeerBDataTable.myCredentials =
new Credential(new SMEPPKey("SMEPPKEY","SMEPPPWD"),
new SMEPPKey[]{new SMEPPKey("TempReaderGroup","MyGroupNamePassword")});5
peer.Primitives.getPrimitives().newPeer(TempReaderPeerBDataTable.myCredentials,instance);
TempReaderPeerBDataTable.tempGroupId =
peer.Primitives.getPrimitives().
createGroup(new GroupDescription("TempReaderGroup"),instance);
TempReaderPeerBFlow11 TempReaderPeerBfl11 = new TempReaderPeerBFlow11(instance);10
TempReaderPeerBfl11.start();
TempReaderPeerBFlow12 TempReaderPeerBfl12 = new TempReaderPeerBFlow12(instance);
TempReaderPeerBfl12.start();
try{TempReaderPeerBfl11.join();}
catch(InterruptedException e){e.printStackTrace();}15
try{TempReaderPeerBfl12.join();}
catch(InterruptedException e){e.printStackTrace();}
}
In the 6th line, one can see the call to the newPeer() primitive. The first parameter is a variable
representing the credentials and the second is a reference to the FaultHandler. This reference
is used inside the primitive implementation to forward faults. In the same vein, the 9th line is
the translation of createGroup(). The lines from 10 to 17 are the statements used to create the
different branches of the Flow. In this case, it starts two new Java threads, which are defined
in TempReaderPeerBFlow11 and TempReaderBFlow12. When the child threads are started, the
main one waits for them using the Java’s join().
FaultHandler. In this example, each FaultHandler object contains the following lines at
the end.
synchronized public void forwardFault(Fault f) {1
super.setStopped(true);
boolean catched = false;
Iterator it = super.getCatches().iterator();
if(!catched && it.hasNext()){5
catched=true;
Catch c = (Catch) it.next();
if(c.isAll() || c.getFault().getName().equals(f.getName())){
System.out.println(f.getName()+" caught");
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//catch main command10
System.exit(1);
}
}
}
The purpose of this method is to handle faults. In this case, there are no catches but only
a catchAll clause. However, one can see the basic idea of the method. Firstly, it stops the
execution of the command by calling setStopped()22. Then, it obtains the list of catches and
parses it.
InformationHandler. A particularly complex construct is the InformationHandler. Two
InformationHandlers are present in the example: one in ClientPeer1 and one in ServiceClient.
They are both similar to each other. Thus, we can only focus on ClientPeer1. As explained in
Section 4.1.1, the construct is translated to three objects23. The first file (ClientPeer1BIH11.java)
contains the main command. Here, it consists in these lines:
public void execute(ThreadedCommand parent) {1
Pair tempPair = null;
ClientPeer1BIH11Branch1 ClientPeer1Bih11b1 = new ClientPeer1BIH11Branch1(instance);
ClientPeer1Bih11b1.start();
try{Thread.sleep(parser.SMoLParser.translateXPathDuration("PT1H"));}5
catch(InterruptedException e){e.printStackTrace();}
peer.Primitives.getPrimitives().unsubscribe(instance);
super.setFinished();
}
In a few words, the method starts a new thread which corresponds to the (only) branch
of the Informationhandler. Then, it executes the main command: it waits before calling
unsubscribe() (lines 5 to 7). Finally, the method calls setFinished() to signal the end of
the main command’s execution.
The newly launched thread is defined in ClientPeer1BIH11Branch1.java. It executes the
following lines.
public void run(){1
Pair tempPair = null;
while(!instance.isFinished() || !instance.isStopped()){
tempPair = peer.Primitives.getPrimitives().
receiveEvent(ClientPeer1BDataTable.gidArray[0],"temp5s",instance);5
if(instance.isStopped()) return;
ClientPeer1BDataTable.temp10s = (Input) tempPair.getSecond();
ClientPeer1BDataTable.caller_event = (CallerID) tempPair.getFirst();
if(instance.isFinished() || instance.isStopped()) return;
ClientPeer1BIH11Branch1Cmd ClientPeer1Bih11b1cmd =10
new ClientPeer1BIH11Branch1Cmd(instance);
ClientPeer1Bih11b1cmd.start();
}
}
This executes the receiveEvent() primitive while the main command is still running and no
faults have been raised. In order to avoid to execute the associated command if a fault has
been raised24, one needs to check it before starting the corresponding thread. In case a fault
has been raised (isStopped()) or the main command is finished (isFinished()), the method
terminates its execution prematurely via a call to return (see lines 6 and 9).
The associated command of the branch is defined in ClientPeer1BIH11Branch1Cmd.java.
This file contains only a run() method which is responsible of executing the translation of the
command. In this example, no SMoL code was associated with the branch, so the method body
is empty.
22The command’s children check the stopped variable regularly.
23Actually, if an InformationHandler has n branches, it is translated to n+1 objects.
24Inside receiveEvent(), for instance.
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Step 3: Editing and compiling
At this stage, the programmer can add some platform-dependant code into the generated files.
In this example, we only add a Java while before the calls to getGroups(). This avoids the
primitive to return null if the group creator is not running yet. In this way, one can run the
peers in any order.
In the root file of Client Peer 1 (see Appendix B.2.2), we added those lines around the
getGroups() primitive.
int i = 0;1
while(i==0){
ClientPeer1BDataTable.gidArray =
peer.Primitives.getPrimitives().
getGroups(new GroupDescription("TempReaderGroup"),instance);5
i = ClientPeer1BDataTable.gidArray.length;
try Thread.sleep(1000); catch (InterruptedException e) e.printStackTrace();
}
This additional code forces the peer to call getGroups() until it returns an array containing at
least one element. To avoid a high CPU load, the thread sleeps for 1 second between each call.
Once the programmer has done all the changes he wanted to, he can compile the files with
the Java compiler. This is typically done with “javac -cp SMoL2Java.jar *.java”. This
compiles all the Java files in the current directory. The -cp parameter ensures the compiler has
access to the objects declared in the jar file.
Step 4: Running the peers
The last step consists in running the peers. In this example, we use the following three com-
mands.
java -jar SMoL2Java.jar -v 5555 TempReaderPeerBRootFH
java -jar SMoL2Java.jar -v 6666 ClientPeer1BRootFH
java -jar SMoL2Java.jar -v 7777 ClientPeer2BRootFH
The -v parameter enables the verbose mode in which every primitive displays some infor-
mation about its execution. Three screen captures are available in Appendix B.3. The first
capture shows the behaviour of TempReaderPeer. After its initialisation, the peer sends events
at regular intervals. The second capture illustrates ClientPeer1. After discovering the groups
and joining TempReaderGroup, it waits for the “temp5s” event. The last capture is related to
the second client. After joining the group, it published a service in it. Then, the capture shows
the executions of the peer and its service. One sees the peer invokes the “monitor” operation,
the service receives the corresponding message and starts its execution. Basically, the service
listens to the “temp10s” event for a while and, then, replies to the caller. One can see, in
one of the last lines, that the peer receives the dummy text “anyOutputPossible”. In a real
application, it could be any value (for instance, the average of the received events values).
4.3.3 Implementation tests
A series of tests have been performed to ensure that the behaviour of the proof-of-concept
meets the SMEPP specification. The following steps have been achieved successfully on a
Linux machine.
 The translation and execution of each SMoL command (from a XML file to a Java pro-
gram).
 The execution of all primitives, independently.
 A simple SMoL application, featuring two SMEPP peers and a service, presented in the
paper we published (see Appendix C).
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 The aforementioned example was used to ensure a whole SMoL application works properly,
from the XML file to the Java executable code. Remember this example features three
SMEPP peers and a service as well as “complex” SMoL commands.
Unfortunately, due to the lack of a tool to assist the development of SMoL programs, testing
more complex applications is very time-consuming (please see the XML codes of the aforemen-
tioned example, in Appendix B.1). We believe more tests could be useful. Nevertheless, the
set of tests we have achieved give us confidence in the compliance of our application with the
SMEPP service model.
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Chapter 5
Perspectives
The previous chapter showed that the proof-of-concept implementation meets its goals. How-
ever, the implementation context is very restrictive. Indeed, the implementation is built on
top of the SecureLime API which brings its own limitations. In the same vein, the SMEPP
service model is only theoretically defined and its implementation raises many questions which
are not always easy to address. Thus, some compromises had to be made. In some cases, they
constitute questionable weaknesses of the prototype.
This chapter brings a critical point of view on our proof-of-concept implementation. This
look shows the compromises we made, classifying them according to their relations with the
implementation context. Firstly, Section 5.1 gives the criticisms related to the SecureLime API,
while the following one (Section 5.2) presents those related to the gap between the SMEPP
service model and the tuple space based coordination model. Finally, Section 5.3 suggests
future work which could be interesting to be investigated.
5.1 SecureLime related issues
This section presents the implementation weaknesses having as main origin the use of Secure-
Lime as coordination system. We firstly discuss the lack of session keys mechanisms and the
way this could be added to the implementation. Then, we analyse the context management
limitations due to some restrictions on SecureLime’s operations. Finally, we study the addition
of timed primitives to the coordination language in order to enhance retrieval operations while
staying compliant with SMoL specifications.
5.1.1 Keys refreshment
In the implementation, all the communications are protected using symmetric pre-shared keys
(AppKey for groups and services discovery, GKeys for group communication). While this mech-
anism actually ensures data secrecy, it has a main flaw. Indeed, a well known security principle
states that pre-shared keys should be used as sparingly as possible. In ad hoc network, com-
munication channels are often not secure (e.g. wireless networks), thus an attacker can easily
eavesdrop the communications. Furthermore, the more a key is used, the more chances an
attacker has to guess it. Therefore, mechanisms to limit the amount of cipher-text available
to cryptanalysis for the given key are needed. The standard solution is the use of session
keys, which are refreshed regularly. The lack of such a mechanism is an important flaw in our
implementation.
In SecureLime, once a protected tuple space is created, the password cannot be changed.
Therefore, implementing a session keys mechanism would require every peer to do the following
steps: backup all the tuples contained in its local tuple space, create a new one (using a new
password) and put the saved tuples in the new tuple space, using out() operations. Further-
more, if reactions are registered in the tuple space, they must be registered again in the new
one. Besides its obvious lack of efficiency, this mechanism would cause consistency problems
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Figure 5.1: New design.
between the two tuple space versions, in particular when a peer invokes an operation, i.e. tuples
move from a local tuple space to another. Moreover, the re-registering of reactions could imply
the loss of some events.
In order to implement a working session keys mechanism, we need a coordination system
which adds a mean to change on-the-fly the key protecting a tuple space. In SecureLime terms,
this could be modelled as the tuple space disengagement, the key update and the tuple space
re-engagement. Assuming the availability of a new SecureLime version, featuring on-the-fly
password changing, we propose the following design.
Each group is modelled into two tuple spaces. The first is protected using the corresponding
GKey and serves to exchange the session keys which protect the second tuple space. This one,
called communication tuple space in the following, is used in the same way as in our previous
design (see Section 4.2.1).
Figure 5.1 illustrates the new design. Three peers are members of a group which is repre-
sented as two tuple spaces. The top of the figure shows the tuple space used to exchange and
refresh the keys. It is protected by GKey and every peer has put a tuple containing the current
session key (see hereafter) in its local tuple space. The middle of the figure represents the tuple
space used for other interactions.
The new design requires to review group creation and joining. In order to create a new
group, a peer performs the following steps:
1. It creates a new tuple space using the group’s identifier and the corresponding GKey.
2. It inserts a tuple into this new tuple space. This tuple has the form:
< ’skey’,sessionkeyi,tuple owner id,#,remove-pwd > (called skey-tuple).
The first field is simply a tag, the second one contains a securely generated session key
and tuple owner id is the peer’s identifier. Moreover, the tuple is remove-protected by
a password kept secret by the peer.
3. The peer registers a reaction on the tuple space which reacts to the template:
<’ refresh’,initiator id,#,remove-pwd> (called refresh-tuple)1.
1If initiator id is the identifier of the peer, the reaction’s body is aborted.
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When fired, it reads the skey-tuple where tuple owner id = initiator id. Then, it
updates its own skey-tuple by changing the sessionkey field. The reaction terminates
by changing the key of the communication tuple space.
4. Finally, the peer creates a second tuple space using the group’s identifier and the session
key it has chosen in the second step. This tuple space is used for the actual group
communications.
When a peer wants to join a group, it executes the following steps:
1. It creates a new tuple space using the group’s identifier and the corresponding GKey.
This tuple space merges with other tuple spaces having the same name and key.
2. It reads a skey-tuple from the tuple space and extracts the session key contained in it.
3. Then, it creates a skey-tuple where the sessionkey is the previously extracted key,
tuple owner is its own identifier and remove-pwd is a chosen secret password.
4. It creates the same reaction as in step 3 of the group creation.
5. Finally, it creates a new tuple space using the group’s identifier and the session key it
read before.
Furthermore, we add a mechanism to refresh keys. A peer initiates a key refresh when it
notices that it has used the same key for a certain amount of time or of data2. Here are the
steps involved in the refresh procedure when triggered:
1. The initiator peer starts by changing the key of its communication tuple space. We assume
the key is securely generated.
2. It updates its skey-tuple with the newly generated key.
3. It inserts a refresh-tuple, protected by a chosen password, containing its own identifier.
It also starts a new process which will delete this tuple after a few seconds3.
4. The refresh-tuple triggers the reaction registered by other members at group joining/cre-
ation. Thus, they update their skey-tuple and change the key of their communication
tuple space.
5. After that, every member uses the same key.
The peer creation has also to be reviewed, in particular the way the application level tuple
spaces (SD and GD) are protected. In concrete terms, one applies the same mechanism to the
SD and GD tuple spaces. This requires an additional tuple space, protected by the application
key (AppKey), used to exchange and refresh the keys. SD and GD keep their respective roles
but are now protected by the session key established in the first tuple space. Thus, the new
version of newPeer() is similar to create and join a group. When a peer engages the tuple
space protected by AppKey, it is not sure it will find a skey-tuple, since it may be the first peer
to join the network. In this case, it is similar to the group creation: the peer generates a key,
publishes it in a skey-tuple and creates the discovery tuple spaces. If the peer is not the first
one, it is similar to join a group: the peer reads a skey-tuple and then creates SD and GD with
the newly read key.
2One could use either a timer or a variable counting the number of exchanged tuples.
3Note that if the tuple stays in the tuple space, it would trigger unnecessarily the reaction registered by new
members.
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5.1.2 Context management limitations
As explained in Section 3.5, SecureLime enforces to specify the location parameters when using
probe (inp() and rdp()) and aggregate (rdg() and ing()) tuple space operations. However,
the needs to read the whole tuple space in a non-blocking manner and to retrieve multiple results
are common to many applications. When one needs to use these operations on a federated tuple
space, SecureLime requires to know all the identifiers of the connected peers.
To be able to invoke these operations on a federated tuple space, our implementation uses
a workaround which retrieves a list of the peers’ identifiers from the LimeSystemTupleSpace
and, then, loops on it, invoking the actual operation. Although the workaround is easy to
implement, it creates new problems. Indeed, between the instant where the peers’ identifiers
are retrieved and the instant where the operation is called, several peers could have joined the
network. This may lead to inconsistent results. One may miss a tuple added by a peer which
has just joined the network.
Unfortunately, in the current implementation of SecureLime, it seems not possible to bypass
this workaround. The authors of Lime justify this limitation, saying “a unconstrained definition,
such as the one provided for in and rd, would involve a distributed transaction across the
federated tuple space to preserve the semantics of the probe” [75].
While this problem is not critical for the implementation use, it highlights the lack of space
uncoupling in SecureLime. Indeed, instead of querying a whole tuple space, the user is forced
to know in which peer’s local tuple space the data it is looking for is located.
However, space uncoupling is a feature, with time uncoupling, that made the success of
tuple space based coordination system (please refer to Section 3.1.2). In addition, space and
time uncoupling eases the context management because the peers do not have to synchronise
to exchange information about their states. In the case of SecureLime, a peer cannot retrieve a
global knowledge of the network without knowing its structure (i.e. the set of connected peers).
In [57], Herrmann compares Lime’s network transparency with his MeshMDL middleware.
“(. . . ) Lime federates tuple spaces of neighboring nodes. While this creates some degree of
transparency for the programmer by presenting only one space to him, it also increases the
coupling of nodes. The space concept in Lime is much more complicated since there exist
several spaces for agents and nodes that need to federate. Interestingly, the designers of Lime
discovered that total transparency is not achievable. As a result they integrated operations into
their space model that break transparency and let callers deal explicitly with individual spaces
at specific locations.”
5.1.3 Timed primitives
The SMoL specification defines that any command must be terminated as soon as a fault is
raised inside the FaultHandler including it. This poses a problem when the implementation of
a primitive requires to use a SecureLime blocking operation (such as in() and rd()). Indeed, as
the execution is blocked, when a fault is raised, it is impossible to terminate the waiting. Thus,
to comply with the SMoL specification, we never use any blocking operation. We implemented
“active waiting” versions of these operations. Basically, they are implemented by a loop which
iterates until a matching tuple is found or a fault is raised. Inside the loop, we invoke the
operations’ probe versions and, in case no tuple is found, we suspend (via a Java sleep() call)
the execution of the thread for a few seconds.
This workaround has many flaws. Firstly, it is resource demanding since it may loop for a
long time (or even forever). Secondly, the sleep period may lead to starvation issues. Assuming
a loop sleeps for 1 second every cycle and an operation takes 1 millisecond, if the loop lasts 1
minute, a peer actually searches for (') 0.06 second. Therefore, the rest of the time can be
exploited by concurrent operations and a caller could never get any result. Thirdly, the use of
probe operation, if invoked on the whole federated tuple space, creates the same problem as dis-
cussed in the previous paragraph. Finally, the workaround may interfere with the coordination
system’s scheduling of operations. Although Lime and SecureLime documentations do not give
any information on the fact that the operations are orderly fulfilled, one can imagine the system
must be implemented in a deterministic way. However, in our implementation, the scheduling
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is non-deterministic. For instance, if two peers successively invoke an in() operation with the
same template4, SecureLime may ensure that the first caller is the first to get a result. In our
implementation, this does not stand anymore because of the sleep period. If a tuple appears
during the sleep period of the first caller and the second one’s invocation occurs during this
period, the second caller gets a result before the first one.
In order to avoid these problems, it is necessary that the coordination system features timed
operations. For instance, such a primitive may have the form: inp(<template>,timeout).
We expect the middleware to schedule the operations and to actually search for a timeout
period (and not for a small percentage of it).
Note that since some primitives are blocking, it is still necessary to use these timed primitives
inside a loop which regularly checks whether a fault has been raised or not.
Two of the systems surveyed in Section 3.3 provide transactional features and timed versions
of the primitives such as the one previously described. These systems are JavaSpaces [48] and
MARS [24]. However, these two languages do not meet the SMEPP peer-to-peer orientation
requirement (R1 in Section 2.5). Therefore, they cannot be used to implement our SMEPP
middleware proof-of-concept.
5.2 SMEPP related issues
This section presents the issues due to the gap between the SMEPP model and our tuple space
based implementation. Firstly, in order to highlight the problems they raise, we discuss the
differences between the way events are modelled in SMEPP and in tuple space systems. Then,
we analyse the choice made to make SMoL an executable language. Finally, we propose a new
architecture design which allows to use the API without the SMoL to Java translator.
5.2.1 Event handling
The SMEPP service model manages events in a quite non-intuitive way. An entity must sub-
scribe to an event before being allowed to receive it. Furthermore, to actually retrieve an event,
it must call the receiveEvent() primitive. A more intuitive solution for event handling is the
publish/subscribe model [58]. In this model, entities subscribe to events of their interest and
receive them “automatically” when new events are raised. Thus, in this model, the receiver
is passive after the subscription. No blocking operations are needed to receive an event, i.e.
entities can continue their execution.
Similarly to other languages providing event modelling (such as MARS, KLAIM, LuCe, etc.
[24, 41, 43, 48, 60, 71, 74, 84]), SecureLime only features the publish/subscribe model which is
implemented via the “reactions”. Therefore, the mapping from SMEPP events to Lime concepts
is not obvious. The difference between the two models led us to an implementation where the
subscription to a SMEPP event is only locally handled. The subscriber is the only one to know
about its subscription. Thus, the subscription is only used to control the entities’ rights to
receive or not an event. It is when an entity invokes receiveEvent() that we register a new
reaction on a tuple space. When, the reaction is triggered, it returns the event-tuple to the
caller. This implementation does not take advantage of the SecureLime reactions. Indeed, the
program is blocked to comply with the SMEPP specification. However, it could benefit from
the reaction implementation by continuing its execution while still being given the event at
reception time.
This problem makes us reconsider the joint use of the subscribe() and receiveEvent()
primitives. We believe that one of them appears to be quite unnecessary in the tuple space
model. Indeed, a subscription to an event is never refused but a call to receiveEvent()
implies a previous subscription. Thus, it suffices to call subscribe() before receiveEvent()
to avoid a refusal. Furthermore, the model does not specify any lifetime for events. This
complicates the choice to be made in order to implement the release and reception of events.
If several events of the same type are published, the issue is twofold. Firstly, is the existence
of more than one event of the same type allowed? Secondly, if it is allowed, which event is
4The problem can also occur when the templates match a common set of tuples.
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read by receiveEvent()? On the one hand, taking the subscribe() (and unsubscribe())
away from the service model would not affect the way it handles events. Furthermore, it would
simplify the SMEPP middleware from the user point of view. The current implementation
still fits this modification. It only requires to remove the subscription handling part. On the
other hand, switching to the publish/subscribe model would allow to match directly the tuple
space concepts. Furthermore, it would solve the issue related to the choice of the event to be
retrieved. However, it would require to remove the receiveEvent() primitive. This change is
much heavier than the previous one. Indeed, it would require to rethink all the event handling
in SMEPP.
5.2.2 Target language dependence
Since SMoL is a specification language and our goal was to produce executable code, we had
to adapt the concrete representation of the data. Indeed, SMoL programs handle many data
which need to be modelled in Java. This implies that a SMoL code must contain all the needed
information.
For instance, the representation of the credentials used in an application is not defined by
the service model. However, the implementation requires to have the structure of a creden-
tial defined. The chosen representation5 has many consequences on both the implementation
and the way SMoL code has to be written. Since SecureLime uses password to protect the
tuple spaces, the credentials we defined contains arrays of strings representing them. Thus,
the SMoL programmer undergoes the security features of SecureLime. Assuming another im-
plementation would use asymmetric keys based mechanisms to secure the communications, the
same XML representation of credentials could not be used. SMEPP should define an abstract
representation which must be generic enough to encompass all kinds of credentials.
Another similar issue is caused by the input and output parameters of service operations.
The service model ensures that an operation invocation matches the types of input and output
parameters defined in the signature. This poses a problem since the signature describes the
parameters in an abstract manner and the implementation of the operation needs concrete data.
For instance, in our implementation, operations are Java-based. Thus, the parameters must be
mapped to Java. Two solutions are possible. The first solution defines every object used by
a SMoL program into an abstract XML structure and defines a corresponding translation to
Java. The second one uses directly the target language (here, Java) in the XML files. In order
to illustrate these solutions, we start with the abstract assign command:
Copy from 5 to temperature End-Copy.
In the first solution, the “from” part must be written as:
<from><literal><Integer><value>5</value></Integer></literal></from>.
The flag Integer is used by a translation rule to produce the corresponding Java code. The
“to” part is written as <to variable=’’temperature’’/>. This solution, although elegant,
implies much work since it requires the implementers to think about all the possible data
structures (or objects) and their translation. Furthermore, the way the structures are defined
has a strong object-oriented connotation which may not be always wanted.
The second solution would model the “from” part as:
<from><literal>new Integer(5)</literal></from>.
One sees that some Java code is directly used inside the XML files. This solution is much easier
to translate, but it wipes out the SMoL’s intention to be independent towards the SMEPP
middleware implementations.
Our implementation uses mainly the first solution. Many data structure are defined in the
XML schema. However, a problem remains to reach fully the first solution. It concerns the
input/output parameters of service operations. We could not find a way to define all the data
structures for every kind of parameters. To bypass this limitation, we defined a generic data
type, Input, which can contain any Java Object. This generic object is used similarly as the
second solution proposed before (i.e. using the Input’s constructor).
5See Appendix A.2.
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try1
{
String tmp variable = (String) invoke(peerServiceId,operationName,AnyInput);
}
catch(ClassCastException e )5
{
parent.forwardFault(new Fault(invalidOutputParameter));
}
Figure 5.2: Output parameter type check.
The main drawback of this workaround is that it makes impossible to check that the type
of input/output parameters of the invoke() and reply() primitives match the type defined in
the operation’s signature. To solve this problem, we need all possible data structures handled
by service operations to be defined in abstract terms (i.e. in the XML schema). We also need a
translation rule to the target language for every data structure. Furthermore, every input and
output parameters used in operation signatures must refer to an existing definition.
In that case, the input parameters can be checked inside the invoke() implementation. It
suffices to ensure that the concrete representations of the input data refer well to the signature.
Otherwise, the primitive raises an invalidInputParameter exception. The same verification
has to be made in receiveMessage() on the provider side.
In Java, checking the type of output parameters is slightly more complicated. It requires
to encapsulate the actual call to invoke() in a try/catch block. Figure 5.2 shows how it is
made. The operation output type is used to cast the generic object returned by invoke() in
the signature expected type (here, String). In case Java raises a ClassCastException, this
means the types do no match, thus an invalidOutputParameter exception is raised.
5.2.3 Translator and API coupling
As a late requirement of our work, we have been asked whether it is possible to use our API
without using SMoL (i.e. without the translator). In the current state of the implementation,
this requires additional work from the user. Indeed, the API and the translator are tightly
coupled, mainly because of the SMoL fault handling, but also because of some commands
(i.e. InformationHandler and Pick). The behaviour of the primitives is influenced by their
uses inside such commands, which requires a synchronisation between them. For instance,
concerning fault handling, the primitives have to interact with their parent FaultHandlers in
order to stop other possibly running child Flows, if need be.
To use the API without the translator, the following is required. Since the API expects the
executable code to be included inside a FaultHandler, the programmer has to write his program
inside a “pseudo FaultHandler”, as the one described in Figure 5.3. This ensures that when a
SMoL fault is forwarded to it, it is translated to a Java RuntimeException. Running a SMEPP
peer remains the same. One simply needs to compile and execute the pseudo FaultHander as
usual (see the fourth step in Section 4.3.1).
Moreover, since SecureLime restricts access to tuple space6 only to LimeAgent and LimeThread
objects, the programmer cannot use the classic Java Thread class. Therefore, we provide a new
abstract class which allows concurrent programming while keeping access to tuple spaces. This
class is given in Figure 5.4. It implements ILimeAgent and extends LimeThread to comply with
SecureLime requirements.
This is the easiest way to use the current implementation without the translator. Note that
the programmer has still to provide the reference to the pseudo FaultHandler as a parameter
to every primitive.
A more elegant solution would require to review a substantial part of the design. We propose
in the following a new design which takes into account the desire to use the API without the
6Please remember that the primitives access tuple spaces.
116 Chapter 5
public class PseudoFaultHandler extends FaultHandler {1
ThreadedCommand parent = null;
public PseudoFaultHandler() {
parent = this;
}5
public void execute(ThreadedCommand parent) {
〈Peer’s or service’s body.〉
}
synchronized public void forwardFault(Fault f) {
stopped = true;10
throw new RuntimeException(f.toString());
}
public boolean isStopped() {
return false;
}15
}
Figure 5.3: Pseudo FaultHandler.
public class SMEPPThread extends LimeThread implements ILimeAgent {1
private Threadcommand parent = null;
public SMEPPThread(ThreadedCommand cmd) {
parent = cmd;
}5
public void run(){
〈Thread’s body.〉
}
public LimeAgentMgr getMgr() {
return getParent().getMgr();10
//to comply with ILimeAgent interface
}
}
Figure 5.4: SMEPP Thread class.
translator. This design re-use a substantial part of the current one. It keeps the Primitives
class which contains the implementations of the primitives and the three SMEPP entity classes
(Peer, Service and Session) which keep their structure (e.g. groups, services managers etc.).
Figure 5.5 gives the class diagram of the new design. In order to maintain the restrictions on
primitives call7 when the translator is not used, we divide the primitives into three classes,
namely SMEPPEntity, Peer and Service. The first one contains the primitives available for
both types of entities, in the form of public methods. The second one, Peer, features the peer
specific primitives, as private methods. Finally, Service contains the only primitive available
only to services (i.e. getPublishingGroup(), without parameters) as a private method.
It is important to mention that the actual implementations of the primitives are still in the
Primitives class. Therefore, the methods in the three entity classes are wrapping them to hide
the SMoL fault handling and primitive synchronisation features.
Remember that, in Primitives, the methods take as last parameter the SMoL command
including them (i.e. a ThreadedCommand object). However, when SMoL is not used, this last pa-
rameter is not needed and is disturbing for the API user. To hide the SMoL related features, all
primitives’ implementations in SMEPPEntity and its children call the methods from Primitives
specifying as last parameter their own reference8. Furthermore, the forwardFault() method
is overridden to raise a Java exception instead of a SMoL fault. In addition, isStopped() is
overridden to return always false, since it is only used in SMoL FaultHandler.
7Some primitives can only be called by peers, one can only be called by services and some can be called by
both.
8As SMEPPEntity implements ThreadedCommand.
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Figure 5.5: New design proposal.
The programmer wishing to create a SMEPP peer with the API, but without the translator,
has to create a new class extending JavaPeer. In this class, the peer application code has to be
written inside execute(). Every call to a primitive is implemented by a call to the primitive
methods defined in SMEPPEntity or Peer. Similarly, when the programmer wants to create a
service, s/he creates a new class extending JavaService. However, in this case, the methods
available are the ones in the SMEPPEntity and Service classes. If multi-threading is needed,
instead of using standard Java Threads, the programmer has to use our SMEPPThread class
given in Figure 5.4.
When the translator is used, the way to proceed is the same as before. The translator gener-
ates a FaultHandler class for each peer and service. This class is the root of the entity’s body.
As in the current implementation, primitive calls in FaultHandler refer to the Primitives
class directly.
The advantage of this solution is that it does not imply redundant implementations of the
primitives (one for SMoL entities and one for Java ones). Furthermore, it does not require
many changes of the current implementation. It comes quite well along on top of the current
design. Above all, this solution does not require the programmer to know about SMoL if s/he
does not want to. Unfortunately, as the requirement of using the API separately from SMoL
came late in our implementation work, we have not been able to propose a concrete solution in
time.
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5.3 Future work
This section intends to outline new topics of work which could improve the architecture and
implementation we proposed. Firstly, Subsection 5.3.1 proposes a new design which permits
to meet SMEPP security level 2 requirements. Secondly, Subsection 5.3.2 discusses new tuple
matching policies which can ease the implementation of the service model. Then, Subsec-
tion 5.3.3 studies the feasibility of a similar proof-of-concept meeting interoperability require-
ments. Finally, Subsection 5.3.4 proposes a proof scheme to validate the middleware implemen-
tation and the SMoL translator.
5.3.1 Higher security level
The current implementation features only SMEPP security level 1. Remember that this level
uses only symmetric keys. The main issue is that the security keys have to be pre-shared.
Thus, after the application initialisation, it is impossible to exclude members from a group
or to create non-foreseen groups. Furthermore, in security level 1, every peer may endanger
the whole application if its credentials are leaked. In contrast, in security level 2, based on
asymmetric keys, every entity has its own private/public keys couple. Therefore, if a credential
is leaked, it only affects its owner. In such a case, the owner can be blacklisted, which has
the consequence that the application preserves its security. The main challenge of level 2 is
to ensure such security guarantees without relying on a centralised entity inside the SMEPP
applications.
Currently, level 2 is not yet completely specified in SMEPP. However, it would notably
extends the possibility of group creation by allowing to create dynamically new groups, without
requiring all the peers to know a priori their existences. These “dynamic” groups can define
a policy which specifies how the decision to accept a new member is taken and, possibly, how
members decide to exclude another one.
In the following, we start by giving the assumptions which have to made concerning the
SMEPP service model and the coordination system on top of which the implementation would
be built. Then, we propose a design meeting level 2.
Assumptions
In order to propose a new design overview of a SMEPP proof-of-concept based on tuple space
system, we need to define two types of assumptions. On the one hand, we have to detail on
what basis the SMEPP security level 2 can be built. On the other hand, we have to elicit the
requirements the coordination system has to meet to be a suitable basis.
We propose the following extensions to the security related assumptions on SMEPP entities:
 each peer trusts a Certification Authority (CA) which delivers public key certificates,
 the interactions with the CA take place outside the SMEPP application,
 each peer has a couple of private and public keys,
 each peer owns a public key certificate which binds together its identity to its public key,
 each certificate incorporates the usual security features, such as the public key being
signed, the peer identity, a validity period and the digital signature of the certificate
provider. This ensures the peer’s right to access the application,
 each certificate also contains a set of attributes consisting in a set of groups the owner
can join,
 each peer owns a set of keys which defines the group categories it can see. These cate-
gories are used to rank the security level of groups, each category having a key used to
restrict its visibility. For instance, one could have a 3-categories application, featuring
free, confidential and top-secret groups. A peer having the keys corresponding to free and
confidential can discover all the groups contained in these categories.
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 services’ visibility is defined by the group in which they are published9,
 the set of categories the peer is allowed to see is contained in the peer’s certificate,
 two group types are possible:
– Static groups are similar to level 1 ones, but rights to access them are defined in
peers’ certificates,
– Dynamic groups do not need to be foreseen before runtime. Accessing them is
restricted through group policies. The policy type is decided by its creator and
can involve other members participation. The group creator is able to generate a
private/public key couple for the group.
In conclusion, the application access level is restricted by the validity of the peer’s certifi-
cate. The group visibility is restricted by the ownership of the corresponding category keys.
Furthermore, group access depends on the group type. Static group authorisation is managed
through the peer’s certificate, while dynamic group authorisation is managed through group
policies. Finally, services’ visibility depends on the group category in which they are published.
Note that peers can discover services they cannot invoke, because they may not have access to
the group in which they are published.
To develop a tuple space based proof-of-concept of SMEPP which meets security level 2, one
needs a suitable coordination system. We propose that it should have the following features:
 transiently shared tuple spaces, similar to Lime’s ones,
 tuple level access control providing read- and remove-protections,
 matching policy similar to the SecSpace [52] one, based on asymmetric keys (see Sec-
tion 3.3.1, p. 53),
 tuple space level access control, similar to SecureLime, but based on a stronger type of
keys and which can be changed on-the-fly,
 programmability of the tuple space, similar to the Lime’s reaction, and,
 a transactional version of outg() (as in Lime) which allows to insert several tuples in an
atomic manner.
We assume that the tuple level access control uses the following matching policy. It is
similar to the SecSpaces one but allows to leave unspecified the targeted peer in the asymmetric
partition field. In SecSpaces, the matching rule provides for one-to-one communication. Using
this new matching rule, one-to-many communication is possible. We model a tuple as follows:
<field1,...,fieldn,read-key,remove-key>. In case of a rd(), a tuple and a template
match only if their fields and their read-keys match. The matching rule is the same for in(),
but the remove-keys must match too. The matching process for read- and remove-key fields
is defined as follows. Two protection fields match if and only if one is a private key and the
other is the corresponding public key.
For instance, let two peers, A and B, wishing to communicate in a secure fashion. A inserts
a tuple to be read only by B and to be removed only by A. The operations are as follows.
A: out(<field1,...,fieldn,PB,PA >)
B: rd(<*,...,*,SB,#>)
A: in(<*,...,*,#,SA >)
where PA/SA and PB/SB are the public/private keys of A and B, respectively. Remember that
# means no key is specified and that * stands for wildcard.
9This definition of visibility ensures that entities cannot discover services which are published in groups they
are not supposed to see. Indeed, the getServices() returns notably the group identifiers of the group in which
services are published.
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Figure 5.6: Group level design.
Design
The current design has to be reviewed to comply with level 2. At the tuple space level, the
design is similar to the one presented in Section 5.1.1 (p. 109). An additional tuple space
(called security tuple space) is used to manage access and key refresh of the discovery tuple
spaces (SD and GD). Figure 5.7 (p. 122) illustrates them. The difference with the session-
key design (presented in Section 5.1.1) is that this additional tuple space is not protected
by symmetric keys. Instead, all communications are protected using the peers’ key couples.
Therefore, communications inside those tuple spaces are one-to-one.
Similarly, a security tuple space is added to each group tuple space. All communication tu-
ple spaces are protected by session keys. The security tuple space is protected by the category
key corresponding to the group (this ensures visibility restrictions). Furthermore, all commu-
nications are protected using the peers’ key couple (this ensures access restrictions). Figure 5.6
illustrates the group level design. Optionally, service interactions could be protected using the
invoker and provider’s public keys. This ensures that invocation-tuples and reply-tuple can
only be retrieved by the involved entities. Note that in this case, the provider must publish its
public key in the SD tuple space (as an additional field of the service-tuple). Furthermore, the
invoker must also provide its public key in the invocation-tuple.
The content of GD is similar to the previous design, but the reference-tuple contains an
additional field specifying whether the group is static or not. Furthermore, if the group is
dynamic, the reference-tuple contains the group public key. The group public key serves to
ensure that a peer referencing a SMEPP dynamic group is a valid member. When a peer A
wants to join a group, the member B handling A’s request is challenged to prove B owns the
private key corresponding to the public key it published in its reference-tuple.
The new level requires to review the way peers create and join groups. The solution we
propose is as follows.
Group creation. To create a group, a peer A does the following steps:
1. The peer creates the security tuple space named by the group’s identifier and protected
by the category key corresponding to the wished visibility level.
2. It inserts a tuple ensuring its identity, called identity-tuple. An identity-tuple has the
format: <’ peer’,peer A,certificate A,#,PA >, where PA is A’s secret key.
3. It securely generates a fresh session key. If the group is dynamic, it also generates the
group’s asymmetric key pair.
4. It creates the communication tuple space protected by the session key and named by the
group’s identifier.
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5. It registers a reaction on its local security tuple space. This reaction waits for a tem-
plate <’ join’,peer X,certificate X,challenge,SA,SA > (called join-tuple). When
triggered, this reaction initiates the member approval process (see group joining). Fur-
thermore, it registers a reaction for key refresh (see below).
6. It inserts a reference-tuple in GD. This tuple is read-protected by the group category key
and remove-protected by PA. If the group is dynamic, the tuple also contains the group
public key.
Static group joining. In order to join a static group, a peer B does the following steps:
1. It creates the security tuple space corresponding to the group it wants to join. Remember
this tuple space is protected by the category key and named by the group’s identifier.
2. It invokes rd() operation on this tuple space to read an arbitrary identity-tuple. Let the
owner of this tuple be peer A.
3. It checks that A’s certificate is valid and that A has well the rights to have created this
group.
4. It sends a join-tuple into A’s local security tuple space:
<’ join’,peer id,certificate B,challenge,PA,PA >.
The tuple contains B’s identifier, B’s certificate and a challenge generated by B. It is
remove- and read-protected by A’s public key. Thus, only A can retrieve it.
5. Through its registered reaction, A retrieves the join-tuple and checks that B’s certificate
allows it to join this group.
6. If B is allowed, A sends an authentication-tuple of the form:
<’ auth’,{challenge}SA,sessionkey,PB,PB>.
7. B checks the validity of the challenge response. In case of failure, it aborts the joining
process. This ensure that A is well the sender of the tuple.
8. B inserts its identity-tuple in the security tuple space.
9. B creates the communication tuple space corresponding to the group named by the group’s
identifier and protected by sessionkey.
10. B registers two reactions as in the 5th step of group creation.
11. It finally inserts a reference-tuple corresponding to the group in GD.
Dynamic group joining. When a peer B wants to join a dynamic group, of which peer A
is member, the following steps are necessary:
1. It creates the security tuple space corresponding to the group it wants to join (named by
the group’s identifier). Remember this tuple space is protected by the category key.
2. It invokes a rd() operation on this tuple space to read an arbitrary identity-tuple. Let
the owner of this tuple be peer A.
3. It checks that A’s certificate is valid and that A has the right to create groups of this
visibility category.
4. B sends a join-tuple into A’s local security tuple space.
5. Through its registered reaction, A retrieves the join-tuple. According to the group policy,
A allows or not B to access the group. In a few words, classic policies could be10:
10This list is non-exhaustive. Note also that the implementation of policies is not discussed here as it would
involve their definition in the SMEPP service model.
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Figure 5.7: Application level design.
 Open: peers are always accepted,
 Democracy: there exists a mechanism inside the communication tuple space which
allows the peers to vote. In this case, each of them must have an own vote policy.
 Closed: only a defined set of peers can enter the group. This implies that the
members own a list of accepted peers.
 Blacklist: all peers are accepted except if they are blacklisted.
If B is accepted, A sends an authentication-tuple of the form:
<’ auth’,{challenge}SA,{challenge}SG,sessionkey,asym keys,PB,PB>.
6. B checks the validity of the challenge responses. In case of failure, it aborts the joining
process. This ensures that A is well the tuple sender and that it is an authorised group
member.
7. B inserts its identity-tuple in the security tuple space.
8. B creates the communication tuple space corresponding to the group. It is named by the
group’s identifier and protected by sessionkey.
9. B registers two reactions as in the 5th step of group creation.
10. It finally inserts a reference-tuple corresponding to the group in GD. This tuple contains
the group public key.
A mechanism of blacklisting could be simply modelled by a shared tuple space where every peer
inserts tuples representing the peers it does not trust anymore. Thus, all peers could consult
this tuple space before accepting a new member.
Application level security. At the application level, similar mechanisms are applied. Every
peer starts by creating a security related tuple space. When a peer join the application and is
the first to do it11, it generates a session key to protect discovery tuple spaces. When other
peers are already connected, a new peer joins the application by executing similar steps to
group joining. Figure 5.7 illustrates the tuple spaces used to model the application level.
Refreshing keys. The key refresh mechanism is somewhat similar to the one described in
Section 5.1.1 (p. 109). In order to refresh a group session key, a peer initiator inserts a refresh-
tuple (similar to the one described in Section 5.1.1) in the security tuple space. However, in this
case, the communication is one-to-one. Here, the initiator sends a tuple to each group member.
11In this case, no identity-tuples are available.
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It contains the new session key and the current one. This last field ensures that the initiator is
an actual member of the group. The tuple has thus the following form:
<’ refresh’,initiator id,current sessionkey,new sessionkey,PX,PX>.
This tuple has to be sent to every group member and it is important that the sending is done
atomically. Indeed, if the initiator loses its connection while sending the tuples, two session keys
would be used at the same time. To avoid this problem, the initiator has to use a transactional
outg() operation as defined in the previous subsection. In this way, either all or no members
receive the new key.
Every member has a reaction waiting for a refresh-tuple, similar to the one in Section 5.1.1.
However, the two protection fields of the template contain the peer’s secret key (Sx). When
this reaction is triggered, the peer checks that the current sessionkey is the key currently
used to protect the communication tuple space and that the initiator’s certificate is still valid.
In this case, the peer changes the session key of the communication tuple space. Otherwise, the
tuple is ignored.
Members exclusion. Members exclusion is a difficult problem. Indeed, it requires to specify
a policy defining how to detect a member to exclude. It demands more complex security
mechanisms and it also requires to prevent its misuse by malicious members. Note that, under
our assumptions, members exclusion only applies to dynamic groups because static group access
is based on static attributes contained in peers’ certificates. Our goal here is not to define a
complete design of a solution but rather to propose some leads that may be used to implement
exclusion features.
The first topic is the definition of bad behaviours detection. In the design we proposed
above, every peer could keep a list of the peers interacting with it. In this list, the peers could
be ranked according to how well they behave. When a peer reaches a to-be-specified threshold
of maliciousness, the peer holding the list can initiate an exclusion process. A simple way
to assess a peer’s trust rank could be to keep track of the security related interactions. For
instance, when a peer notices another peer has failed a challenge or has an invalid certificate,
this could arise suspicion on the peer’s intention. The list owner could then decrease its trust
rank.
To actually exclude a group member, a peer can initiate a session key refresh. Since the
refresh related communication is one-to-one, it suffices that the initiator does not send the
new key to the peer it wants to exclude. Furthermore, excluded peers could be blacklisted by
others in order to prevent it to join again the group. This would require that the peers share
blacklisting information.
It is important to note that allowing to exclude members could bring more problems than
it could actually resolve. Indeed, if malicious peers have the possibility to exclude others, then
they could exclude every suspicious member. To prevent this problem, a member exclusion
should not be based on one’s decision. This should involve a collaborative decision of group
members, for instance, through a voting system.
5.3.2 Enhanced matching policy
In the proof-of-concept, groups and services discovery is implemented with the standard basic
tuple matching policy provided by SecureLime. This implies that peers can only discover groups
using their name and description in textual forms. In the same vein, the matching of service
contracts is only based on a syntactical comparison of operation names and session types. For
instance, consider a peer looking for a group called “plant-monitoring”. In the current version
of the implementation, if the peer enters a request containing the text “plantmonitoring”, it
will not get a positive result.
In addition, our implementation does not take into account the issues induced by embedded
systems. Especially, in a real system, it would require mechanisms to reduce battery consump-
tion and to overcome connectivity problems.
In the following, we propose different matching policies which may be helpful to improve
the current groups and services discovery as well as embedded related features. However,
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most of our propositions could be implemented at the application level (thus, on top of the
coordination system). For instance, one can simulate finer grained matching policies on top
of aggregate operations (i.e. rdg() and ing()). Still, we argue that providing these enhanced
matching policies at the middleware level could be done in a more efficient way.
 Range matching: This matching policy permits to specify templates which feature values
intervals. Tuples are matched if their values are in between the intervals. For instance, a
template <1-5> would match the tuple <3>. A policy similar to range matching can be
applied to unordered values by allowing several values in a template field. Fields match if
the value in the tuple field is equal to one of the values in the template field. For instance,
the template <[water,tea,coffee],pie> matches the tuple <coffee,pie>.
In the context of SMEPP, this policy can be applied in several situations. Notably, it could
be used to model Quality-of-Service (QoS) properties of services. An integer representing
the level of QoS can be associated with each service. When a peer searches for services
providing a certain level of QoS, it can specify the range including the QoS level it wants.
Furthermore, the policy can also be used to discover groups. In particular, the policy can
be used to search for group featuring a certain security or visibility level.
 Comparative template: Another interesting policy can allow to match the tuples compara-
tively. For instance, as for integer values, the policy selects a tuple with a field having the
biggest, the least or the closest integer compared to the template. It may also compute
distances between values. For instance, the policy could compute the distance between
a string specified in the template and the strings contained in available tuples. Then, it
would return the tuple with the closest field. In order to avoid irrelevant results when a
distance is computed, it is necessary to be able to specify a bound to the wished distance.
In SMEPP, this may be very useful to improve groups and services discovery. For instance,
when a peer wants to discover groups related to printing, it specifies the key word “print”
in the field corresponding to the group name. With this policy, the system returns the
tuple(s) having a group name field similar to “print”, for instance “printing” or “printer”
etc.
 Prioritised fields: The fields can also be prioritised. One can imagine the user could
associate an importance to each field in the template. The system then returns tuple(s)
according to a certain computed score, based on the number of tuple matching the tem-
plate and their priorities.
In the context of SMEPP, this matching policy can be used in the services discovery. For
instance, one could give a higher priority to the field representing the service name and a
lower one to the QoS field.
 Location based: Some additional attributes can be associated with the tuples to add em-
bedded related information about the host owning them, such as geographical coordinates,
connection quality, host type (i.e. desktop, PDA, mobile phone, mote, etc.), battery au-
tonomy etc. According to the type of attribute, the user could specify its needs in the
template.
For instance, in SMEPP, when a peer discovers services, the coordination system could
first return the tuples owned by host having better battery autonomy or being the closest,
etc. Likewise, the system could prioritise the tuples according to their host type (for
instance, it could return the desktop tuples before the mote ones).
Obviously, if several policies are used at the same time, it is required to prioritise them. Such
prioritisation should be made by the user. For instance, the coordination operations may require
additional parameters specifying the order by which the policy have to be applied.
5.3.3 Interoperability
The current version of the implementation does not meet fully the SMEPP interoperability
requirements. These requirements were left out of the thesis scope to focus on coordination
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issues. The coordination system we chose does not provide many interoperability features.
Indeed, SecureLime uses Java’s serialised objects to exchange tuples between hosts. This implies
that every device involved in the application network must be Java compliant. While Java is a
ubiquitous language (it is available on many device types, e.g. from mobile phones to desktops),
all devices are not Java compliant, especially the legacy ones. Thus, using SecureLime excludes
this kind of hardware.
In order to develop an implementation meeting fully interoperability requirements on top
of a coordination system, one needs a system which uses language and platform independent
communications. For instance, the exchanged tuples could be in the form of structured ASCII
files. Furthermore, a protocol shared by all entities is required to exchange the files between
heterogeneous hosts (e.g. UDP/TCP protocols are available on almost all host types).
The Lime model can also be implemented in different languages. For instance, G.-P. Picco,
in [39], proposes a coordination system based on Lime which is developed to run on embedded
system. The implementation is written in nesC, a dialect of the C programming language and
it is aimed to run on TinyOS, which is an operating system designed for wireless embedded
sensor networks. This system, with additional security features, could be a good candidate to
build an implementation meeting the interoperability requirements.
5.3.4 Implementation correctness
The SMEPP middleware intends to be used in various application fields. Some of them require
strong reliability properties. Indeed, systems used in the context of plant monitoring, health
care, disaster recovery, etc. must prohibit unexpected behaviour (e.g. software crashes, abnor-
mal response time, erroneous behaviour, etc.). The purpose of the SMoL language is precisely
to permit the theoretical analysis of SMEPP applications. However, the SMEPP middleware
implementation and the translation from SMoL have to be trusted. On the one hand, the
middleware needs to be proved reliable (i.e. compliant to the SMEPP service model). On the
other hand, the translation needs to keep the semantics of SMoL programs.
Proving the middleware compliance amounts to analyse the primitives implementations with
respect to the service model. This could be done by modelling the implementation using an
abstract version of Java and SecureLime. In this way, it could be possible to compare this model
with the SMEPP abstract model we presented in Section 2.3.3. Obviously, the modelling of
the implementation using an abstract Java language is not a trivial work. However, the use
of SecureLime could ease the comparison between the abstract model and the implementation
model because SecureLime provides a higher abstraction level than basic coordination mecha-
nisms (e.g. UDP/TCP protocols, RPC systems, etc.). Indeed, it is easier to compare a tuple
space with a set and its operations than to compare the same set and operations with concepts
such as TCP sockets and buffers.
To establish the equivalence between a SMoL program and its translation to Java, one also
needs to build an abstract language which provides a higher level view of the implementation.
Then, it is possible to analyse theoretically the correspondence of the implementation semantics
and of the SMoL semantics. Thus, the purpose is that for each SMoL program P, its translation
T(P) keeps the same semantics. Since [15] defines a transformational semantics from SMoL to
YAWL workflows, one could similarly model the implementation in YAWL concepts.
This proof scheme requires a deep understanding of SMoL and Java to be able to abstract
them in a correct and sound way. Indeed, the rest of the proof assume the equivalence between
the concrete language and its abstraction. Although such a proof would be of high importance
in the final SMEPP implementation, we are forced to leave it as future work, given the amount
of work it would require.
5.4 Concluding remarks
The previous sections elicited many features which have been showed to be very useful for
service-oriented applications in ad hoc networks. In particular, we want to stress the lack of
proper security mechanisms in coordination systems in general. SecSpaces [52] features by far
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the most suitable security model in tuple space coordination language and its implementation,
if it were peer-to-peer oriented, it would permit us to fully meet the highest SMEPP security
requirements (i.e. to offer configurable security levels).
Chapter 6
Conclusion
The main motivation of this thesis is to study the development of a secure middleware for ad
hoc systems on top of a coordination language. Ad hoc systems raise two main challenges
to be faced. On the one hand, the devices involved in such systems lack of reliability. In-
deed, these devices are prone to frequent and unpredicted disconnections and interact using
unreliable communication technologies (i.e. wireless links). On the other hand, given the com-
munication technologies typically used in ad hoc settings, the interactions need to be protected
against eavesdropping, man-in-the-middle attack, denial-of-service, etc. Those two drawbacks
are worsened by the absence of a centralised entity which, in other distributed models, takes
care of monitoring the network topology and securing the communications.
These challenges must be addressed by a suitable middleware which wraps the difficulties
induced by ad hoc networks. We showed that the development of this kind of middleware is eased
by the separated specification of the internal behaviour of the devices and their interactions.
Gelernter and Carriero, in [51], suggest to use a coordination model to specify the interaction
part of distributed systems. Many coordination models have been proposed (e.g. PVM [103],
RPC [9], Manifold [3], Gamma [5], etc.), but the advantages of the tuple space model made it
become ubiquitous and widely used in the context of web-based applications [94]. This thesis
experimented the development of a proof-of-concept of the SMEPP middleware, presented in
Chapter 2, on top of a tuple based coordination system.
Firstly, we studied the state of the art of coordination languages to select the most suitable
basis on top of which the middleware implementation is built. Chapter 3 gave a broad survey
of the coordination theory in the light of the security and ad hoc requirements. We believe this
analysis to be a good basis for the selection of an ad hoc oriented coordination system.
Then, we compared the SMEPP middleware requirements with the different features of
the languages surveyed in the study. This led us to choose SecureLime as a basis for our
implementation. Indeed, it provides features such as federated (password-protected) tuple
spaces and tuple level access control. These features allowed us to successfully model all SMEPP
key concepts.
We consider the experiment was successful as the implementation complies with the SMEPP
objectives and requirements [96]. Furthermore, this work showed how a real world service model
can be implemented using a tuple space coordination language. We argue the proof-of-concept
design and implementation feature the following main contributions. Firstly, we provide an
extension of SecureLime with the SMEPP programming model that offers a simple high-level
API supporting the definition of peer and service code, peer groups, group-wise security, syn-
chronous and asynchronous message patterns (one-to-one, direct or blind operation invocations)
and event-based communication (one-to-many). Furthermore, this proof-of-concept can be used
to test/simulate interactions of peers and services.
Part of Chapter 4 describing the middleware design and implementation was published at
the Workshop on Coordination Models and Applications: Knowledge in Pervasive Environments
(CoMA) held at the 17th IEEE International Workshops on Enabling Technologies: Infrastruc-
tures for Collaborative Enterprises (WETICE). The paper is available in Appendix C.
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We have also implemented a SMoL to Java translator (which generates Java code from a
SMoL specification) and we have integrated it with our implementation based on SecureLime.
The resulting prototype produces executable Java code that runs on top of SecureLime starting
from a SMoL description of the behaviour of a peer or service.
The critical analysis given in Chapter 5 of our implementation allowed us to elicit some
features lacking in the currently available coordination systems. In particular, in order to
enhance the security level (i.e. to build an asymmetric keys based system) addressed in the
scope of our thesis, we proposed a set of requirements to be met by a coordination system.
However, while theoretical models (partly) meet them, the state of the art analysis showed that
no such coordination systems are available.
While the context of our work was restrictive, we believe the design ideas underlying our
implementation and the new leads we propose in Chapter 5 can be re-used in similar projects.
Indeed, the SMEPP project intends to produce a generic service-oriented middleware. Thus,
concepts similar to the ones we implemented are likely to be used in other projects. Furthermore,
there exist many coordination languages having common features with SecureLime. Therefore,
it is possible to apply our high level design to other tuple space based languages.
Our goal was to study the development of a tuple space based secure middleware in ad
hoc settings. We believe this goal has been achieved through the following contributions. We
highlighted the needed features to be met by a coordination language for ad hoc networks,
we provided a re-usable high level design for tuple space based application and we elicited
requirements necessary to provide decentralised security management in tuple space systems.
However, in order to meet thoroughly the SMEPP requirements, we showed that the sur-
veyed systems need additional features. In particular, these features must provide an interoper-
able communication model for embedded devices, advanced matching policies and asymmetric
key based security mechanisms. We stressed the fact that even though some theoretical mod-
els exhibit these features, none of them is currently implemented. And yet, the lack of such
implementations is manifest.
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Appendix A
XML schemas
A.1 Service schemas
A.1.1 Signature.xsd schema
1 <?xml version=”1.0” encoding=”utf−8”?>
<!−− edited with XMLSPY v5 rel. 4 U (http://www.xmlspy.com) by BlackJack (BlackJack) −−>
<!−−
W3C XML Schema defined in the Web Services Description (WSDL)
Version 2.0 specification
http://www.w3.org/TR/wsdl20
Copyright 2005 World Wide Web Consortium,
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology, European Research Consortium for
11 Informatics and Mathematics, Keio University). All Rights Reserved. This
work is distributed under the W3C Software License [1] in the hope that
it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied
warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
[1] http://www.w3.org/Consortium/Legal/2002/copyright−software−20021231
$Id: wsdl20.xsd,v 1.1 2007/05/17 16:13:03 plehegar Exp $
−−>
<xs:schema targetNamespace=”http://www.w3.org/ns/wsdl” xmlns:sign=”http://www.w3.org/ns/wsdl”
xmlns:xs=”http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema” elementFormDefault=”qualified”
attributeFormDefault=”unqualified”>
21 <xs:element name=”documentation” type=”sign:DocumentationType”/>
<xs:complexType name=”DocumentationType” mixed=”true”>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:any namespace=”##any” processContents=”lax” minOccurs=”0”
maxOccurs=”unbounded”/>
</xs:sequence>
<xs:anyAttribute namespace=”##other” processContents=”lax”/>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name=”DocumentedType” mixed=”false”>
<xs:annotation>
<xs:documentation>
31 This type is extended by component types to allow them to be documented.
</xs:documentation>
</xs:annotation>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element ref=”sign:documentation” minOccurs=”0” maxOccurs=”unbounded”/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name=”ExtensibleDocumentedType” abstract=”true” mixed=”false”>
<xs:annotation>
<xs:documentation>
41 This type is extended by component types to allow
attributes from other namespaces to be added.
</xs:documentation>
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</xs:annotation>
<xs:complexContent mixed=”false”>
<xs:extension base=”sign:DocumentedType”>
<xs:anyAttribute processContents=”lax”/>
</xs:extension>
</xs:complexContent>
</xs:complexType>
51 <xs:complexType name=”DescriptionType” mixed=”false”>
<xs:annotation>
<xs:documentation>
Although correct, this type declaration does not capture
all the constraints on the contents of the wsdl:description
element as defined by the WSDL 2.0 specification.
In particular, the ordering constraints wrt elements preceding
and following the wsdl:types child element are not captured, as
attempts to incorporate such restrictions in the schema
61 ran afoul of the UPA (Unique Particle Attribution) rule
in the XML Schema language.
Please refer to the WSDL 2.0 specification for
additional information on the contents of this type.
</xs:documentation>
</xs:annotation>
<xs:complexContent mixed=”false”>
<xs:extension base=”sign:ExtensibleDocumentedType”>
<xs:sequence>
71 <xs:element ref=”sign:types” minOccurs=”0”
maxOccurs=”unbounded”/>
<xs:element ref=”sign:interface”/>
<xs:any namespace=”##other” processContents=”lax”
minOccurs=”0”/>
</xs:sequence>
<xs:attribute name=”targetNamespace” type=”xs:anyURI”
use=”optional”/>
</xs:extension>
</xs:complexContent>
</xs:complexType>
<!−− types for import and include elements −−>
<xs:element name=”types” type=”sign:TypesType”/>
81 <xs:complexType name=”TypesType” mixed=”false”>
<xs:complexContent mixed=”false”>
<xs:extension base=”sign:ExtensibleDocumentedType”>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:any namespace=”##other” processContents=”strict”
minOccurs=”0” maxOccurs=”unbounded”/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:extension>
</xs:complexContent>
</xs:complexType>
<!−− parts related to wsdl:interface −−>
91 <xs:element name=”interface” type=”sign:InterfaceType”>
<xs:unique name=”operation”>
<xs:selector xpath=”sign:operation”/>
<xs:field xpath=”@name”/>
</xs:unique>
<xs:unique name=”fault”>
<xs:selector xpath=”sign:fault”/>
<xs:field xpath=”@name”/>
</xs:unique>
</xs:element>
101 <xs:complexType name=”InterfaceType” mixed=”false”>
<xs:complexContent mixed=”false”>
<xs:extension base=”sign:ExtensibleDocumentedType”>
<xs:choice minOccurs=”0” maxOccurs=”unbounded”>
<xs:element name=”operation”
type=”sign:InterfaceOperationType”/>
<xs:element name=”fault” type=”sign:InterfaceFaultType”/>
<xs:any namespace=”##other” processContents=”lax”/>
</xs:choice>
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<xs:attribute name=”name” type=”xs:NCName” use=”required”/>
<xs:attribute name=”extends” use=”optional”>
111 <xs:simpleType>
<xs:list itemType=”xs:QName”/>
</xs:simpleType>
</xs:attribute>
<xs:attribute name=”styleDefault” use=”optional”>
<xs:simpleType>
<xs:list itemType=”xs:anyURI”/>
</xs:simpleType>
</xs:attribute>
</xs:extension>
121 </xs:complexContent>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name=”InterfaceOperationType” mixed=”false”>
<xs:complexContent mixed=”false”>
<xs:extension base=”sign:ExtensibleDocumentedType”>
<xs:choice minOccurs=”0” maxOccurs=”unbounded”>
<xs:element name=”input” type=”sign:MessageRefType”/>
<xs:element name=”output” type=”sign:MessageRefType”/>
<xs:element name=”infault” type=”sign:MessageRefFaultType”/>
<xs:element name=”outfault” type=”sign:MessageRefFaultType”/>
131 <xs:any namespace=”##other” processContents=”lax”/>
</xs:choice>
<xs:attribute name=”name” type=”xs:NCName” use=”required”/>
<xs:attribute name=”pattern” type=”xs:anyURI” use=”optional”/>
<xs:attribute name=”safe” type=”xs:boolean” use=”optional”/>
<xs:attribute name=”style” type=”xs:anyURI” use=”optional”/>
</xs:extension>
</xs:complexContent>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name=”MessageRefType” mixed=”false”>
141 <xs:complexContent mixed=”false”>
<xs:extension base=”sign:ExtensibleDocumentedType”>
<xs:choice minOccurs=”0” maxOccurs=”unbounded”>
<xs:any namespace=”##other” processContents=”lax”/>
</xs:choice>
<xs:attribute name=”messageLabel” type=”xs:NCName” use=”optional”/>
<xs:attribute name=”element” type=”sign:ElementReferenceType”
use=”optional”/>
</xs:extension>
</xs:complexContent>
</xs:complexType>
151 <xs:simpleType name=”ElementReferenceType”>
<xs:annotation>
<xs:documentation>
Use the QName of a GED that describes the content,
#any for any content,
#none for empty content, or
#other for content described by some other extension attribute that references a declaration in a
non−XML extension type system.
</xs:documentation>
</xs:annotation>
<xs:union memberTypes=”xs:QName”>
161 <xs:simpleType>
<xs:restriction base=”xs:token”>
<xs:enumeration value=”#any”/>
<xs:enumeration value=”#none”/>
<xs:enumeration value=”#other”/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
</xs:union>
</xs:simpleType>
<xs:complexType name=”MessageRefFaultType” mixed=”false”>
171 <xs:complexContent mixed=”false”>
<xs:extension base=”sign:ExtensibleDocumentedType”>
<xs:choice minOccurs=”0” maxOccurs=”unbounded”>
<xs:any namespace=”##other” processContents=”lax”/>
</xs:choice>
<xs:attribute name=”ref” type=”xs:QName” use=”required”/>
140 Chapter A
<xs:attribute name=”messageLabel” type=”xs:NCName” use=”optional”/>
</xs:extension>
</xs:complexContent>
</xs:complexType>
181 <xs:complexType name=”InterfaceFaultType” mixed=”false”>
<xs:complexContent mixed=”false”>
<xs:extension base=”sign:ExtensibleDocumentedType”>
<xs:choice minOccurs=”0” maxOccurs=”unbounded”>
<xs:any namespace=”##other” processContents=”lax”/>
</xs:choice>
<xs:attribute name=”name” type=”xs:NCName” use=”required”/>
<xs:attribute name=”element” type=”xs:QName” use=”optional”/>
</xs:extension>
</xs:complexContent>
191 </xs:complexType>
<!−− types related to wsdl:binding −−>
<!−− types related to service −−>
<xs:attribute name=”required” type=”xs:boolean”/>
<xs:complexType name=”ExtensionElement” abstract=”true” mixed=”false”>
<xs:annotation>
<xs:documentation>
This abstract type is intended to serve as the base type for
extension elements. It includes the wsdl:required attribute
which it is anticipated will be used by most extension elements
201 </xs:documentation>
</xs:annotation>
<xs:attribute ref=”sign:required” use=”optional”/>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:element name=”description” type=”sign:DescriptionType”/>
</xs:schema>
A.1.2 Contract.xsd schema
<?xml version=”1.0” encoding=”UTF−8”?>
<!−− edited with XMLSPY v5 rel. 4 U (http://www.xmlspy.com) by BlackJack (BlackJack) −−>
3 <xs:schema xmlns:sign=”http://www.w3.org/ns/wsdl” xmlns:smol=”http://SMoL.SMEPP.org”
xmlns:xs=”http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema”
targetNamespace=”http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema” elementFormDefault=”qualified”
attributeFormDefault=”unqualified” blockDefault=”#all”>
<xs:import namespace=”http://www.w3.org/ns/wsdl” schemaLocation=”Signature.xsd”/>
<xs:import namespace=”http://SMoL.SMEPP.org” schemaLocation=”SMoLv21.xsd”/>
<xs:element name=”Contract”>
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name=”Signature”>
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name=”service”>
13 <xs:complexType>
<xs:simpleContent>
<xs:extension base=”xs:string”>
<xs:attribute name=”name” type=”xs:QName” use=”required”/>
<xs:attribute name=”category” type=”xs:QName” use=”required”/>
<xs:attribute name=”type” use=”optional” default=”state−less”>
<xs:simpleType>
<xs:restriction base=”xs:NMTOKEN”>
<xs:enumeration value=”state−less”/>
<xs:enumeration value=”state−full”/>
23 </xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
</xs:attribute>
<xs:attribute name=”sessionState” use=”optional” default=”session−less”>
<xs:simpleType>
<xs:restriction base=”xs:NMTOKEN”>
<xs:enumeration value=”session−less”/>
<xs:enumeration value=”session−full”/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
APPENDIX A. XML SCHEMAS 141
33 </xs:attribute>
</xs:extension>
</xs:simpleContent>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element ref=”sign:description”/>
</xs:sequence>
<xs:attributeGroup ref=”xs:ontologyAttrG”/>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
43 <xs:element name=”Grounding”>
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name=”Parameters” minOccurs=”0”>
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name=”param” maxOccurs=”unbounded”>
<xs:complexType>
<xs:simpleContent>
<xs:extension base=”xs:string”>
53 <xs:attribute name=”name” type=”xs:QName” use=”required”/>
<xs:attribute name=”type” type=”xs:QName” use=”required”/>
</xs:extension>
</xs:simpleContent>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
</xs:sequence>
<xs:attributeGroup ref=”xs:ontologyAttrG”/>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
63 <xs:any namespace=”##other” minOccurs=”0”/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name=”Properties” minOccurs=”0”>
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name=”property” maxOccurs=”unbounded”>
<xs:complexType>
<xs:simpleContent>
73 <xs:extension base=”xs:string”>
<xs:attribute name=”category” type=”xs:QName” use=”required”/>
<xs:attribute name=”name” type=”xs:QName” use=”required”/>
<xs:attribute name=”type” type=”xs:QName” use=”required”/>
<xs:anyAttribute/>
</xs:extension>
</xs:simpleContent>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
</xs:sequence>
83 <xs:attributeGroup ref=”xs:ontologyAttrG”/>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name=”QoS” minOccurs=”0”>
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name=”QoSParameter” maxOccurs=”unbounded”>
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name=”QoSImpact” type=”xs:string” minOccurs=”0”
maxOccurs=”unbounded”/>
93 <xs:element name=”QoSMetric” minOccurs=”0” maxOccurs=”unbounded”>
<xs:complexType>
<xs:simpleContent>
<xs:extension base=”xs:string”>
<xs:attribute name=”type” type=”xs:QName” use=”required”/>
<xs:attribute name=”unit” type=”xs:QName” use=”optional”/>
</xs:extension>
</xs:simpleContent>
</xs:complexType>
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</xs:element>
103 <xs:element name=”RelationShip” minOccurs=”0”>
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name=”Relation” maxOccurs=”unbounded”>
<xs:complexType>
<xs:attribute name=”refQoSParameter” type=”xs:string” use=”required”/>
<xs:attribute name=”impactFactor” use=”required”>
<xs:simpleType>
<xs:restriction base=”xs:QName”>
<xs:enumeration value=”Proportional”/>
113 <xs:enumeration value=”InverselyProportional”/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
</xs:attribute>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name=”Agregations” minOccurs=”0”>
123 <xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name=”Aggregated” maxOccurs=”unbounded”>
<xs:complexType>
<xs:attribute name=”refQoSParameter” type=”xs:string” use=”required”/>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
133 </xs:sequence>
<xs:attribute name=”nature” use=”required”>
<xs:simpleType>
<xs:restriction base=”xs:NMTOKEN”>
<xs:enumeration value=”static”/>
<xs:enumeration value=”dynamic”/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
</xs:attribute>
<xs:attribute name=”name” type=”xs:QName” use=”required”/>
143 <xs:attribute name=”domain” type=”xs:QName” use=”required”/>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
</xs:sequence>
<xs:attributeGroup ref=”xs:ontologyAttrG”/>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name=”Behavior” minOccurs=”0”>
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
153 <xs:element ref=”smol:process”/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:attributeGroup name=”ontologyAttrG”>
<xs:attribute name=”targetTaxNamespace” type=”xs:anyURI” use=”optional”/>
<xs:attribute name=”targetOwnNamespace” type=”xs:anyURI” use=”optional”/>
163 </xs:attributeGroup>
</xs:schema>
A.2 SMoL schema
<?xml version=”1.0” encoding=”UTF−8”?>
APPENDIX A. XML SCHEMAS 143
<!−−
Copyright (c) OASIS Open 2003−2007. All Rights Reserved.
Modified by Razvan Popescu (UPI) for SMEPP.
5 −−>
<xsd:schema xmlns=”http://SMoL.SMEPP.org” xmlns:xsd=”http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema”
targetNamespace=”http://SMoL.SMEPP.org” elementFormDefault=”qualified” blockDefault=”#all”>
<xsd:import namespace=”http://www.w3.org/XML/1998/namespace”
schemaLocation=”http://www.w3.org/2001/xml.xsd”/>
<xsd:element name=”process” type=”tProcess”/>
<xsd:complexType name=”tProcess”>
<xsd:complexContent>
<xsd:extension base=”tExtensibleElements”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element ref=”import” minOccurs=”0”
maxOccurs=”unbounded”/>
<xsd:element ref=”variables” minOccurs=”0”/>
15 <xsd:group ref=”activity”/>
</xsd:sequence>
<xsd:attribute name=”name” type=”xsd:NCName” use=”required”/>
<xsd:attribute name=”targetNamespace” type=”xsd:anyURI”
use=”required”/>
<xsd:attribute name=”queryLanguage” type=”xsd:anyURI”
default=”urn:oasis:names:tc:wsbpel:2.0:sublang:xpath1.0”/>
<xsd:attribute name=”expressionLanguage” type=”xsd:anyURI”
default=”urn:oasis:names:tc:wsbpel:2.0:sublang:xpath1.0”/>
</xsd:extension>
</xsd:complexContent>
</xsd:complexType>
<xsd:complexType name=”tExtensibleElements”>
25 <xsd:annotation>
<xsd:documentation>
This type is extended by other component types to allow elements and
attributes from
other namespaces to be added at the modeled places.
</xsd:documentation>
</xsd:annotation>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element ref=”documentation” minOccurs=”0” maxOccurs=”unbounded”/>
<xsd:any namespace=”##other” processContents=”lax” minOccurs=”0”
maxOccurs=”unbounded”/>
</xsd:sequence>
35 <xsd:anyAttribute namespace=”##other” processContents=”lax”/>
</xsd:complexType>
<xsd:element name=”documentation” type=”tDocumentation”/>
<xsd:complexType name=”tDocumentation” mixed=”true”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:any namespace=”##any” processContents=”lax” minOccurs=”0”
maxOccurs=”unbounded”/>
</xsd:sequence>
<xsd:attribute name=”source” type=”xsd:anyURI”/>
<!−−<xsd:attribute ref=”xml:lang”/>−−>
</xsd:complexType>
45 <xsd:element name=”import” type=”tImport”/>
<xsd:complexType name=”tImport”>
<xsd:complexContent>
<xsd:extension base=”tExtensibleElements”>
<xsd:attribute name=”namespace” type=”xsd:anyURI” use=”optional”/>
<xsd:attribute name=”location” type=”xsd:anyURI” use=”optional”/>
<xsd:attribute name=”importType” type=”xsd:anyURI” use=”required”/>
</xsd:extension>
</xsd:complexContent>
</xsd:complexType>
55 <xsd:element name=”variables” type=”tVariables”/>
<xsd:complexType name=”tVariables”>
<xsd:complexContent>
<xsd:extension base=”tExtensibleElements”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element ref=”variable” maxOccurs=”unbounded”/>
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:extension>
144 Chapter A
</xsd:complexContent>
</xsd:complexType>
65 <xsd:element name=”variable” type=”tVariable”/>
<xsd:complexType name=”tVariable”>
<xsd:annotation>
<xsd:documentation>
The ”from” tag serves to initialise variables.
</xsd:documentation>
</xsd:annotation>
<xsd:complexContent>
<xsd:extension base=”tExtensibleElements”>
<xsd:sequence>
75 <xsd:element ref=”from” minOccurs=”0”/>
</xsd:sequence>
<xsd:attribute name=”name” type=”VariableName” use=”required”/>
<xsd:attribute name=”messageType” type=”xsd:QName” use=”optional”/>
<xsd:attribute name=”type” type=”xsd:QName” use=”optional”/>
<xsd:attribute name=”element” type=”xsd:QName” use=”optional”/>
</xsd:extension>
</xsd:complexContent>
</xsd:complexType>
<xsd:simpleType name=”VariableName”>
85 <xsd:restriction base=”xsd:NCName”>
<xsd:pattern value=”[ˆ\.]+”/>
</xsd:restriction>
</xsd:simpleType>
<xsd:group name=”activity”>
<xsd:choice>
<xsd:group ref=”basic commands”/>
<xsd:group ref=”structured commands”/>
</xsd:choice>
</xsd:group>
95 <xsd:group name=”basic commands”>
<xsd:choice>
<xsd:group ref=”primitives”/>
<xsd:element ref=”empty”/>
<xsd:element ref=”assign”/>
<xsd:element ref=”wait”/>
<xsd:element ref=”throw”/>
<xsd:element ref=”catch”/>
<!−− to be used only inside faultHandlers −−>
<xsd:element ref=”catchAll”/>
105 <!−− to be used only inside faultHandlers −−>
<xsd:element ref=”exit”/>
</xsd:choice>
</xsd:group>
<xsd:group name=”structured commands”>
<xsd:choice>
<xsd:element ref=”sequence”/>
<xsd:element ref=”flow”/>
<xsd:element ref=”while”/>
<xsd:element ref=”repeatUntil”/>
115 <xsd:element ref=”if”/>
<xsd:element ref=”pick”/>
<xsd:element ref=”informationHandler”/>
<xsd:element ref=”faultHandler”/>
</xsd:choice>
</xsd:group>
<xsd:group name=”primitives”>
<xsd:choice>
<!−− Peer Management Primitives −−>
<xsd:element ref=”newPeer”/>
125 <xsd:element ref=”getPeerId”/>
<xsd:element ref=”getPeers”/>
<!−− Group Management Primitives −−>
<xsd:element ref=”createGroup”/>
<xsd:element ref=”getGroups”/>
<xsd:element ref=”getGroupDescription”/>
<xsd:element ref=”joinGroup”/>
<xsd:element ref=”leaveGroup”/>
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<xsd:element ref=”getIncludingGroups”/>
<xsd:element ref=”getPublishingGroup”/>
135 <!−− Service Management Primitives −−>
<xsd:element ref=”publish”/>
<xsd:element ref=”unpublish”/>
<xsd:element ref=”getServices”/>
<xsd:element ref=”getServiceContract”/>
<xsd:element ref=”startSession”/>
<!−− Message Management Primitives −−>
<xsd:element ref=”invoke”/>
<xsd:element ref=”receiveMessage”/>
<xsd:element ref=”reply”/>
145 <!−− Event Management Primitives −−>
<xsd:element ref=”event”/>
<xsd:element ref=”receiveEvent”/>
<xsd:element ref=”subscribe”/>
<xsd:element ref=”unsubscribe”/>
</xsd:choice>
</xsd:group>
<!−− Start of basic commands’ definition. −−>
<!−− Start of primitives’ definition. −−>
<!−− Peer Management Primitives −−>
155 <!−− peerId newPeer(credentials) −−>
<xsd:element name=”newPeer” type=”tNewPeer”/>
<xsd:complexType name=”tNewPeer”>
<xsd:complexContent>
<xsd:extension base=”tActivity”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name=”input” type=”tInputNewPeer”/>
<xsd:element name=”output” type=”tOutputNewPeer”
minOccurs=”0”/>
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:extension>
165 </xsd:complexContent>
</xsd:complexType>
<xsd:complexType name=”tInputNewPeer”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name=”credentials” type=”tFrom”/>
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:complexType>
<xsd:complexType name=”tOutputNewPeer”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name=”peerId” type=”tTo”/>
175 </xsd:sequence>
</xsd:complexType>
<xsd:complexType name=”tActivity”>
<xsd:complexContent>
<xsd:extension base=”tExtensibleElements”>
<xsd:attribute name=”name” type=”xsd:NCName”/>
</xsd:extension>
</xsd:complexContent>
</xsd:complexType>
<!−− peerId getPeerId(id?) −−>
185 <xsd:element name=”getPeerId” type=”tGetPeerId”/>
<xsd:complexType name=”tGetPeerId”>
<xsd:complexContent>
<xsd:extension base=”tActivity”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name=”input” type=”tInputGetPeerId”
minOccurs=”0”/>
<xsd:element name=”output” type=”tOutputGetPeerId”
minOccurs=”0”/>
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:extension>
</xsd:complexContent>
195 </xsd:complexType>
<xsd:complexType name=”tInputGetPeerId”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name=”id” type=”tFrom”/>
</xsd:sequence>
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</xsd:complexType>
<xsd:complexType name=”tOutputGetPeerId”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name=”peerId” type=”tTo”/>
</xsd:sequence>
205 </xsd:complexType>
<!−− peerId[] getPeers(groupId?) −−>
<xsd:element name=”getPeers” type=”tGetPeers”/>
<xsd:complexType name=”tGetPeers”>
<xsd:complexContent>
<xsd:extension base=”tActivity”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name=”input” type=”tInputGetPeers”
minOccurs=”0”/>
<xsd:element name=”output” type=”tOutputGetPeers”
minOccurs=”0”/>
</xsd:sequence>
215 </xsd:extension>
</xsd:complexContent>
</xsd:complexType>
<xsd:complexType name=”tInputGetPeers”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name=”groupId” type=”tFrom”/>
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:complexType>
<xsd:complexType name=”tOutputGetPeers”>
<xsd:sequence>
225 <xsd:element name=”peerIdArray” type=”tTo”/>
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:complexType>
<!−− Group Management Primitives −−>
<!−− groupId createGroup(groupDescription) −−>
<xsd:element name=”createGroup” type=”tCreateGroup”/>
<xsd:complexType name=”tCreateGroup”>
<xsd:complexContent>
<xsd:extension base=”tActivity”>
<xsd:sequence>
235 <xsd:element name=”input” type=”tInputCreateGroup”/>
<xsd:element name=”output” type=”tOutputCreateGroup”
minOccurs=”0”/>
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:extension>
</xsd:complexContent>
</xsd:complexType>
<xsd:complexType name=”tInputCreateGroup”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name=”groupDescription” type=”tFrom”/>
</xsd:sequence>
245 </xsd:complexType>
<xsd:complexType name=”tOutputCreateGroup”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name=”groupId” type=”tTo”/>
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:complexType>
<!−− groupId[] getGroups(groupDescription?) −−>
<xsd:element name=”getGroups” type=”tGetGroups”/>
<xsd:complexType name=”tGetGroups”>
<xsd:complexContent>
255 <xsd:extension base=”tActivity”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name=”input” type=”tInputGetGroups”
minOccurs=”0”/>
<xsd:element name=”output” type=”tOutputGetGroups”
minOccurs=”0”/>
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:extension>
</xsd:complexContent>
</xsd:complexType>
<xsd:complexType name=”tInputGetGroups”>
<xsd:sequence>
APPENDIX A. XML SCHEMAS 147
265 <xsd:element name=”groupDescription” type=”tFrom” minOccurs=”0”/>
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:complexType>
<xsd:complexType name=”tOutputGetGroups”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name=”groupIdArray” type=”tTo”/>
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:complexType>
<!−− groupGescription getGroupDescription(groupId) −−>
<xsd:element name=”getGroupDescription” type=”tGetGroupDescription”/>
275 <xsd:complexType name=”tGetGroupDescription”>
<xsd:complexContent>
<xsd:extension base=”tActivity”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name=”input” type=”tInputGetGroupDescription”/>
<xsd:element name=”output”
type=”tOutputGetGroupDescription” minOccurs=”0”/>
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:extension>
</xsd:complexContent>
</xsd:complexType>
285 <xsd:complexType name=”tInputGetGroupDescription”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name=”groupId” type=”tFrom”/>
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:complexType>
<xsd:complexType name=”tOutputGetGroupDescription”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name=”groupDescription” type=”tTo”/>
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:complexType>
295 <!−− void joinGroup(groupId, credentials) −−>
<xsd:element name=”joinGroup” type=”tJoinGroup”/>
<xsd:complexType name=”tJoinGroup”>
<xsd:complexContent>
<xsd:extension base=”tActivity”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name=”input” type=”tInputJoinGroup”/>
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:extension>
</xsd:complexContent>
305 </xsd:complexType>
<xsd:complexType name=”tInputJoinGroup”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name=”groupId” type=”tFrom”/>
<xsd:element name=”credentials” type=”tFrom”/>
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:complexType>
<!−− void leaveGroup(groupId) −−>
<xsd:element name=”leaveGroup” type=”tLeaveGroup”/>
<xsd:complexType name=”tLeaveGroup”>
315 <xsd:complexContent>
<xsd:extension base=”tActivity”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name=”input” type=”tInputLeaveGroup”/>
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:extension>
</xsd:complexContent>
</xsd:complexType>
<xsd:complexType name=”tInputLeaveGroup”>
<xsd:sequence>
325 <xsd:element name=”groupId” type=”tFrom”/>
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:complexType>
<!−− groupId[] getIncludingGroups() −−>
<xsd:element name=”getIncludingGroups” type=”tGetIncludingGroups”/>
<xsd:complexType name=”tGetIncludingGroups”>
<xsd:complexContent>
<xsd:extension base=”tActivity”>
<xsd:sequence>
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<xsd:element name=”output” type=”tOutputGetIncludingGroups”
minOccurs=”0”/>
335 </xsd:sequence>
</xsd:extension>
</xsd:complexContent>
</xsd:complexType>
<xsd:complexType name=”tOutputGetIncludingGroups”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name=”groupIdArray” type=”tTo”/>
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:complexType>
<!−− groupId getPublishingGroup(id?) −−>
345 <xsd:element name=”getPublishingGroup” type=”tGetPublishingGroup”/>
<xsd:complexType name=”tGetPublishingGroup”>
<xsd:complexContent>
<xsd:extension base=”tActivity”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name=”input” type=”tInputGetPublishingGroup”
minOccurs=”0”/>
<xsd:element name=”output” type=”tOutputGetPublishingGroup”
minOccurs=”0”/>
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:extension>
</xsd:complexContent>
355 </xsd:complexType>
<xsd:complexType name=”tInputGetPublishingGroup”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name=”id” type=”tFrom”/>
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:complexType>
<xsd:complexType name=”tOutputGetPublishingGroup”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name=”groupId” type=”tTo”/>
</xsd:sequence>
365 </xsd:complexType>
<!−− Service Management Primitives −−>
<!−− <groupServiceId, peerServiceId> publish(groupId, serviceContract) −−>
<xsd:element name=”publish” type=”tPublish”/>
<xsd:complexType name=”tPublish”>
<xsd:complexContent>
<xsd:extension base=”tActivity”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name=”input” type=”tInputPublish”/>
<xsd:element name=”output” type=”tOutputPublish”
minOccurs=”0”/>
375 </xsd:sequence>
</xsd:extension>
</xsd:complexContent>
</xsd:complexType>
<xsd:complexType name=”tInputPublish”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name=”groupId” type=”tFrom”/>
<xsd:element name=”serviceContract” type=”tFrom”/>
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:complexType>
385 <xsd:complexType name=”tOutputPublish”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name=”groupServiceId” type=”tTo”/>
<xsd:element name=”peerServiceId” type=”tTo”/>
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:complexType>
<!−− void unpublish(peerServiceId) −−>
<xsd:element name=”unpublish” type=”tUnpublish”/>
<xsd:complexType name=”tUnpublish”>
<xsd:complexContent>
395 <xsd:extension base=”tActivity”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name=”input” type=”tInputUnpublish”/>
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:extension>
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</xsd:complexContent>
</xsd:complexType>
<xsd:complexType name=”tInputUnpublish”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name=”peerServiceId” type=”tFrom”/>
405 </xsd:sequence>
</xsd:complexType>
<!−− <groupId, groupServiceId, peerServiceId>[] getServices(groupId?, peerId?, serviceContract?,
maxResults?, credentials) −−>
<xsd:element name=”getServices” type=”tGetServices”/>
<xsd:complexType name=”tGetServices”>
<xsd:complexContent>
<xsd:extension base=”tActivity”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name=”input” type=”tInputGetServices”/>
<xsd:element name=”output” type=”tOutputGetServices”
minOccurs=”0”/>
415 </xsd:sequence>
</xsd:extension>
</xsd:complexContent>
</xsd:complexType>
<xsd:complexType name=”tInputGetServices”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name=”groupId” type=”tFrom” minOccurs=”0”/>
<xsd:element name=”peerId” type=”tFrom” minOccurs=”0”/>
<xsd:element name=”serviceContract” type=”tFrom” minOccurs=”0”/>
<xsd:element name=”maxResults” type=”tFrom” minOccurs=”0”/>
425 <xsd:element name=”credentials” type=”tFrom”/>
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:complexType>
<xsd:complexType name=”tOutputGetServices”>
<xsd:sequence>
<!−− EDIT jbuchhol ; getServices must return an array of
<groupId,groupServiceId,peerServiceId>
<xsd:element name=”groupId” type=”tTo” minOccurs=”0”/>
<xsd:element name=”groupServiceId” type=”tTo” minOccurs=”0”/>
<xsd:element name=”peerServiceId” type=”tTo” minOccurs=”0”/>−−>
<xsd:element name=”tripleArray” type=”tTo”/>
435 </xsd:sequence>
</xsd:complexType>
<!−− serviceContract getServiceContract(id) −−>
<xsd:element name=”getServiceContract” type=”tGetServiceContract”/>
<xsd:complexType name=”tGetServiceContract”>
<xsd:complexContent>
<xsd:extension base=”tActivity”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name=”input” type=”tInputGetServiceContract”/>
<xsd:element name=”output” type=”tOutputGetServiceContract”
minOccurs=”0”/>
445 </xsd:sequence>
</xsd:extension>
</xsd:complexContent>
</xsd:complexType>
<xsd:complexType name=”tInputGetServiceContract”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name=”id” type=”tFrom”/>
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:complexType>
<xsd:complexType name=”tOutputGetServiceContract”>
455 <xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name=”serviceContract” type=”tTo”/>
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:complexType>
<!−− sessionId startSession(serviceId) −−>
<xsd:element name=”startSession” type=”tStartSession”/>
<xsd:complexType name=”tStartSession”>
<xsd:complexContent>
<xsd:extension base=”tActivity”>
<xsd:sequence>
465 <xsd:element name=”input” type=”tInputStartSession”/>
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<xsd:element name=”output” type=”tOutputStartSession”
minOccurs=”0”/>
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:extension>
</xsd:complexContent>
</xsd:complexType>
<xsd:complexType name=”tInputStartSession”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name=”serviceId” type=”tFrom”/>
</xsd:sequence>
475 </xsd:complexType>
<xsd:complexType name=”tOutputStartSession”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name=”sessionId” type=”tTo”/>
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:complexType>
<!−− Message Management Primitives −−>
<!−− output? invoke(entityId, operationName, input?) −−>
<xsd:element name=”invoke” type=”tInvoke”/>
<xsd:complexType name=”tInvoke”>
485 <xsd:complexContent>
<xsd:extension base=”tActivity”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name=”input” type=”tInputInvoke”/>
<xsd:element name=”output” type=”tOutputInvoke”
minOccurs=”0”/>
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:extension>
</xsd:complexContent>
</xsd:complexType>
<xsd:complexType name=”tInputInvoke”>
495 <xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name=”entityId” type=”tFrom”/>
<xsd:element name=”operationName” type=”tFrom”/>
<xsd:element name=”input” type=”tFrom” minOccurs=”0”/>
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:complexType>
<xsd:complexType name=”tOutputInvoke”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name=”output” type=”tTo”/>
</xsd:sequence>
505 </xsd:complexType>
<!−− <callerId, input?> receiveMessage(groupId?, operationName) −−>
<xsd:element name=”receiveMessage” type=”tReceiveMessage”/>
<xsd:complexType name=”tReceiveMessage”>
<xsd:complexContent>
<xsd:extension base=”tActivity”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name=”input” type=”tInputReceiveMessage”/>
<xsd:element name=”output” type=”tOutputReceiveMessage”/>
</xsd:sequence>
515 </xsd:extension>
</xsd:complexContent>
</xsd:complexType>
<xsd:complexType name=”tInputReceiveMessage”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name=”groupId” type=”tFrom” minOccurs=”0”/>
<xsd:element name=”operationName” type=”tFrom”/>
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:complexType>
<xsd:complexType name=”tOutputReceiveMessage”>
525 <xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name=”callerId” type=”tFrom”/>
<xsd:element name=”input” type=”tFrom” minOccurs=”0”/>
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:complexType>
<!−− void reply(callerId, operationName, output?, faultName?) −−>
<xsd:element name=”reply” type=”tReply”/>
<xsd:complexType name=”tReply”>
<xsd:complexContent>
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<xsd:extension base=”tActivity”>
535 <xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name=”input” type=”tInputReply”/>
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:extension>
</xsd:complexContent>
</xsd:complexType>
<xsd:complexType name=”tInputReply”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name=”callerId” type=”tFrom”/>
<xsd:element name=”operationName” type=”tFrom”/>
545 <xsd:element name=”output” type=”tFrom” minOccurs=”0”/>
<xsd:element name=”faultName” type=”tFrom” minOccurs=”0”/>
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:complexType>
<!−− Event Management Primitives −−>
<!−− void event(groupId?, eventName, input?) −−>
<xsd:element name=”event” type=”tEvent”/>
<xsd:complexType name=”tEvent”>
<xsd:complexContent>
<xsd:extension base=”tActivity”>
555 <xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name=”input” type=”tInputEvent”/>
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:extension>
</xsd:complexContent>
</xsd:complexType>
<xsd:complexType name=”tInputEvent”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name=”groupId” type=”tFrom” minOccurs=”0”/>
<xsd:element name=”eventName” type=”tFrom”/>
565 <xsd:element name=”input” type=”tFrom” minOccurs=”0”/>
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:complexType>
<!−− <callerId, input?> receiveEvent(groupId?, eventName) −−>
<xsd:element name=”receiveEvent” type=”tReceiveEvent”/>
<xsd:complexType name=”tReceiveEvent”>
<xsd:complexContent>
<xsd:extension base=”tActivity”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name=”input” type=”tInputReceiveEvent”/>
575 <xsd:element name=”output” type=”tOutputReceiveEvent”/>
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:extension>
</xsd:complexContent>
</xsd:complexType>
<xsd:complexType name=”tInputReceiveEvent”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name=”groupId” type=”tFrom” minOccurs=”0”/>
<xsd:element name=”eventName” type=”tFrom”/>
</xsd:sequence>
585 </xsd:complexType>
<xsd:complexType name=”tOutputReceiveEvent”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name=”callerId” type=”tFrom”/>
<xsd:element name=”input” type=”tFrom” minOccurs=”0”/>
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:complexType>
<!−− void subscribe(eventName?, groupId?) −−>
<xsd:element name=”subscribe” type=”tSubscribe”/>
<xsd:complexType name=”tSubscribe”>
595 <xsd:complexContent>
<xsd:extension base=”tActivity”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name=”input” type=”tInputSubscribe”
minOccurs=”0”/>
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:extension>
</xsd:complexContent>
</xsd:complexType>
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<xsd:complexType name=”tInputSubscribe”>
<xsd:sequence>
605 <xsd:element name=”eventName” type=”tFrom” minOccurs=”0”/>
<xsd:element name=”groupId” type=”tFrom” minOccurs=”0”/>
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:complexType>
<!−− void unsubscribe(eventName?, groupId?) −−>
<xsd:element name=”unsubscribe” type=”tUnsubscribe”/>
<xsd:complexType name=”tUnsubscribe”>
<xsd:complexContent>
<xsd:extension base=”tActivity”>
<xsd:sequence>
615 <xsd:element name=”input” type=”tInputUnsubscribe”
minOccurs=”0”/>
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:extension>
</xsd:complexContent>
</xsd:complexType>
<xsd:complexType name=”tInputUnsubscribe”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name=”eventName” type=”tFrom” minOccurs=”0”/>
<xsd:element name=”groupId” type=”tFrom” minOccurs=”0”/>
</xsd:sequence>
625 </xsd:complexType>
<!−− End of primitives definition. −−>
<xsd:element name=”empty” type=”tEmpty”/>
<xsd:complexType name=”tEmpty”>
<xsd:complexContent>
<xsd:extension base=”tActivity”/>
</xsd:complexContent>
</xsd:complexType>
<xsd:element name=”assign” type=”tAssign”/>
<xsd:complexType name=”tAssign”>
635 <xsd:complexContent>
<xsd:extension base=”tActivity”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element ref=”copy” maxOccurs=”unbounded”/>
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:extension>
</xsd:complexContent>
</xsd:complexType>
<xsd:element name=”copy” type=”tCopy”/>
<xsd:complexType name=”tCopy”>
645 <xsd:complexContent>
<xsd:extension base=”tExtensibleElements”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element ref=”from”/>
<xsd:element ref=”to”/>
</xsd:sequence>
<xsd:attribute name=”keepSrcElementName” type=”tBoolean”
use=”optional” default=”no”/>
<xsd:attribute name=”ignoreMissingFromData” type=”tBoolean”
use=”optional” default=”no”/>
</xsd:extension>
</xsd:complexContent>
655 </xsd:complexType>
<xsd:simpleType name=”tBoolean”>
<xsd:restriction base=”xsd:string”>
<xsd:enumeration value=”yes”/>
<xsd:enumeration value=”no”/>
</xsd:restriction>
</xsd:simpleType>
<xsd:element name=”from” type=”tFrom”/>
<xsd:complexType name=”tFrom” mixed=”true”>
<xsd:sequence>
665 <xsd:element ref=”documentation” minOccurs=”0” maxOccurs=”unbounded”/>
<xsd:any namespace=”##other” processContents=”lax” minOccurs=”0”
maxOccurs=”unbounded”/>
<xsd:choice minOccurs=”0”>
<xsd:element ref=”literal”/>
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<xsd:element ref=”query”/>
</xsd:choice>
</xsd:sequence>
<xsd:attribute name=”expressionLanguage” type=”xsd:anyURI”/>
<xsd:attribute name=”variable” type=”VariableName”/>
<xsd:attribute name=”part” type=”xsd:NCName”/>
675 <xsd:anyAttribute namespace=”##other” processContents=”lax”/>
</xsd:complexType>
<xsd:element name=”literal” type=”tLiteral”/>
<xsd:complexType name=”tLiteral” mixed=”true”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:any namespace=”##any” processContents=”lax” minOccurs=”0”/>
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:complexType>
<xsd:element name=”query” type=”tQuery”/>
<xsd:complexType name=”tQuery” mixed=”true”>
685 <xsd:sequence>
<xsd:any processContents=”lax” minOccurs=”0” maxOccurs=”unbounded”/>
</xsd:sequence>
<xsd:attribute name=”queryLanguage” type=”xsd:anyURI”/>
<xsd:anyAttribute namespace=”##other” processContents=”lax”/>
</xsd:complexType>
<xsd:element name=”to” type=”tTo”/>
<xsd:complexType name=”tTo” mixed=”true”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element ref=”documentation” minOccurs=”0” maxOccurs=”unbounded”/>
695 <xsd:any namespace=”##other” processContents=”lax” minOccurs=”0”
maxOccurs=”unbounded”/>
<xsd:element ref=”query” minOccurs=”0”/>
</xsd:sequence>
<xsd:attribute name=”expressionLanguage” type=”xsd:anyURI”/>
<xsd:attribute name=”variable” type=”VariableName”/>
<xsd:attribute name=”part” type=”xsd:NCName”/>
<xsd:anyAttribute namespace=”##other” processContents=”lax”/>
</xsd:complexType>
<xsd:element name=”wait” type=”tWait”/>
<xsd:complexType name=”tWait”>
705 <xsd:complexContent>
<xsd:extension base=”tActivity”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:choice>
<xsd:element ref=”for” minOccurs=”0”/>
<xsd:element ref=”until” minOccurs=”0”/>
<xsd:element ref=”repeatEvery” minOccurs=”0”/>
</xsd:choice>
<!−−<xsd:element ref=”repeatEvery” minOccurs=”0”/>−−>
<!−− The repeatEvery element can only be defined for
informationHandler branches −−>
715 </xsd:sequence>
</xsd:extension>
</xsd:complexContent>
</xsd:complexType>
<xsd:element name=”for” type=”tDuration−expr”/>
<xsd:element name=”until” type=”tDeadline−expr”/>
<xsd:element name=”repeatEvery” type=”tDuration−expr”/>
<xsd:complexType name=”tDuration−expr” mixed=”true”>
<xsd:complexContent mixed=”true”>
<xsd:extension base=”tExpression”/>
725 </xsd:complexContent>
</xsd:complexType>
<xsd:complexType name=”tDeadline−expr” mixed=”true”>
<xsd:complexContent mixed=”true”>
<xsd:extension base=”tExpression”/>
</xsd:complexContent>
</xsd:complexType>
<xsd:complexType name=”tExpression” mixed=”true”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:any processContents=”lax” minOccurs=”0” maxOccurs=”unbounded”/>
735 </xsd:sequence>
<xsd:attribute name=”expressionLanguage” type=”xsd:anyURI”/>
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<xsd:anyAttribute namespace=”##other” processContents=”lax”/>
</xsd:complexType>
<xsd:element name=”throw” type=”tThrow”/>
<xsd:complexType name=”tThrow”>
<xsd:complexContent>
<xsd:extension base=”tActivity”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name=”input” type=”tInputThrow”/>
745 </xsd:sequence>
</xsd:extension>
</xsd:complexContent>
</xsd:complexType>
<xsd:complexType name=”tInputThrow”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name=”faultName” type=”tFrom”/>
<xsd:element name=”faultVariable” type=”tFrom” minOccurs=”0”/>
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:complexType>
755 <xsd:element name=”catch” type=”tCatch”/>
<xsd:complexType name=”tCatch”>
<xsd:complexContent>
<xsd:extension base=”tActivityContainer”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name=”input” type=”tInputCatch”/>
<xsd:element name=”output” type=”tOutputCatch”
minOccurs=”0”/>
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:extension>
</xsd:complexContent>
765 </xsd:complexType>
<xsd:complexType name=”tInputCatch”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name=”faultName” type=”tFrom”/>
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:complexType>
<xsd:complexType name=”tOutputCatch”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name=”faultVariable” type=”tTo”/>
</xsd:sequence>
775 </xsd:complexType>
<xsd:complexType name=”tActivityContainer”>
<xsd:complexContent>
<xsd:extension base=”tExtensibleElements”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:group ref=”activity”/>
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:extension>
</xsd:complexContent>
</xsd:complexType>
785 <xsd:element name=”catchAll” type=”tCatchAll”/>
<xsd:complexType name=”tCatchAll”>
<xsd:complexContent>
<xsd:extension base=”tActivityContainer”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name=”output” type=”tOutputCatchAll”
minOccurs=”0”/>
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:extension>
</xsd:complexContent>
</xsd:complexType>
795 <xsd:complexType name=”tOutputCatchAll”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name=”faultName” type=”tTo”/>
<xsd:element name=”faultVariable” type=”tTo” minOccurs=”0”/>
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:complexType>
<xsd:element name=”exit” type=”tExit”/>
<xsd:complexType name=”tExit”>
<xsd:complexContent>
<xsd:extension base=”tActivity”/>
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805 </xsd:complexContent>
</xsd:complexType>
<!−− End of basic commands definition. −−>
<!−− Start of structured commands definition. −−>
<xsd:element name=”sequence” type=”tSequence”/>
<xsd:complexType name=”tSequence”>
<xsd:complexContent>
<xsd:extension base=”tActivity”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:group ref=”activity” maxOccurs=”unbounded”/>
815 </xsd:sequence>
</xsd:extension>
</xsd:complexContent>
</xsd:complexType>
<xsd:element name=”flow” type=”tFlow”/>
<xsd:complexType name=”tFlow”>
<xsd:complexContent>
<xsd:extension base=”tActivity”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:group ref=”activity” maxOccurs=”unbounded”/>
825 </xsd:sequence>
</xsd:extension>
</xsd:complexContent>
</xsd:complexType>
<xsd:element name=”while” type=”tWhile”/>
<xsd:complexType name=”tWhile”>
<xsd:complexContent>
<xsd:extension base=”tActivity”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element ref=”condition”/>
835 <xsd:group ref=”activity”/>
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:extension>
</xsd:complexContent>
</xsd:complexType>
<xsd:element name=”condition” type=”tBoolean−expr”/>
<xsd:complexType name=”tBoolean−expr” mixed=”true”>
<xsd:complexContent mixed=”true”>
<xsd:extension base=”tExpression”/>
</xsd:complexContent>
845 </xsd:complexType>
<xsd:element name=”repeatUntil” type=”tRepeatUntil”/>
<xsd:complexType name=”tRepeatUntil”>
<xsd:complexContent>
<xsd:extension base=”tActivity”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:group ref=”activity”/>
<xsd:element ref=”condition”/>
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:extension>
855 </xsd:complexContent>
</xsd:complexType>
<xsd:element name=”if” type=”tIf”/>
<xsd:complexType name=”tIf”>
<xsd:complexContent>
<xsd:extension base=”tActivity”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element ref=”condition”/>
<xsd:group ref=”activity”/>
<xsd:element ref=”else” minOccurs=”0”/>
865 </xsd:sequence>
</xsd:extension>
</xsd:complexContent>
</xsd:complexType>
<xsd:element name=”else” type=”tActivityContainer”/>
<xsd:element name=”pick” type=”tPick”/>
<xsd:complexType name=”tPick”>
<xsd:complexContent>
<xsd:extension base=”tActivity”>
<xsd:sequence>
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875 <xsd:element ref=”onMessage” minOccurs=”0”
maxOccurs=”unbounded”/>
<xsd:element ref=”onEvent” minOccurs=”0”
maxOccurs=”unbounded”/>
<xsd:element ref=”onAlarm” minOccurs=”0”
maxOccurs=”unbounded”/>
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:extension>
</xsd:complexContent>
</xsd:complexType>
<xsd:element name=”onMessage” type=”tOnMessage”/>
<xsd:complexType name=”tOnMessage”>
<xsd:complexContent>
885 <xsd:extension base=”tActivityContainer”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element ref=”receiveMessage”/>
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:extension>
</xsd:complexContent>
</xsd:complexType>
<xsd:element name=”onEvent” type=”tOnEvent”/>
<xsd:complexType name=”tOnEvent”>
<xsd:complexContent>
895 <xsd:extension base=”tActivityContainer”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element ref=”receiveEvent”/>
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:extension>
</xsd:complexContent>
</xsd:complexType>
<xsd:element name=”onAlarm” type=”tOnAlarm”/>
<xsd:complexType name=”tOnAlarm”>
<xsd:complexContent>
905 <xsd:extension base=”tActivityContainer”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element ref=”wait”/>
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:extension>
</xsd:complexContent>
</xsd:complexType>
<xsd:element name=”informationHandler” type=”tInformationHandler”/>
<xsd:complexType name=”tInformationHandler”>
<xsd:complexContent>
915 <xsd:extension base=”tActivity”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:group ref=”activity”/>
<xsd:element ref=”onMessage” minOccurs=”0”
maxOccurs=”unbounded”/>
<xsd:element ref=”onEvent” minOccurs=”0”
maxOccurs=”unbounded”/>
<xsd:element ref=”onAlarm” minOccurs=”0”
maxOccurs=”unbounded”/>
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:extension>
</xsd:complexContent>
</xsd:complexType>
925 <xsd:element name=”faultHandler” type=”tFaultHandler”/>
<xsd:complexType name=”tFaultHandler”>
<xsd:complexContent>
<xsd:extension base=”tActivity”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:group ref=”activity”/>
<xsd:element ref=”catch” minOccurs=”0”
maxOccurs=”unbounded”/>
<xsd:element ref=”catchAll” minOccurs=”0”/>
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:extension>
935 </xsd:complexContent>
</xsd:complexType>
<!−− End of structured commands definition. −−>
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<!−− Begin of data types definition −−>
<xsd:element name=”Credential” type=”Credential”/>
<xsd:complexType name=”Credential”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name=”smeppkey” type=”tSmeppKey”/>
<xsd:element name=”groupkeys” type=”tSmeppKey” maxOccurs=”unbounded”/>
</xsd:sequence>
945 <xsd:attribute name=”expressionLanguage” type=”xsd:anyURI”/>
<xsd:attribute name=”variable” type=”VariableName”/>
<xsd:attribute name=”part” type=”xsd:NCName”/>
<xsd:anyAttribute namespace=”##other” processContents=”lax”/>
</xsd:complexType>
<xsd:complexType name=”tSmeppKey”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name=”name” type=”xsd:string”/>
<xsd:element name=”pwd” type=”xsd:string”/>
</xsd:sequence>
955 </xsd:complexType>
<xsd:element name=”GroupDescription” type=”GroupDescription”/>
<xsd:complexType name=”GroupDescription”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name=”groupName” type=”xsd:string”/>
</xsd:sequence>
<xsd:attribute name=”expressionLanguage” type=”xsd:anyURI”/>
<xsd:attribute name=”variable” type=”VariableName”/>
<xsd:attribute name=”part” type=”xsd:NCName”/>
<xsd:anyAttribute namespace=”##other” processContents=”lax”/>
965 </xsd:complexType>
<xsd:element name=”ID” type=”ID”/>
<xsd:complexType name=”ID”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name=”peerId” type=”PeerID” minOccurs=”0”/>
<xsd:element name=”groupId” type=”GroupID” minOccurs=”0”/>
<xsd:element name=”sessionId” type=”SessionID” minOccurs=”0”/>
<xsd:element name=”groupServiceId” type=”GroupServiceID” minOccurs=”0”/>
<xsd:element name=”peerServiceId” type=”PeerServiceID” minOccurs=”0”/>
</xsd:sequence>
975 </xsd:complexType>
<xsd:complexType name=”PeerID”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name=”opaquePID” type=”xsd:string”/>
</xsd:sequence>
<xsd:attribute name=”expressionLanguage” type=”xsd:anyURI”/>
<xsd:attribute name=”variable” type=”VariableName”/>
<xsd:attribute name=”part” type=”xsd:NCName”/>
<xsd:anyAttribute namespace=”##other” processContents=”lax”/>
</xsd:complexType>
985 <xsd:complexType name=”GroupID”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name=”opaqueGID” type=”xsd:string”/>
</xsd:sequence>
<xsd:attribute name=”expressionLanguage” type=”xsd:anyURI”/>
<xsd:attribute name=”variable” type=”VariableName”/>
<xsd:attribute name=”part” type=”xsd:NCName”/>
<xsd:anyAttribute namespace=”##other” processContents=”lax”/>
</xsd:complexType>
<xsd:complexType name=”GroupServiceID”>
995 <xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name=”opaqueGSID” type=”xsd:string”/>
</xsd:sequence>
<xsd:attribute name=”expressionLanguage” type=”xsd:anyURI”/>
<xsd:attribute name=”variable” type=”VariableName”/>
<xsd:attribute name=”part” type=”xsd:NCName”/>
<xsd:anyAttribute namespace=”##other” processContents=”lax”/>
</xsd:complexType>
<xsd:complexType name=”PeerServiceID”>
<xsd:sequence>
1005 <xsd:element name=”opaquePSID” type=”xsd:string”/>
</xsd:sequence>
<xsd:attribute name=”expressionLanguage” type=”xsd:anyURI”/>
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<xsd:attribute name=”variable” type=”VariableName”/>
<xsd:attribute name=”part” type=”xsd:NCName”/>
<xsd:anyAttribute namespace=”##other” processContents=”lax”/>
</xsd:complexType>
<xsd:complexType name=”SessionID”>
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name=”opaqueSSID” type=”xsd:string”/>
1015 </xsd:sequence>
<xsd:attribute name=”expressionLanguage” type=”xsd:anyURI”/>
<xsd:attribute name=”variable” type=”VariableName”/>
<xsd:attribute name=”part” type=”xsd:NCName”/>
<xsd:anyAttribute namespace=”##other” processContents=”lax”/>
</xsd:complexType>
<!−− End of data types definition −−>
</xsd:schema>
Appendix B
Application example
B.1 SMoL code
B.1.1 TempReaderPeer’s code
<?xml version=”1.0” encoding=”UTF−8”?>
<process targetNamespace=”” name=”NCName” xsi:schemaLocation=”http://SMoL.SMEPP.org
SMoLv21.xsd” xmlns=”http://SMoL.SMEPP.org”
xmlns:xsi=”http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema−instance”>
<variables>
<variable name=”myCredentials” type=”Credential”/>
<variable name=”tempGroupId” type=”GroupID”/>
<variable name=”temp5s” type=”Input”/>
8 <variable name=”temp10s” type=”Input”/>
<variable name=”temp” type=”Input”/>
</variables>
<sequence>
<assign>
<copy>
<from>
<literal>
<Credential>
18 <smeppkey>
<name>SMEPPKEY</name>
<pwd>SMEPPPWD</pwd>
</smeppkey>
<groupkeys>
<name>TempReaderGroup</name>
<pwd>MyGroupNamePassword</pwd>
</groupkeys>
</Credential>
</literal>
28 </from>
<to variable=”myCredentials”/>
</copy>
</assign>
<newPeer>
<input>
<credentials variable=”myCredentials”/>
</input>
</newPeer>
38
<createGroup>
<input>
<groupDescription>
<literal>
<GroupDescription>
<groupName>TempReaderGroup</groupName>
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</GroupDescription>
</literal>
</groupDescription>
48 </input>
<output>
<groupId variable=”tempGroupId”/>
</output>
</createGroup>
<flow>
<while>
<condition>true</condition>
<sequence>
58 <assign>
<copy>
<from>
<literal>
<Input>new
Long(System.currentTimeMillis())</Input>
</literal>
</from>
<to variable=”temp5s”></to>
</copy>
</assign>
68
<event>
<input>
<groupId variable=”tempGroupId”/>
<eventName><literal><String>temp5s</String></literal></eventName>
<input><literal><Input>TempReaderPeerBDataTable.temp</Input></literal></input>
</input>
</event>
<wait>
<for>PT5S</for>
78 </wait>
</sequence>
</while>
<while>
<condition>true</condition>
<sequence>
<assign>
<copy>
<from>
<literal>
88 <Input>new
Long(System.currentTimeMillis())</Input>
</literal>
</from>
<to variable=”temp10s”></to>
</copy>
</assign>
<event>
<input>
<groupId variable=”tempGroupId”/>
98 <eventName><literal><String>temp10s</String></literal></eventName>
<input><literal><Input>TempReaderPeerBDataTable.temp</Input></literal></input>
</input>
</event>
<wait>
<for>PT10S</for>
</wait>
</sequence>
</while>
</flow>
108
</sequence>
</process>
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B.1.2 ClientPeer1’s code
<?xml version=”1.0” encoding=”UTF−8”?>
<process targetNamespace=”” name=”NCName” xsi:schemaLocation=”http://SMoL.SMEPP.org
SMoLv21.xsd” xmlns=”http://SMoL.SMEPP.org”
xmlns:xsi=”http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema−instance”>
<variables>
<variable name=”myCredentials” type=”Credential”/>
<variable name=”tempGroupId” type=”GroupID”/>
<variable name=”temp5s” type=”Input”/>
<variable name=”temp10s” type=”Input”/>
9 <variable name=”temp” type=”Input”/>
<variable name=”gidArray” type=”GroupIDArray”/>
<variable name=”caller event” type=”CallerID”/>
</variables>
<sequence>
<assign>
<copy>
<from>
<literal>
19 <Credential>
<smeppkey>
<name>SMEPPKEY</name>
<pwd>SMEPPPWD</pwd>
</smeppkey>
<groupkeys>
<name>TempReaderGroup</name>
<pwd>MyGroupNamePassword</pwd>
</groupkeys>
</Credential>
29 </literal>
</from>
<to variable=”myCredentials”/>
</copy>
</assign>
<newPeer>
<input>
<credentials variable=”myCredentials”/>
</input>
39 </newPeer>
<getGroups>
<input>
<groupDescription>
<literal>
<GroupDescription>
<groupName>TempReaderGroup</groupName>
</GroupDescription>
</literal>
49 </groupDescription>
</input>
<output>
<groupIdArray variable=”gidArray”/>
</output>
</getGroups>
<joinGroup>
<input>
<groupId variable=”gidArray”><query>/gidArray[0]</query></groupId>
59 <credentials variable=”myCredentials”/>
</input>
</joinGroup>
<subscribe>
<input>
<eventName><literal><String>temp5s</String></literal></eventName>
<groupId variable=”gidArray”><query>/gidArray[0]</query></groupId>
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</input>
</subscribe>
69
<informationHandler>
<sequence>
<wait>
<for>PT1H</for>
</wait>
<unsubscribe></unsubscribe>
</sequence>
<onEvent>
<!−− use the event load for smtgh −−>
79 <sequence>
<empty></empty>
</sequence>
<receiveEvent>
<input>
<groupId
variable=”gidArray”><query>/gidArray[0]</query></groupId>
<eventName><literal><String>temp5s</String></literal></eventName>
</input>
<output>
<callerId variable=”caller event”/>
89 <input variable=”temp10s”/>
</output>
</receiveEvent>
</onEvent>
</informationHandler>
</sequence>
</process>
B.1.3 ClientPeer2’s code
<?xml version=”1.0” encoding=”UTF−8”?>
2 <process targetNamespace=”” name=”NCName” xsi:schemaLocation=”http://SMoL.SMEPP.org
SMoLv21.xsd” xmlns=”http://SMoL.SMEPP.org”
xmlns:xsi=”http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema−instance”>
<variables>
<variable name=”myCredentials” type=”Credential”/>
<variable name=”tempGroupId” type=”GroupID”/>
<variable name=”temp” type=”Input”/>
<variable name=”gidArray” type=”GroupIDArray”/>
<variable name=”psid” type=”PeerServiceID”/>
<variable name=”gsid” type=”GroupServiceID”/>
</variables>
12
<sequence>
<assign>
<copy>
<from>
<literal>
<Credential>
<smeppkey>
<name>SMEPPKEY</name>
<pwd>SMEPPPWD</pwd>
22 </smeppkey>
<groupkeys>
<name>TempReaderGroup</name>
<pwd>MyGroupNamePassword</pwd>
</groupkeys>
</Credential>
</literal>
</from>
<to variable=”myCredentials”/>
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</copy>
32 </assign>
<newPeer>
<input>
<credentials variable=”myCredentials”/>
</input>
</newPeer>
<getGroups>
<input>
42 <groupDescription>
<literal>
<GroupDescription>
<groupName>TempReaderGroup</groupName>
</GroupDescription>
</literal>
</groupDescription>
</input>
<output>
<groupIdArray variable=”gidArray”/>
52 </output>
</getGroups>
<joinGroup>
<input>
<groupId variable=”gidArray”><query>/gidArray[0]</query></groupId>
<credentials variable=”myCredentials”/>
</input>
</joinGroup>
62 <publish>
<input>
<groupId variable=”gidArray”><query>/gidArray[0]</query></groupId>
<serviceContract><literal>./ClientService2.xml</literal></serviceContract>
</input>
<output>
<groupServiceId variable=”gsid”></groupServiceId>
<peerServiceId variable=”psid”></peerServiceId>
</output>
</publish>
72 <invoke>
<input>
<entityId variable=”psid”/>
<operationName><literal><String>monitor</String></literal></operationName>
<input><literal><Input>ClientPeer2BDataTable.gidArray[0]</Input></literal></input>
</input>
<output>
<output variable =”temp”/>
</output>
</invoke>
82
</sequence>
</process>
B.1.4 ClientService’s code
<?xml version=”1.0” encoding=”UTF−8”?>
<Contract xmlns:xsi=”http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema−instance”
xsi:schemaLocation=”http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema Contract.xsd”
xmlns:sign=”http://www.w3.org/ns/wsdl” xmlns:smol=”http://SMoL.SMEPP.org”
5 xmlns=”http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema”>
<Signature>
<service name=”ClientService2” type=”state−less” category=”unknown”/>
<sign:description>
<sign:types/>
<sign:interface name=”ClientService2”>
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<sign:operation name=”monitor”>
<sign:input messageLabel=”gr” element=”groupId”/>
<sign:output messageLabel=”temp” element=”Input”/>
</sign:operation>
15 </sign:interface>
</sign:description>
</Signature>
<Grounding>
<!−−<Parameters>
<param name=”protocol” type=”xsi:string”>RMI</param>
<param name=”encryptation” type=”xsi:string”>MD5</param>
</Parameters>−−>
</Grounding>
25
<Behavior>
<smol:process targetNamespace=”” name=”NCName”
xsi:schemaLocation=”http://SMoL.SMEPP.org SMoLv21.xsd”
xmlns=”http://SMoL.SMEPP.org”
xmlns:xsi=”http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema−instance”>
<smol:variables>
<smol:variable name=”callerId” type=”CallerID”/>
<smol:variable name=”temp” type=”Input”/>
<smol:variable name=”caller temp” type=”CallerID”/>
<smol:variable name=”temp10s” type=”Input”/>
<smol:variable name=”gid” type=”GroupID”/>
</smol:variables>
35
<smol:sequence>
<smol:receiveMessage>
<smol:input>
<smol:operationName><smol:literal><smol:String>monitor</smol:String></smol:literal></smol:operationName>
</smol:input>
<smol:output>
<smol:callerId variable=”callerId”/>
<smol:input variable=”temp”/>
45 </smol:output>
</smol:receiveMessage>
<smol:getPublishingGroup>
<smol:output>
<smol:groupId variable=”gid”/>
</smol:output>
</smol:getPublishingGroup>
<smol:subscribe>
55 <smol:input>
<smol:eventName><literal><String>temp10s</String></literal></smol:eventName>
<smol:groupId variable=”gid”/>
</smol:input>
</smol:subscribe>
<smol:informationHandler>
<smol:sequence>
<smol:wait>
<smol:for>PT30S</smol:for>
65 </smol:wait>
<smol:unsubscribe>
<smol:input>
<smol:eventName><literal><String>temp10s</String></literal></smol:eventName>
<smol:groupId variable=”gid”/>
</smol:input>
</smol:unsubscribe>
</smol:sequence>
<smol:onEvent>
<sequence><empty></empty></sequence>
75 <!−− use the event load for smtgh −−>
<smol:receiveEvent>
<smol:input>
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<smol:groupId variable=”gid”/>
<smol:eventName><literal><String>temp10s</String></literal></smol:eventName>
</smol:input>
<smol:output>
<smol:callerId variable=”caller temp”/>
<smol:input variable=”temp10s”/>
</smol:output>
85 </smol:receiveEvent>
</smol:onEvent>
</smol:informationHandler>
<smol:reply>
<smol:input>
<smol:callerId variable=”callerId”/>
<smol:operationName><smol:literal><smol:String>monitor</smol:String></smol:literal></smol:operationName>
<smol:output><literal><Input>new
String(”anyOutputPossible”)</Input></literal></smol:output>
</smol:input>
95 </smol:reply>
</smol:sequence>
</smol:process>
</Behavior>
</Contract>
B.2 Java code
B.2.1 TempReaderPeer’s generated code
Root FaultHandler
import java.util.Vector;
import java.util.Iterator;
import peer.*;
import peer.managers.services.*;
import sMoLTranslated.*;
import utils.*;
import utils.exceptions.*;
import utils.ids.*;
9
public class TempReaderPeerBRootFH extends FaultHandler{
public TempReaderPeerBRootFH instance;
public TempReaderPeerBRootFH(SMEPPCaller cal){
instance = this;
super.setCatches(new Vector());
super.getCatches().add(new Catch(true,null));
19 this.execute(cal);
if(this.getContainer() instanceof Peer){
this.execute(this);
}
}
public void execute(SMEPPCaller cal){
super.setCaller(cal);
}
29 public void execute(ThreadedCommand parent) {
//a temp Pair variable is declared in order to use primitive’s return composed type (having more than one
value)
//it is a temporary variable which purpose is to save the primitive’s return value into the output specified in
the xml
Pair tempPair = null;
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TempReaderPeerBDataTable.myCredentials = new Credential(new SMEPPKey(”SMEPPKEY”,”
SMEPPPWD”),
new SMEPPKey[]{new SMEPPKey(”TempReaderGroup”,”MyGroupNamePassword”)});
peer.Primitives.getPrimitives().newPeer(TempReaderPeerBDataTable.myCredentials,instance);
TempReaderPeerBDataTable.tempGroupId =
39 peer.Primitives.getPrimitives().createGroup(new GroupDescription(”TempReaderGroup”),
instance);
TempReaderPeerBFlow11 TempReaderPeerBfl11 = new TempReaderPeerBFlow11(instance);
TempReaderPeerBfl11.start();
TempReaderPeerBFlow12 TempReaderPeerBfl12 = new TempReaderPeerBFlow12(instance);
TempReaderPeerBfl12.start();
try{TempReaderPeerBfl11.join();}
catch(InterruptedException e){e.printStackTrace();}
try{TempReaderPeerBfl12.join();}
catch(InterruptedException e){e.printStackTrace();}
}
49
synchronized public void forwardFault(Fault f) {
super.setStopped(true);
boolean catched = false;
Iterator it = super.getCatches().iterator();
if(!catched && it.hasNext()){
catched=true;
Catch c = (Catch) it.next();
if(c.isAll() || c.getFault().getName().equals(f.getName())){
System.out.println(f.getName()+” caught”);
59 //catch main command
System.exit(1);
}
}
}
}
DataTable
import peer.*;
import peer.managers.services.*;
import sMoLTranslated.*;
import utils.*;
5 import utils.exceptions.*;
import utils.ids.*;
public class TempReaderPeerBDataTable {
private static TempReaderPeerBDataTable instance;
public static Credential myCredentials;
public static GroupID tempGroupId;
public static Input temp5s;
public static Input temp10s;
15 public static Input temp;
private TempReaderPeerBDataTable(){
}
public static TempReaderPeerBDataTable getDataTable(){
if(instance == null){
instance = new TempReaderPeerBDataTable();
}
25 return instance;
}
}
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Branch 1 flow
import java.util.Vector;
2 import java.util.Iterator;
import peer.*;
import peer.managers.services.*;
import sMoLTranslated.*;
import utils.*;
import utils.exceptions.*;
import utils.ids.*;
public class TempReaderPeerBFlow11 extends Flow{
12 public TempReaderPeerBFlow11 instance;
public TempReaderPeerBFlow11(ThreadedCommand parent){
super.setUpperCmd(parent);
instance = this;
}
public void execute(ThreadedCommand parent) {
//a temp Pair variable is declared in order to use primitive’s return composed type (having more than one
value)
22 //it is a temporary variable which purpose is to save the primitive’s return value into the output specified in
the xml
Pair tempPair = null;
while(true){
TempReaderPeerBDataTable.temp5s = new Input(new Long(System.currentTimeMillis()));
peer.Primitives.getPrimitives().event(TempReaderPeerBDataTable.tempGroupId,”temp5s”,new Input(
TempReaderPeerBDataTable.temp),instance);
try{Thread.sleep(parser.SMoLParser.translateXPathDuration(”PT5S”));}
catch(InterruptedException e){e.printStackTrace();}
}
32 }
public void run(){
execute(super.getUpperCmd());
}
}
Branch 2 flow
import java.util.Vector;
import java.util.Iterator;
3 import peer.*;
import peer.managers.services.*;
import sMoLTranslated.*;
import utils.*;
import utils.exceptions.*;
import utils.ids.*;
public class TempReaderPeerBFlow12 extends Flow{
public TempReaderPeerBFlow12 instance;
13
public TempReaderPeerBFlow12(ThreadedCommand parent){
super.setUpperCmd(parent);
instance = this;
}
public void execute(ThreadedCommand parent) {
//a temp Pair variable is declared in order to use primitive’s return composed type (having more than one
value)
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//it is a temporary variable which purpose is to save the primitive’s return value into the output specified in
the xml
23 Pair tempPair = null;
while(true){
TempReaderPeerBDataTable.temp10s = new Input(new Long(System.currentTimeMillis()));
peer.Primitives.getPrimitives().event(TempReaderPeerBDataTable.tempGroupId,”temp10s”,new Input(
TempReaderPeerBDataTable.temp),instance);
try{Thread.sleep(parser.SMoLParser.translateXPathDuration(”PT10S”));}
catch(InterruptedException e){e.printStackTrace();}
}
}
33
public void run(){
execute(super.getUpperCmd());
}
}
B.2.2 ClientPeer1’s generated code
Root FaultHander
import java.util.Vector;
import java.util.Iterator;
3 import peer.*;
import peer.managers.services.*;
import sMoLTranslated.*;
import utils.*;
import utils.exceptions.*;
import utils.ids.*;
public class ClientPeer1BRootFH extends FaultHandler{
public ClientPeer1BRootFH instance;
13
public ClientPeer1BRootFH(SMEPPCaller cal){
instance = this;
super.setCatches(new Vector());
super.getCatches().add(new Catch(true,null));
this.execute(cal);
if(this.getContainer() instanceof Peer){
this.execute(this);
}
23 }
public void execute(SMEPPCaller cal){
super.setCaller(cal);
}
public void execute(ThreadedCommand parent) {
//a temp Pair variable is declared in order to use primitive’s return composed type (having more than one
value)
//it is a temporary variable which purpose is to save the primitive’s return value into the output specified in
the xml
33 Pair tempPair = null;
ClientPeer1BDataTable.myCredentials = new Credential(new SMEPPKey(”SMEPPKEY”,”SMEPPPWD”),
new SMEPPKey[]{new SMEPPKey(”TempReaderGroup”,”MyGroupNamePassword”)});
peer.Primitives.getPrimitives().newPeer(ClientPeer1BDataTable.myCredentials,instance);
int i = 0;
while(i==0){
ClientPeer1BDataTable.gidArray = peer.Primitives.getPrimitives().getGroups(new GroupDescription(”
TempReaderGroup”),instance);
i = ClientPeer1BDataTable.gidArray.length;
try {Thread.sleep(1000);} catch (InterruptedException e) {e.printStackTrace();}
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}
43 peer.Primitives.getPrimitives().joinGroup(ClientPeer1BDataTable.gidArray[0],ClientPeer1BDataTable.
myCredentials,instance);
peer.Primitives.getPrimitives().subscribe(”temp5s”,ClientPeer1BDataTable.gidArray[0],instance);
ClientPeer1BIH11 ClientPeer1Bih11 = new ClientPeer1BIH11(instance);
}
synchronized public void forwardFault(Fault f) {
super.setStopped(true);
boolean catched = false;
Iterator it = super.getCatches().iterator();
if(!catched && it.hasNext()){
53 catched=true;
Catch c = (Catch) it.next();
if(c.isAll() || c.getFault().getName().equals(f.getName())){
System.out.println(f.getName()+” caught”);
//catch main command
System.exit(1);
}
}
}
63 }
DataTable
import peer.*;
import peer.managers.services.*;
import sMoLTranslated.*;
import utils.*;
import utils.exceptions.*;
import utils.ids.*;
7
public class ClientPeer1BDataTable {
private static ClientPeer1BDataTable instance;
public static Credential myCredentials;
public static GroupID tempGroupId;
public static Input temp5s;
public static Input temp10s;
public static Input temp;
public static GroupID[] gidArray;
17 public static CallerID caller event;
private ClientPeer1BDataTable(){
}
public static ClientPeer1BDataTable getDataTable(){
if(instance == null){
instance = new ClientPeer1BDataTable();
}
27 return instance;
}
}
InformationHandler root
import java.util.Vector;
import java.util.Iterator;
import peer.*;
import peer.managers.services.*;
import sMoLTranslated.*;
import utils.*;
import utils.exceptions.*;
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import utils.ids.*;
10 public class ClientPeer1BIH11 extends InformationHandler{
public ClientPeer1BIH11 instance;
public ClientPeer1BIH11(ThreadedCommand parent){
super.setUpperCmd(parent);
instance = this;
this.execute(super.getUpperCmd());
}
20 public void execute(ThreadedCommand parent) {
//a temp Pair variable is declared in order to use primitive’s return composed type (having more than one
value)
//it is a temporary variable which purpose is to save the primitive’s return value into the output specified in
the xml
Pair tempPair = null;
ClientPeer1BIH11Branch1 ClientPeer1Bih11b1 = new ClientPeer1BIH11Branch1(instance);
ClientPeer1Bih11b1.start();
try{Thread.sleep(parser.SMoLParser.translateXPathDuration(”PT1H”));}
catch(InterruptedException e){e.printStackTrace();}
30 peer.Primitives.getPrimitives().unsubscribe(instance);
super.setFinished();
}
}
InformationHandler branch 1
import lime.ILimeAgent;
import lime.LimeAgentMgr;
import lime.LimeThread;
import java.util.Vector;
import java.util.Iterator;
6 import peer.*;
import peer.managers.services.*;
import sMoLTranslated.*;
import utils.*;
import utils.exceptions.*;
import utils.ids.*;
public class ClientPeer1BIH11Branch1 extends LimeThread implements ILimeAgent {
public InformationHandler instance;
16
public ClientPeer1BIH11Branch1(InformationHandler p){
instance = p;
}
public void run(){
//a temp Pair variable is declared in order to use primitive’s return composed type (having more than one
value)
//it is a temporary variable which purpose is to save the primitive’s return value into the output specified in
the xml
Pair tempPair = null;
26 while(!instance.isFinished() || !instance.isStopped()){
//translation of the receiveEvent
tempPair = peer.Primitives.getPrimitives().receiveEvent(ClientPeer1BDataTable.gidArray[0],”temp5s”,
instance);
//check if a fault has been raised during the waiting period of this receiveEvent and returns if one has been
raised
if(instance.isStopped()) return;
ClientPeer1BDataTable.temp10s = (Input) tempPair.getSecond();
ClientPeer1BDataTable.caller event = (CallerID) tempPair.getFirst();
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//check if the informationHandler main command isn’t terminated or if a fault was raised
if(instance.isFinished() || instance.isStopped()) return;
36
//starts the thread which executes the receiveEvent’s command
ClientPeer1BIH11Branch1Cmd ClientPeer1Bih11b1cmd = new ClientPeer1BIH11Branch1Cmd(instance);
ClientPeer1Bih11b1cmd.start();
}
}
public LimeAgentMgr getMgr() {
return getParent().getMgr();
}
46 }
InformationHandler branch 1’s command
import lime.ILimeAgent;
import lime.LimeAgentMgr;
import lime.LimeThread;
4 import java.util.Vector;
import java.util.Iterator;
import peer.*;
import peer.managers.services.*;
import sMoLTranslated.*;
import utils.*;
import utils.exceptions.*;
import utils.ids.*;
public class ClientPeer1BIH11Branch1Cmd extends LimeThread implements ILimeAgent{
14
public InformationHandler instance;
public ClientPeer1BIH11Branch1Cmd(InformationHandler p){
instance = p ;
}
public void run(){
//a temp Pair variable is declared in order to use primitive’s return composed type (having more than one
value)
//it is a temporary variable which purpose is to save the primitive’s return value into the output specified in
the xml
24 Pair tempPair = null;
//empty operation
}
public LimeAgentMgr getMgr() {
return getParent().getMgr();
}
}
B.2.3 ClientPeer2’s generated code
Root FaultHandler
import java.util.Vector;
import java.util.Iterator;
import peer.*;
import peer.managers.services.*;
import sMoLTranslated.*;
import utils.*;
import utils.exceptions.*;
8 import utils.ids.*;
public class ClientPeer2BRootFH extends FaultHandler{
172 Chapter B
public ClientPeer2BRootFH instance;
public ClientPeer2BRootFH(SMEPPCaller cal){
instance = this;
super.setCatches(new Vector());
18 super.getCatches().add(new Catch(true,null));
this.execute(cal);
if(this.getContainer() instanceof Peer){
this.execute(this);
}
}
public void execute(SMEPPCaller cal){
super.setCaller(cal);
}
28
public void execute(ThreadedCommand parent) {
//a temp Pair variable is declared in order to use primitive’s return composed type (having more than one
value)
//it is a temporary variable which purpose is to save the primitive’s return value into the output specified in
the xml
Pair tempPair = null;
ClientPeer2BDataTable.myCredentials = new Credential(new SMEPPKey(”SMEPPKEY”,”SMEPPPWD”),
new SMEPPKey[]{new SMEPPKey(”TempReaderGroup”,”MyGroupNamePassword”)});
peer.Primitives.getPrimitives().newPeer(ClientPeer2BDataTable.myCredentials,instance);
int i = 0;
38 while(i==0){
ClientPeer2BDataTable.gidArray = peer.Primitives.getPrimitives().getGroups(new GroupDescription(”
TempReaderGroup”),instance);
i = ClientPeer2BDataTable.gidArray.length;
try {Thread.sleep(1000);} catch (InterruptedException e) {e.printStackTrace();}
}
peer.Primitives.getPrimitives().joinGroup(ClientPeer2BDataTable.gidArray[0],ClientPeer2BDataTable.
myCredentials,instance);
tempPair = peer.Primitives.getPrimitives().publish(ClientPeer2BDataTable.gidArray[0],new Contract(”./
ClientService2.xml”),instance);
ClientPeer2BDataTable.gsid = (GroupServiceID) tempPair.getFirst();
ClientPeer2BDataTable.psid = (PeerServiceID) tempPair.getSecond();
ClientPeer2BDataTable.temp = peer.Primitives.getPrimitives().invoke(ClientPeer2BDataTable.psid,”monitor”
,new Input(ClientPeer2BDataTable.gidArray[0]),instance);
48 //check if a fault has been raised during the waiting period of this invoke and returns if one has been raised
if(instance.isStopped()) return;
}
synchronized public void forwardFault(Fault f) {
super.setStopped(true);
boolean catched = false;
Iterator it = super.getCatches().iterator();
if(!catched && it.hasNext()){
catched=true;
58 Catch c = (Catch) it.next();
if(c.isAll() || c.getFault().getName().equals(f.getName())){
System.out.println(f.getName()+” caught”);
//catch main command
System.exit(1);
}
}
}
}
DataTable
import peer.*;
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import peer.managers.services.*;
3 import sMoLTranslated.*;
import utils.*;
import utils.exceptions.*;
import utils.ids.*;
public class ClientPeer2BDataTable {
private static ClientPeer2BDataTable instance;
public static Credential myCredentials;
public static GroupID tempGroupId;
13 public static Input temp;
public static GroupID[] gidArray;
public static PeerServiceID psid;
public static GroupServiceID gsid;
private ClientPeer2BDataTable(){
}
public static ClientPeer2BDataTable getDataTable(){
23 if(instance == null){
instance = new ClientPeer2BDataTable();
}
return instance;
}
}
B.2.4 ClientService’s generated code
Root FaultHandler
1 import java.util.Vector;
import java.util.Iterator;
import peer.*;
import peer.managers.services.*;
import sMoLTranslated.*;
import utils.*;
import utils.exceptions.*;
import utils.ids.*;
public class ClientService2RootFH extends FaultHandler{
11
public ClientService2RootFH instance;
public ClientService2RootFH(SMEPPCaller cal){
instance = this;
super.setCatches(new Vector());
super.getCatches().add(new Catch(true,null));
this.execute(cal);
if(this.getContainer() instanceof Peer){
21 this.execute(this);
}
}
public void execute(SMEPPCaller cal){
super.setCaller(cal);
}
public void execute(ThreadedCommand parent) {
31 //a temp Pair variable is declared in order to use primitive’s return composed type (having more than one
value)
//it is a temporary variable which purpose is to save the primitive’s return value into the output specified in
the xml
Pair tempPair = null;
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tempPair = peer.Primitives.getPrimitives().receiveMessage(”monitor”,instance);
//check if a fault has been raised during the waiting period of this receiveMessage and returns if one has been
raised
if(instance.isStopped() || tempPair == null) return;
ClientService2DataTable.temp = (Input) tempPair.getSecond();
ClientService2DataTable.callerId = (CallerID) tempPair.getFirst();
ClientService2DataTable.gid = peer.Primitives.getPrimitives().getPublishingGroup(instance);
41 peer.Primitives.getPrimitives().subscribe(”temp10s”,ClientService2DataTable.gid,instance);
ClientService2IH11 ClientService2ih11 = new ClientService2IH11(instance);
peer.Primitives.getPrimitives().reply(ClientService2DataTable.callerId,”monitor”,new Input(new String(”
anyOutputPossible”)),instance);
}
synchronized public void forwardFault(Fault f) {
super.setStopped(true);
boolean catched = false;
Iterator it = super.getCatches().iterator();
if(!catched && it.hasNext()){
51 catched=true;
Catch c = (Catch) it.next();
if(c.isAll() || c.getFault().getName().equals(f.getName())){
System.out.println(f.getName()+” caught”);
//catch main command
System.exit(1);
}
}
}
61 }
DataTable
import peer.*;
import peer.managers.services.*;
import sMoLTranslated.*;
import utils.*;
import utils.exceptions.*;
import utils.ids.*;
public class ClientService2DataTable {
9
private static ClientService2DataTable instance;
public static CallerID callerId;
public static Input temp;
public static CallerID caller temp;
public static Input temp10s;
public static GroupID gid;
private ClientService2DataTable(){
19 }
public static ClientService2DataTable getDataTable(){
if(instance == null){
instance = new ClientService2DataTable();
}
return instance;
}
}
InformationHandler’s root
import java.util.Vector;
2 import java.util.Iterator;
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import peer.*;
import peer.managers.services.*;
import sMoLTranslated.*;
import utils.*;
import utils.exceptions.*;
import utils.ids.*;
public class ClientService2IH11 extends InformationHandler{
12 public ClientService2IH11 instance;
public ClientService2IH11(ThreadedCommand parent){
super.setUpperCmd(parent);
instance = this;
this.execute(super.getUpperCmd());
}
public void execute(ThreadedCommand parent) {
22 //a temp Pair variable is declared in order to use primitive’s return composed type (having more than one
value)
//it is a temporary variable which purpose is to save the primitive’s return value into the output specified in
the xml
Pair tempPair = null;
ClientService2IH11Branch1 ClientService2ih11b1 = new ClientService2IH11Branch1(instance);
ClientService2ih11b1.start();
try{Thread.sleep(parser.SMoLParser.translateXPathDuration(”PT30S”));}
catch(InterruptedException e){e.printStackTrace();}
peer.Primitives.getPrimitives().unsubscribe(”temp10s”,ClientService2DataTable.gid,instance);
32 super.setFinished();
}
}
InformationHandler branch 1
import lime.ILimeAgent;
import lime.LimeAgentMgr;
import lime.LimeThread;
import java.util.Vector;
import java.util.Iterator;
6 import peer.*;
import peer.managers.services.*;
import sMoLTranslated.*;
import utils.*;
import utils.exceptions.*;
import utils.ids.*;
public class ClientService2IH11Branch1 extends LimeThread implements ILimeAgent {
public InformationHandler instance;
16
public ClientService2IH11Branch1(InformationHandler p){
instance = p;
}
public void run(){
//a temp Pair variable is declared in order to use primitive’s return composed type (having more than one
value)
//it is a temporary variable which purpose is to save the primitive’s return value into the output specified in
the xml
Pair tempPair = null;
26 while(!instance.isFinished() || !instance.isStopped()){
//translation of the receiveEvent
tempPair = peer.Primitives.getPrimitives().receiveEvent(ClientService2DataTable.gid,”temp10s”,instance);
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//check if a fault has been raised during the waiting period of this receiveEvent and returns if one has been
raised
if(instance.isStopped() || tempPair == null) return;
ClientService2DataTable.temp10s = (Input) tempPair.getSecond();
ClientService2DataTable.caller temp = (CallerID) tempPair.getFirst();
//check if the informationHandler main command isn’t terminated or if a fault was raised
if(instance.isFinished() || instance.isStopped()) return;
36
//starts the thread which executes the receiveEvent’s command
ClientService2IH11Branch1Cmd ClientService2ih11b1cmd = new ClientService2IH11Branch1Cmd(instance);
ClientService2ih11b1cmd.start();
}
}
public LimeAgentMgr getMgr() {
return getParent().getMgr();
}
46 }
InformationHandler branch 1’s command
import lime.ILimeAgent;
import lime.LimeAgentMgr;
import lime.LimeThread;
4 import java.util.Vector;
import java.util.Iterator;
import peer.*;
import peer.managers.services.*;
import sMoLTranslated.*;
import utils.*;
import utils.exceptions.*;
import utils.ids.*;
public class ClientService2IH11Branch1Cmd extends LimeThread implements ILimeAgent{
14
public InformationHandler instance;
public ClientService2IH11Branch1Cmd(InformationHandler p){
instance = p ;
}
public void run(){
//a temp Pair variable is declared in order to use primitive’s return composed type (having more than one
value)
//it is a temporary variable which purpose is to save the primitive’s return value into the output specified in
the xml
24 Pair tempPair = null;
//empty operation
}
public LimeAgentMgr getMgr() {
return getParent().getMgr();
}
}
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Appendix C
CoMA paper
Part of Chapter 4 has been published as a paper “Secure P2P programming on top of tuple
spaces” at the Workshop on Coordination Models and Applications: Knowledge in Pervasive
Environments (CoMA) held at the 17th IEEE International Workshops on Enabling Technolo-
gies: Infrastructures for Collaborative Enterprises (June 2008). We presented this paper in
Rome on June 2008, the 24th. The paper is given in the following six pages.
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Secure P2P programming on top of tuple spaces∗
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(1) Department of Computer Science, University of Pisa, Italy
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Abstract
A new programming model for secure (embedded) peer-
to-peer systems has been recently proposed in the context
of the European project SMEPP. In this paper we present
the design and implementation of such a model on top of
tuple spaces. More precisely, we show how the SMEPP
service-oriented interaction primitives can be effectively
implemented using SecureLime.
Keywords: Peer-to-peer systems, tuple spaces.
1 Introduction and motivations
The flexibility of the peer-to-peer model allows the de-
sign of scalable and robust applications in many situations
where a client-server approach is not suited, especially in
those situations provided by mobile ad hoc networks where
devices dynamically join and leave networks whose topol-
ogy is not known in advance. The drawback of such a flexi-
bility is a harder management of device discovery and coor-
dination. However, since many low-level issues occurring
in developing peer-to-peer systems are recurrent, various
middleware solutions (e.g., JXTA [9]) have been deployed
in order to ease the development of peer to peer applications
by abstracting from those issues. One such middleware, es-
pecially targeted at enabling secure peer to peer communi-
cation between embedded systems, is currently under devel-
opment in the SMEPP (Secure Middleware for Embedded
Peer-To-Peer Systems) European project [3].
The SMEPP middleware is based on a service-oriented
model allowing a dynamic integration of functionalities as
devices get connected to the network. It is focused on se-
curity, so that SMEPP services will be easily provided and
used with security guarantees that would be hard and incon-
venient to achieve at application level.
To experiment the effectiveness of the interaction model
designed for the SMEPP middleware, we have developed a
prototype implementation of its functionalities. In this pa-
per, we describe the design and implementation of such a
∗Work partly supported by the SMEPP project EU-FP6-IST 0333563.
prototype which has been built on top of tuple spaces. The
idea of experimenting whether tuple spaces can provide a
suitable basis to implement the SMEPP middleware has two
main motivations. On the one hand, the abstract coordina-
tion model featured by tuple spaces has proven to notably
ease the specification of complex distributed heterogeneous
systems. On the other hand, the generative communication
featured by tuple spaces can be seen as an enhancement
of the basic coordination mechanism offered by standard
data-centric storage techniques (e.g., distributed hash ta-
bles), which are indeed one of the key techniques employed
in peer-to-peer systems
The SMEPP features introduce new coordination chal-
lenges since we have to cope with service and group avail-
ability, random peer disconnection, etc. without a central
entity. As we will show in the following, the result of our
work shows how a coordination language such as Secure-
Lime [7] provides several mechanisms which make the im-
plementation of a realistic service model much easier.
Roughly speaking, the two main issues to be faced in or-
der to implement the SMEPP model on top of tuple spaces
are: (1) how to express SMEPP service-oriented aspects
(e.g., groups, services, communication a.s.o.), and (2) how
to suitably implement security aspects. The tuple space
based language we chose to implement the system is Se-
cureLime [7], an extension of the Lime coordination lan-
guage [11], that adds security properties to tuples and (fed-
erated) tuple spaces. As we will discuss in Section 3, we
exploited Lime features (such as generative communication
and federated tuple spaces) to implement service-oriented
aspects, and SecureLime specific features to implement se-
curity aspects.
In the following we present the key concepts of the
SMEPP model and an example of its use (Section 2), the
design and implementation of the tuple space based proto-
type (Section 3), and some concluding remarks (Section 4).
2 The SMEPP model for secure P2P pro-
gramming
We first introduce the key SMEPP concepts and the ab-
stract SMEPP primitives followed by an example.
// Peer Management
pId newPeer(creds)
pId getPeerId(id?)
pId[] getPeers(gId)
// Group Management
gId createGroup(grDescr) gId[] getGroups(grDescr?)
grDescr getGroupDescription(gId)
void joinGroup(gId, creds)
void leaveGroup(gId)
// Service Management
<gSId, pSId> publish(gId, contract)
void unpublish(pSId)
<gId, gSId, pSId>[]
–getServices(gId?, pId?, sContract?, maxRes?, creds)
sContract getServiceContract(id)
sessId startSession(sId)
// Message Handling
out? invoke(eId, opName, in?)
<cId, in?> receiveMessage(gId?, opName)
void reply(cId, opName, out?, fName?)
// Event Handling
void subscribe(evName?, gId?)
void unsubscribe(evName?, gId?)
void event(gId?, evName, in?)
<cId, in?> receiveEvent(gId?, evName)
Figure 1. SMEPP Primitives.
Key SMEPP Concepts and Primitives. The analysis of
current state-of-the-art models in P2P systems (see [1, 2,
4, 8, 9, 10]) reveals the fact that existing frameworks for
the development of P2P applications generally (i) do not
provide a simple, high-level service (interaction) model that
presents a suitable level of abstraction to ease the develop-
ment of P2P applications, or (ii) do not model key concepts
such as group-wise security, services offered both by peers
and groups, message and event-based communication.
The SMEPP service-oriented model aims to tackle such
limitations. It features a set of abstract primitives (see Fig-
ure 1), which can be used to develop P2P application speci-
fications in a simple, high-level manner. We aim at deploy-
ing such primitives as different (language dependent) APIs,
which will allow the deployment of SMEPP specifications
as real (executable) applications. The key SMEPP concepts
are:
Peers. Roughly, peers are service containers. A peer exe-
cutes a peer program built using the SMEPP primitives, and
it may create or join groups, and offer or invoke services, as
well as raise and receive events inside groups.
Groups. Groups are logical associations of peers, and they
provide a secure communication environment, and a scope
for published services. The SMEPP model offers security-
aware primitives for group creation and joining. Further-
more, all communications among peers and services (see
below) take place inside groups.
Services. Services have contracts and implementations. On
the one hand, a contract provides descriptive information on
a service (e.g., what the service does). On the other hand,
the implementation is the executable service (e.g., a Java
service). Peers publish services in groups. Furthermore,
service clients (viz., peers or other services) join groups
and either directly invoke a particular service provider, or
blindly invoke a group service. Furthermore, services could
invoke other services or peers and raise or receive events.
Communication Abstractions. Peers and services com-
municate by exchanging (data or fault) messages, or events.
Messages are used as input and output (possibly empty) for
services operations. On the one hand peers and services
raise events, on the other hand other peers and services can
subscribe to events of their interest and wait to receive them.
For further details on the SMEPP model please, see [3].
Temperature Monitoring Example. We present here a
simple example of using the primitives to model the be-
haviour of both peers and services. Roughly, the exam-
ple aims to describe the message-based interaction between
peers and services, and it shows (i) how to create peers and
groups, publish services, join groups, and (ii) how to di-
rectly invoke peer services, and how invocations of request-
response operations behave.
Suppose that a TempReaderPeer peer creates
a TempReaderGroup group in which it publishes
a TempReaderService service. TempReader-
Service defines a getTemp request-response operation
without input parameters, which (measures and) returns
the ambient temperature. Another peer, InvokerPeer,
joins the TempReaderGroup group, and then invokes the
getTemp operation of TempReaderService. Using
the SMEPP primitives one could implement the above sce-
nario as follows.
TempReaderPeer. The top of Figure 2 presents the
behaviour of TempReaderPeer using a pseudocode-
like notation. We use the opaque keyword to hide the
value assigned to a variable. TempReaderPeer first
registers itself as a new SMEPP peer, and then it cre-
ates the TempReaderGroup group. Following, it pub-
lishes TempReaderService in TempReaderGroup,
and then it continues processing (e.g., it could loop forever).
Note that the termination of the peer’s code implies the ter-
mination of TempReaderService, which is then unpub-
lished by the middleware from TempReaderGroup.
TempReaderService. The middle of Figure 2 presents
the behaviour of a state-less TempReaderService.
TempReaderService first waits to receive an invoca-
tion of the getTemp operation. Then, it measures the
temperature, and afterwards it replies to the invoker of
getTemp. The execution of TempReaderService ter-
minates after the reply.
InvokerPeer. The bottom of Figure 2 presents the be-
haviour of InvokerPeer. InvokerPeer first regis-
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// TempReaderPeer
myCredentials = opaque;
newPeer(myCredentials);
mySecurityInfo = opaque;
myGroupDescription = <“TempReaderGroup”,mySecurityInfo>;
tempGroupId = createGroup(myGroupDescription);
tempReaderServiceContract = opaque;
publish(tempGroupId, tempReaderServiceContract); ...
//TempReaderService
<callerId> = receiveMessage(“getTemp”);
temp = opaque;
reply(callerId, “getTemp”, temp);
//InvokerPeer
myCredentials = opaque;
newPeer(myCredentials);
desiredGroupDescription = <“TempReaderGroup”>;
gid[] = getGroups(desiredGroupDescription);
tempReaderServiceContract = opaque;
<groupId,tempReaderServiceGroupServiceId,
tempReaderServicePeerServiceId>[] = getServices(gid[0], tempReader-
ServiceContract, myCredentials);
joinGroup(groupId[0], myCredentials);
temp = invoke(tempReaderServicePeerServiceId[0], “getTemp”);
Figure 2. TempReaderPeer.
ters itself as a new SMEPP peer, and then it discovers
the group identifier of TempReaderGroup (viz., gid[0]),
as well as the peer service identifier of TempReader-
Service, which we assume it has been previously pub-
lished by TempReaderPeer into TempReaderGroup
(viz., tempServicePeerServiceId[0]1). We assume for sim-
plicity that InvokerPeer (partially) knows the contract
of TempReaderService. Next, InvokerPeer joins
TempReaderGroup, and then it invokes the getTemp
operation of TempReaderService. This invoca-
tion blocks waiting for the result of getTemp because
getTemp is a request-response operation. InvokerPeer
terminates after the invocation returns.
3 Implementing P2P systems with Secure-
Lime
As discussed in Section 2, the SMEPP models relies on
messages and events. Linda-like models, based on shared
data, can easily incorporate these features. This is partic-
ularly the case for the SecureLime model we have chosen.
To sustain this fact, Subsection 3.1 and Subsection 3.2 first
state the requirements for the implementation and explain
why SecureLime is an appropriate target language. Subsec-
tion 3.3 then provides an overview of our implementation.
3.1 Requirements
Following Section 2, the main requirements on the tar-
get language are as follows. [R1: Peer-to-peer orienta-
tion] As the SMEPP project is by essence peer-to-peer and
embedded devices oriented, we had to choose a language
1TempServicePeerServiceId[0] denotes the value of tempServicePeer-
ServiceId in <groupId, tempServiceGroupServiceId, tempServicePeer-
ServiceId, serviceContract>[0].
amenable to distributed implementations capable of man-
aging transient connection of peers. [R2: Available im-
plementation] The purpose of our work was to implement
the SMEPP service model by using a Linda-like language,
not to make a new implementation of an existing language.
Having an executable language gives us the opportunity to
prove the service model is usable in a real environment.
[R3: Security] SMEPP defines a configurable model of
security which, by default, uses symmetric keys to man-
age access rights: one preshared symmetric key to access
a SMEPP application (i.e. to become a SMEPP peer) and
one preshared symmetric key for each group. In addition to
access control, SMEPP defines group and service visibility
restrictions. A peer can only discover groups and services
of which it has the corresponding key. The use of preshared
symmetric keys prevents the implementation to be able to
expel maliciously behaving peers (in other words, autho-
rised peers are assumed to be well behaved during its whole
life). [R4: Java-integrability] Since the reference imple-
mentation of the SMEPP project will be Java-based, we de-
cided to develop our implementation using Java, in order
to have useful feedback from our proof-of-concept. So we
needed a middleware providing Java integrability.
3.2 Choice of a Linda-based language, Se-
cureLime
Our first concern was to choose a convenient language on
top of which to develop an implementation for the SMEPP
service model. Our approach was to firstly identify the
fundamental requirements, then we explored various well-
known Linda-like languages to make our final choice. Our
analysis lead us to choose SecureLime[7].
Lime (Linda In a Mobile Environment [11]) is a model
and a middleware extending Linda with transiently shared
tuple spaces. For instance, let peer A and peer B have both
two shared tuple spaces, A owns X and Y, while B owns Y
and Z. As soon as A and B get connected, the two instances
of Y are merged into a federated one because they have
the same name. Mainly the goal of Lime is to provide an
application framework to coordinate mobile agents, which
is of great interest in the SMEPP context. SecureLime[7]
extends Lime by adding security properties to it. It adds
access control on both tuple space and tuple level.
[R1] SecureLime perfectly meets the first requirement
[R1] since it provides a completely decentralised architec-
ture where every agent is only responsible for its shared
data. This means that when disconnecting, agent’s data gets
unavailable to others, but the rest of the system stays un-
changed. It fits really well with the offering and discovery
of services in SMEPP. For instance, if a service offered by a
peer is represented by a tuple in its Interface Tuple Space2,
2An ITS is the agent’s local part of the federated tuple space.
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in case of disconnection this tuple will become unavail-
able for others, so no peer can discover this service any-
more. This feature also simplifies the group management in
SMEPP as we will explain in the following subsection.
[R2] SecureLime provides an open-source implemen-
tation, complete and well-documented. This makes it a
good candidate for our purposes since our aim is to avoid
reinventing the wheel and implement a secure tuple space
model from scratch. Moreover, one of the interesting fea-
tures provided by the implementation is a fake GPS allow-
ing to simulate physical disconnections of peers. As easily
noted by the reader, these features meet requirement R2.
[R3] SecureLime offers two levels of access right con-
trol, one restricting access to tuple spaces and the other
restricting access to tuples. The federation mechanism of
Lime is modified in such a way that two tuple spaces are
merged only if they were created using the same name and
the same password. At the tuple level, SecureLime pro-
vides two special tuple fields, Pr and Pw: one enabling a
peer to read the tuple only if it knows the Pr field value
and the other one enabling a peer to remove the tuple only
if it knows the Pw field value. The former turned out to
be useful for managing access to the SMEPP world and
groups. The latter is used to manage visibility of groups
and services. With regards to the SMEPP security require-
ment [R3], SecureLime is fitting really well because it of-
fers password based encryption which can be mapped di-
rectly to the SMEPP symmetric keys. This kind of security
made the authentication of peers into the SMEPP applica-
tion really easy, as we will explain in details later.
[R4] Furthermore, the implementation is entirely Java-
based, which meets the last requirement [R4].
Some other Linda-like models and middlewares have
been considered as potential candidates. Some of them
were not implemented (e.g, SecSpaces), and so, even if in-
teresting got automatically discarded. Other implemented
models were discarded because they failed to meet some
requirements (e.g., both JavaSpaces and TSpace rely on a
centralised architecture, provide limited security and are not
open source).
3.3 Overview of the implementation
We will describe here the key concepts of our implemen-
tation. This will be done in three steps. The first one shows
how the SMEPP basic concepts are modelled using Lime
ones. This leads to the second step, which enriches this
model with security by using SecureLime security primi-
tives. Finally, we will present two typical use cases of the
primitives with a scenario based on the example in Section
2.
High-level design. An important part of SMEPP is the
discovery of services and groups. In our implementation,
this is done by using two tuple spaces, playing the role of
service (SD) and group (GD) directories. The tuples con-
tained in these two tuple spaces constitute respectively a list
of service descriptions and a list of group descriptions. So,
to search for a group or a service we use a read operation
on the right tuple space.
A peer is mapped to a Lime Agent3 which has two de-
fault tuple spaces4 : the SD and the GD tuple spaces de-
scribed above. When a peer wants to create or join a group
G, it has to: (i) create a group tuple space G, (ii) put a tu-
ple describing G in GD, and (iii) put a tuple in G to update
the group membership list. A group is a set of peers which
have executed these three actions. The members of a same
group G use the group tuple space to communicate, as it
will be illustrated in the scenarios below. A service can be
discovered through its description-tuple5 (providing its con-
tract and IDs). As for the service implementation, a service
is simply a Java-based process using our API. Basically, an
event is modelled by the release of a tuple in a group tuple
space G. In order to receive an event (receiveEvent(.)
primitive), a peer creates a new Lime reaction [11] waiting
for a tuple corresponding to the right event-tuple.
Security design. The security aspects of our implemen-
tation have been addressed by using the SecureLime’s ex-
tensions of Lime. According to the SMEPP guidelines: (i)
every peer has an AppKey password granting access to a
SMEPP application, (ii) every peer has a set of passwords
(GKeys) granting access to groups.
In order to prevent illegal peers to get access to the
SMEPP application, the directory tuple spaces (SD and GD)
are protected using SecureLime secured tuple spaces with
AppKey as password. This way, every data passing through
these tuple spaces is encrypted with AppKey.
Note that if the peer does not provide the right password
at peer creation (newPeer(.) primitive), it will not get
a fault message. Actually, it will create isolated directories
(since the secured tuple spaces do not merge if they do not
have the same password, thanks to the SecureLime federa-
tion mechanism). Furthermore, if an illegal peer creates a
group, legal peers will not be able to see it since they will
not share the same directories.
To ensure that every peer sees only groups and services
matching its credentials, we had to prevent the tuples inside
the directories from being visible to everyone. SecureLime
made this task pretty easy. It suffices to use the password of
the group as read-password, so a peer is only able to see a
3A Lime Agent is a Java-based process using the Lime API [11].
4Created by the execution of newPeer(.).
5Which is placed after a publish(.) call in SD.
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group or service description if it has the password matching
the group or service visibility.
To restrict the access to a group, we protect the secured
tuple space representing the group with the GKey corre-
sponding to it. So when a peer tries to join a group, if it
provides the right password, the newly created tuple space
will be merged with the federated one. Otherwise, it will
get an empty tuple space, as in the case of a newPeer(.)
call with an incorrect password.
3.3.1 Scenarios.
The following scenarios illustrate how to map parts of
the example found in Section 2 to the SecureLime API.
Firstly, we will describe how the getGroups(.) and the
joinGroup(.), which are called by InvokerPeer, work.
Then we will describe how the invocation of the getTemp
operation is translated in our API.
The first scenario makes the assumptions that the peers
share the AppKey and the password to get access to temp-
GroupId, GKey in the following. In Figure 3, only one
group (tempGroupId) has been created (by TempReader-
Peer), so a tuple referencing it exists in GD. This tuple con-
tains the name of the group, its ID and the reference owner.
It is read-protected by GKey and remove-protected by trp-
Pwd6. There is also a membership-tuple for TempReader-
Peer in tempGroupId. This one contains the peer’s ID7.
The second scenario illustrates the invocation of the
TempReaderService service. Figure 4 shows that both
peers are members of the tempGroupId group since they
have the tempGroupId tuple space, the reference-tuple and
the membership-tuple. TempReaderPeer has published the
TempReaderService service, so there is a tuple in SD con-
taining the service contract, the peer service ID (TRS-
PSID), the group service ID (TRS-GSID), the group in
which it has been published and the provider. It is read-
protected by GKey and remove-protected by trpPwd, a pass-
word generated by TempReaderPeer.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we described a running prototype imple-
mentation of the SMEPP primitives using SecureLime [7].
We consider the experiment was successful as the imple-
mentation complies with the SMEPP objectives and re-
quirements [12]. Furthermore, this work showed how a
real world service model can be implemented using a tu-
ple space coordination language. We argue the paper fea-
tures the following main contributions. Firstly, we provide
6The last two fields of every tuple are respectively the read and remove-
password. Here trpPwd (which has been securely generated by the peer)
is used to ensure that only the tuple’s owner can remove it.
7The symbol # means that no password is used.
1. InvokerPeer invokes getGroups(desiredGroupDescription,
myCredentials) to discover which groups it can join. To do this, it performs
a read operation on the federated GD tuple space using GKey as read-password.
InvokerPeer gets the only tuple containing the group name and its ID which are the
needed information to join the group later.
2. InvokerPeer invokes joinGroup(groupId[0],myCredentials) which
creates the new SecureLimeTupleSpace object, representing the tempGroupId group
tuple space. The peer has to use the group ID (groupId[0]) and the password corre-
sponding to it (GKey). Since the two tempGroupId tuple spaces have the same name
and password, they automatically merge to create a federated tuple space.
3. joinGroup(.) continues by putting a reference-tuple describing the group in
the GD tuple space. This step ensures that the group will be kept alive as long as the
group contains at least one member. This tuple differs from TempReaderPeer’s one
by the remove-password field (ipPwd) and the field expressing the tuple owner.
4. The last step of joinGroup(.) consists of putting the peer “membership-tuple”
into the tempGroupId tuple space.
Figure 3. Group management.
an extension of SecureLime with the SMEPP programming
model that offers a simple high-level API supporting the
definition of: peer and service code, peer groups, group-
wise security, synchronous and asynchronous message pat-
terns (one-to-one, direct or blind operation invocations),
event-based communication (one-to-many). Then, we have
created a proof-of-concept prototype implementation of the
SMEPP model that can be used to test/simulate interactions
of peers and services. This implementation differs from the
ones presented in [6] and [5], mainly because our service
model features many more coordination concepts. In [6]
and [5] only client, server and service are offered, while in
the SMEPP service model groups, events and sessions are
provided. However, service discovery is handled in a simi-
lar way, using a tuple space as repository.
We selected SecureLime for implementation based on
the assessment of several tuple space-based coordination
models with respect to SMEPP key requirements. Secure-
Lime fulfills such requirements, and it also provides fea-
tures such as federated (password-protected) tuple spaces,
or read/remove tuple passwords. These features allowed us
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1. InvokerPeer calls invoke(tempReaderServicePeerServiceId[0],-
’’getTemp’’) which firstly puts an “invocation-tuple” into TempReaderPeer’s
local tempGroupId tuple space. This tuple contains the operation name (getTemp)
and its parameters (empty here), the service ID (here the peer service ID contained in
tempReaderServicePeerServiceId[0]) and the ID of the caller.
2. Since invoke(.)’s execution must be blocked until the provider has done a
receiveMessage(.), InvokerPeer will perform a (blocking) in operation, wait-
ing for the “reply-tuple” related to the getTemp operation.
3. When receiveMessage(groupId,"getTemp") is called by TempReader-
Service, it retrieves an “invocation-tuple” from the local tuple space of its container
(TempReaderPeer) by doing a in operation on it. The template of this operation con-
tains only the operation name (getTemp).
4. Here the service actually executes the operation.
5. TempReaderService calls reply(.) which puts a “reply-tuple” into the local
tempGroupId tuple space of InvokerPeer (getTemp caller). This tuple contains the
operation name, the caller ID, the operation result and a possible fault. This last
action will unblock the invoker’s execution.
Figure 4. Service invocation.
to successfully model all SMEPP key concepts. However,
a limitation of SecureLime is that it does not provide a way
to change “on-the-fly” the tuple space passwords. Conse-
quently, the developer has to deal with this issue at the ap-
plication level.
We have also defined a SMEPP specification language
(SMoL [3]), which allow one to orchestrate SMEPP primi-
tives into complex behaviour (e.g., using sequential, paral-
lel, choice, or event and fault handler operators). SMoL
is meant to assist the SMEPP developer into (semi-
automatically) generating peer or service code. Further-
more, such a language enables the formal analysis of the be-
haviour of peers and services, and of their interactions [3].
We have implemented a SMoL2Java translator (which gen-
erates Java code from a SMoL specification) and we have
integrated it with our implementation based on SecureLime.
The resulting prototype produces executable Java code that
runs on top of SecureLime starting from a SMoL descrip-
tion of the behaviour of a peer or service8. Unfortunately,
space limitations do not allow us to describe the details of
the translation here.
Beyond the above mentioned limitations due to the re-
strictions of the current SecureLime release, our prototype
8The proof-of-concept prototype can be downloaded from
http://www.smepp.org/Downloads.aspx. Note however that the us-
age of the prototype requires an understanding of SMoL and of the
SMoL2Java translator.
only features a basic mechanism for the discovery of service
contracts based on the syntactic matching of tuples.
Our planned next step is to thoroughly experiment the
prototype in order to engineer the implementation. We also
intend to overcome the present limitations, and to experi-
ment the implementation of an enhanced security mecha-
nism based on session keys.
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